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ABSTRACT

This revised handbook is intended to assist representatives of the media, teachers, students, business executives, government officials, and anyone else interested in increasing their understanding of China. Chapter one, "Learning More About China," is an annotated listing of materials treating current events in China, bibliographies of scholarly resources, handbooks, travel guides, and teacher resources. Chapters two through eight treat various topics and contain brief introductions to the chapter's topic, chronologies, biographies, tables, and suggested readings. Chapter two gives a brief description of "The Land and the People" describing the physical environment, economic potential, and human and political geography. The "History of the Chinese Revolution" is the topic of Chapter three. Chapter four examines "China After Mao." "Foreign Relations and National Defense" are the topics of chapter five. Chapter six deals with "Economic Development and Foreign Trade." Chapter seven discusses "Material Welfare, Education, and Public Health." The handbook concludes with a discussion of "Daily Life" in Chapter eight. An appendix contains a Romanization Conversion Table. (Author/RM)

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THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

A BASIC HANDBOOK

Second Edition

U S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

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FOREWORD

As Harold Isaacs has reminded us in the preface of the most recent edition of Scratches on Our Minds, the American people have long exhibited a mercurial attitude towards China. Rarely indifferent, the dominant mood has shifted, like a vast pendulum, from one extreme to the other.

These rapid changes in American perceptions of China are, at least in part, a reflection of the limited knowledge which most Americans have of the world's largest country, its contemporary institutions, and its rich cultural heritage. Until we are able to broaden the base of informed understanding of China, it will be difficult to supplant the mercurial American attitude with one rooted in realistic knowledge and sympathetic, but not uncritical, awareness of Chinese society.

The last four decades of US-China relations reflect all too vividly these swings of the pendulum. From the warm friendship and support accorded a wartime ally fighting bravely to repulse a totalitarian invader in the first half of the 1940s, the American posture towards China had changed, by the end of that decade, to one of extreme hostility. Americans even had the temerity of accusing one another of "losing" China, as though another sovereign country was ours to keep or lose under any circumstances.

There followed two decades of isolation, during which the extreme hostility of the early 1950s gradually mellowed to the poiint of cold indifference. Then followed President Nixon's dramatic journey to Beijing in 1972, and the pendulum began a downward swing in the other direction.

At first the pendulum moved slowly -- indeed to some observers (both Chinese and American), almost imperceptibly, the bold and hopeful language of the Shanghai Communique notwithstanding. But gradually it began to gather momentum and was greatly accelerated by the normalization of US-China relations in December 1978.

In an effort to diminish these mercurial swings in national mood, both education and the mass media have much to contribute to more informed public understanding of China by the American people. The media, with their enormous capacity for outreach, communicate to tens of millions of Americans an awareness of those volcanic peaks of activity when the media's threshold of "excitability" has been crossed. The task of education is to provide that deeper understanding of the events, processes, and institutions which connect these volcanic peaks and cause them to erupt from time to time.

This handbook reflects a confluence of both streams of public understanding of China. In 1975 the China Council of The Asia Society assembled a set of briefing materials to assist the media in covering President Ford's December 1975 visit to the People's Republic. It soon became apparent to the Council that the biographies of Chinese leaders, maps, several chronologies, glossary, and judiciously selected bibliography would have usefulness to those who wanted to enlarge their knowledge of contemporary China much beyond the transitory attention generated by a presidential visit. This publication was widely distributed and used in college and university courses on China, US foreign policy, and international relations, as well as secondary school and adult education courses and programs.

The wisdom of this judgment was soon confirmed. The first edition of People's Republic of China: Press Briefing Materials was exhausted, and a second revised edition -- updated to reflect subsequent leadership shifts and political developments -- was issued in the latter part of 1976. This edition likewise soon became exhausted.

The basic idea by then having been validated, we decided to move to a greatly increased coverage and a more substantial handbook format. The first edition of the handbook appeared in the spring of 1979 and was again soon exhausted, leading to this second edition a year later.

The present handbook is an expanded and updated version of the earlier publications but its purpose remains the same -- to provide in concise form authoritative information, based on the latest scholarship, to assist representatives of the media, teachers, students, business executives, government officials, and anyone else interested in increasing their understanding of the world's most populous country.

We are glad to have the opportunity to publish The People's Republic of China: A Basic Handbook in cooperation with the China Council of The Asia Society, under whose auspices it was compiled by Professor James Townsend of the University of Washington and Richard Bush of the China Council. The Council on International and Public Affairs is committed to the Jeffersonian principle that when the people are fully informed, they will reach right decisions on the great public questions of the day, and toward that end CIPA maintains an active interest in strengthening American mass media coverage of international affairs. Reflecting a similar commitment, the China Council conducts an extensive program of high quality to increase public understanding of China, both nationally and locally through its regional affiliates across the country. A central element in this program is its work with the mass media, electronic as well as print, in helping to improve media coverage of China.

The China Council has been a major factor in preparing the Ameican people for the new phase in US-China relations into which we are now entering. The durability of this phase of US-China friendship and cooperation will depend in no small measure on the extent to which the China Council and the educational institutions and media organizations with which it works are able to replace the vacillating American attitudes of the past with those based on knowledge and realistic understanding of China and the Chinese people.

Ward Morehouse, President
Council on International and
Public Affairs

New York
September 30, 1980

PREFACE

The China Council of The Asia Society was established in 1975 to foster greater American understanding of China and US-China relations. Since then it has created across the country a network of regional councils which develop programs to meet local needs. It has also sponsored a number of educational materials for general and specialized audiences. This handbook is among them, and we hope that college students, high school teachers, business executives, and journalists among others will find it useful. The National Endowment for the Humanities, The Henry Luce Foundation, The Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and The Rockefeller Foundation provide generous support for the Council's efforts.

Though relatively young as organizations go, the China Council is both part and beneficiary of a long tradition. For many years, China specialists both inside and outside universities have made public education one of their primary professional responsibilities. Probably because of the special and sometimes tragic role China has played in American life, they have contributed uncommon energy to enlighten rather than heat public attitudes. Their compensation has never done justice to their sacrifice.

Such a commitment is certainly not absent in other fields of international studies. The China field is somewhat unusual in that public education work has taken more overt organizational forms -- first the National Committee on US-China Relations and now the China Council. Moreover, this effort has had a regional dimension, addressing the educational needs of local audiences. Still, the voluntary contributions of specialists have been crucial to this organizational process.

James Townsend is but one example of China specialists' commitment to public education. Long active in public education work in the Washington area, he supported the China Council from its inception and played a seminal role in the creation and active work of the Seattle Regional China Council. This handbook was developed from materials he prepared for his students at the University of Washington. And he went several extra miles in preparing them for publication in the handbook's first edition. Whatever the worth of this publication, it is due in large measure to him.

The China Council depends heavily on other international education organizations. By collaborating with them, it multiplies the effects of its own efforts. In this regard, the Council is deeply grateful to Ward Morehouse and the Council on International and Public Affairs and its affiliated organizations. Without them, it would be impossible to make this handbook available in a usable format and at a reasonable price. Special thanks go to Cynthia Morehouse for her consistently valuable editorial skills, to Gordon Woodside of Pageprint Systems, and to Milton Buschhoff of Learning Resources in International Studies.

There are other individuals whose efforts should not go unrecognized. Harlan Jencks, Robert Weiss, Dorothy Margolis, and Arlene Cavanaugh assisted Jim Townsend in the selection and preparation of many materials included herein. Jonathan Daen of the China Council staff was indispensable in the compilation and preparation of this edition. Other colleagues at The Asia Society's Washington Center -- Robert Oxnam, Terry Lautz, Margaret Sullivan, Daisey Kwoh, Judith Sloan, Elizabeth Nichols, and Lisa Swanberg, all helped in a multitude of ways. Harry Harding suggested a number of improvements. I alone am responsible for any errors that remain.

Richard C. Bush
China Council of The Asia Society

Washington, D. C.
December 1980

A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION

Chinese proper names in this volume are rendered in the pinyin system of romanization (the only exceptions are the conventional renderings for Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek). The People's Republic of China has used this system in its foreign language publications since January 1, 1979, and most American publishers subsequently adopted it.

Many readers will be more familiar with renderings of the traditional systems -- Postal Atlas for place names and Wade-Giles for personal names and other words. To reduce confusion, the old forms of the best known names appear parenthetically in the text at appropriate places. The appendix (pages 111-112) gives old and new forms for all words. Below are guidelines on how to pronounce words rendered in pinyin (Wade-Giles equivalents are in parentheses).

How to Pronounce Pinyin

a (a):	as in far
b (p):	as in baby
c (ts):	as "ts" in its
ch (ch'):	as "ch" in church, strongly aspirated
d (t):	as in do
e (e):	1) as "er" in her, the "r" being silent 2) as in yes in the "ie" dipthong 3) as in way in the "ei" dipthong
f (f):	as in foot
g (k):	as in go
h (h):	as in her, strongly aspirated
i (i):	1) as in eat 2) as in sir in syllables beginning with c, ch, r, s, sh, z, zh
j (ch):	as in jeep
k (k'):	as in kind, strongly aspirated
l (l):	as in land
m (m):	as in me
n (n):	as in no
o (o):	as "aw" in law
p (p'):	as in par, strongly aspirated
q (ch'):	as "ch" in cheek
r (j):	as "r" but not rolled, or like "z" in azure
s (s, ss, sz):	as in sister
sh (sh):	as "sh" in shore
t (t'):	as in top, strongly aspirated
u (u):	1) as in too 2) as in the French "u" in "tu" or the German umlauted "u" in "Muenchen"
w (w):	as in want

x (hs): as "sh" in she
y (y): as in yet
z (ts,tz): as in zero
zh (ch): as "j" in jump

N.B. The apostrophe in pinyin indicates syllable division in words where there might be confusion as to the proper division. In Wade-Giles the apostrophe indicates aspiration of the preceding consonant.

I. LEARNING MORE ABOUT CHINA

Anyone wishing to learn more about China is blessed with an excess of riches. Extensive and varied materials exist on most subjects; each type of source has its strengths and weaknesses. Succeeding chapters provide suggestions for further reading on the topic concerned. This chapter outlines how to get access to the general categories of information available.

1. Current Events -- External Sources

Newspapers and newsmagazines are a basic source of information on contemporary China. The national press -- *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, and *Newsweek* -- all have correspondents in Beijing who provide regular coverage of Chinese politics and social life for their own publications and, through their news services, a number of other newspapers as well. However, their coverage is inevitably thin on certain subjects, and should be supplemented with periodicals focusing on Chinese and Asian affairs, such as the following:

The Asia Mail. Published monthly in Alexandria, VA. Includes frequent articles on China and a calendar of China-related events in the United States.

Asian Survey. Published monthly by the University of California Press, Berkeley. Contains frequent articles on China. The January issue each year surveys events in China during the previous year.

China Briefing. Published annually by Westview Press in collaboration with the China Council of The Asia Society. Contains background essays on recent trends in Chinese politics, economics, foreign policy, culture, and society, written originally for American journalists by prominent China specialists.

China Business Review. Published bimonthly by the National Council for US-China Trade, Washington, DC. Provides an exhaustive review of developments in the Chinese economy and Chinese trade with the US and other countries, plus articles on topics of interest to businessmen.

China Exchange News. Formerly *China Exchange Newsletter*. Published bimonthly by the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, Washington, DC. Comprehensive review of scholarly developments in China and of US-China academic exchanges. Includes an excellent bibliography of recent articles and books on contemporary China.

The China Quarterly. Published quarterly in London. The leading Western journal of contemporary China studies, with scholarly articles and book reviews. Each issue contains a valuable chronology and documentary review of the previous quarter.

CIA Reference Aids. Unclassified Central Intelligence Agency charts, statistical compendia, directories, and reports on the Chinese economy and other topics, published on an occasional basis. Information about items dated before February 1, 1979 is available from the Documents Expediting Project, Exchange and Gifts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC 20540; photocopies are available from the Library of Congress's Photo Duplication Service. Items dated after February 1, 1979 can be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Far Eastern Economic Review. Published weekly in Hong Kong. Similar to an American weekly newsmagazine, but with an emphasis on economic affairs. Very good for up-to-date reporting on China. Publishes an annual Yearbook with survey articles and forecasts, accompanied by considerable statistical data.

Issues and Studies. Published monthly in Taipei by the Institute of International Relations, National Political University. Features documents acquired by Nationalist agents on the Chinese mainland.

Modern China. Published quarterly in Beverly Hills, CA. A scholarly journal, more historically oriented, but with many articles on current affairs.

Notes from the National Committee. Published quarterly by the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc., New York, NY. A review of US-China exchanges as well as new developments in US-China relations.

2. Current Events -- Materials from China in English

An enormous amount of material from the PRC is available in English translation, most of it falling into two categories: publications in English from the Foreign Languages Press in Beijing; and English translations of Chinese radio broadcasts, newspaper and periodical articles, books, and so on. Publications from China have a public relations purpose, but in the last few years, even these have been remarkably candid about some of China's problems. Other translations are voluminous but very useful, and constitute one major source for scholars and journalists analyzing developments in China.

What follows are the most prominent examples of each type of source.

a) Publications of Foreign Languages Press. China Books and Periodicals, Inc., the PRC's US distributor for publications, is the easiest point of access for this material. Periodic catalogues of books, pamphlets, maps, tourist guides, posters, and other items, and subscriptions for periodicals are available from CB&P's three offices:

East Coast Center
125 Fifth Ave.
New York, NY 10003
212/677-2650

Midwest Center
174 Randolph St.
Chicago, IL 60601
312/782-6004

West Coast Center
2929 24th Street
San Francisco, CA 94110
415/282-2994

China publishes a large number of periodicals in English, with more expected in the future. The most prominent are:

Beijing Review (weekly; formerly Peking Review). Extremely valuable for anyone interested in contemporary China. Includes translations of major articles, editorials, documents, and government statements that have appeared in the Chinese press, plus feature articles on important issues and controversies in Chinese society.

China Pictorial (monthly). Quality color photography and short articles.

China Reconstructs (monthly). Feature articles and photos on life in the PRC.

Chinese Literature (monthly). Short stories, poems, and novellas from both the traditional and modern periods. Literature is currently one of the principal modes of personal expression in China, and so is an excellent way to "get inside" contemporary Chinese life.

b) English-Language Translation Services. The major serial translations of Chinese materials are voluminous and expensive. Their titles, coverage, and distribution patterns have changed frequently. Most users consult them -- preferably with the help of a librarian or experienced user -- in libraries that maintain special collections of such materials. However, the sources listed below open many windows on the entire history of the PRC. Consequently, they are indispensable to anyone desiring a deeper understanding.

US Consulate-General, Hong Kong. From the 1950s to October 1977, the Hong Kong consulate offered four principal translation series, with varying titles:

Current Background (irregular topical document collections)
Survey of People's Republic of China Magazines (formerly Survey of Chinese Mainland Magazines)
Survey of People's Republic of China Press (formerly Survey of Chinese Mainland Press)
Index (to the above items)

This service was discontinued in 1977, but the material covered was divided among the various serials of the next two translation services. Their distribution is handled by the National Technical Information Service, US Department of Commerce, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report: People's Republic of China. Distributed every working day; contains translations of Chinese radio broadcasts and some newspaper and periodical articles. Annual subscription, $150.

Joint Publications Research Service. Has distributed several serial and monograph translations under various titles since 1957. Two of the most important are Translations on the PRC and Red Flag Magazine. (Red Flag [Hongqi] is the official monthly theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee.)

M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 901 No. Broadway, White Plains, NY 10603. Publishes several quarterly journals of Chinese documents in translation, and initiates many other documentary and book translation projects. The journals are:

Chinese Economic Studies
Chinese Education
Chinese Law and Government
Chinese Sociology and Anthropology
Chinese Studies in History
Chinese Studies in Literature
Chinese Studies in Philosophy

3. Bibliographies for Scholarly Resources

The past fifteen years has seen a flood of scholarly works on China. These draw on archives of Chinese-language sources, translated material, interviews with emigres in Hong Kong, and travel and field research in China. Maintaining control over this avalanche is not easy, even for the specialist. Most of the items listed below are already dated; information about current books and periodicals is most easily found in Focus on Asian Studies (see section 6 below), in the bibliography section of China Exchange News, and in the book review section of China Quarterly (see section 1 above). For recent books on Chinese history, see the book review section of Journal of Asian Studies, published by the Association for Asian Studies.

Major bibliographies include:

Association for Asian Studies. Bibliography of Asian Studies. Annual comprehensive citation of publications (books, articles, monographs) in Western and Asian languages, organized by country and topics with extensive entries on China.

Blair, Patricia. Development in the People's Republic of China: A Selected Bibliography. Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1976. A topically organized list of about 400 publications on political, economic, and social developments in the PRC, most written in the early 1970s. Includes an introductory essay on Chinese development strategies by A. Doak Barnett.

Nathan, Andrew J. Modern China, 1840-1972: An Introduction to Sources and Research Aids. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1973. Designed as a guide for graduate student research, but generally useful for all advanced students of China.

Posner, Arlene, and deKeijzer, Arne J., eds. China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide. 2nd revised edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. An excellent guide for the general teacher or student. Contains essays on teaching about China, an annotated review of curriculum units and audio visual materials, and a selective annotated bibliography organized by topic.

Shulman, Frank J., and Gordon, Leonard H.J., eds. Doctoral Dissertations on China, 1945-70. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972. And Shulman, Frank J. Doctoral Dissertations on China, 1971-75. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978.

The above items identify other bibliographies and reference works. There are three specialized bibliographies which are particularly useful for background on contemporary Chinese affairs and US-China relations prior to 1973:

Dial, Roger. Studies on Chinese External Affairs: An Instructional Bibliography of Commonwealth and American Literature. Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Policy Studies, 1973.

McCutcheon, James M. China and America: A Bibliography of Interactions, Domestic and Foreign. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1972.

Oksenberg, Michel C., et al. A Bibliography of Secondary English Language Literature on Contemporary Chinese Politics. New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1970.

4. Handbooks

Several handbooks exist that provide comprehensive surveys of the PRC. They are:

Hinton, Harold. The People's Republic of China: A Handbook. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979.

Kaplan, Frederic M., et al. Encyclopedia of China Today. 2nd edition. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.

Scherer, John L., ed. China Facts and Figures Annual. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1978. Available from P.O. Box 555, Gulf Breeze, FL 32561.

Wu, Yuan-li. China: A Handbook. New York: Praeger, 1973.

5. Travel Guides

Going to China is an obvious way of learning more. Three guidebooks are especially effective in making the tourist experience more worthwhile:

deKeijzer, Arne J., and Kaplan, Frederic M. China Guidebook: 1980/81 Edition. New York: Eurasia Press, 1980. Very thorough; especially good on the problems and opportunities of China travel.

Destenay, Anne L. Nagel's Encyclopedic Guide to China. Geneva: Nagel Publishers, 1979. Quite expensive, but very useful for the connoisseur of museums, monuments, and palaces.

Fodor's People's Republic of China. New York: David McKay Co., 1979.

6. For the Teacher

The Education Department of The Asia Society has embarked on a comprehensive survey to identify recent scholarship on China useful to upper elementary and secondary school educators. The ultimate product -- an annotated bibliography of available literature on China, selected readings, and suggested classroom strategies -- will help bridge the gap between the picture of China presented in textbooks and the current reality. (The Asia Society's current address is 112 East 64th Street, New York, NY 10022. After March 1, 1981, the address will be 70th and Park, New York, NY 10022.)

Other resources already in print include the following:

China Update. St. Paul, MN: Midwest China Study Resource Center (308 Gullixson Hall, 2375 Como Avenue West, St. Paul, MN 55108).

Monthly newsletter. Provides brief review of recent events in China; ideal for the primary or secondary school teacher.

Focus on Asian Studies. Columbus: Ohio State University Service Center for Teachers of Asian Studies (29 West Woodruff Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210). Reviews new resources for teaching about Asia; very useful for primary and secondary school teachers as a supplement to the following item.

Posner, Arlene, and deKeijzer, Arne J., eds. China: A Resource and Curriculum Guide. 2nd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. See entry in section 3.

II. THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

Chinese leaders throughout the twentieth century have shared the goal of building a strong and prosperous country. And sooner or later they have had to come to grips with the limits to economic growth posed by China's physical environment and human population. Past episodes of visionary optimism have given way to the recognition that geography and demography dictate a "Chinese-style" modernization strategy, characterized by a moderate pace and moderate expectations.

The Physical Environment The Chinese land mass (3,692,244 square miles) descends from the Himalayan highlands to the sea in a series of steps: the first is the Tibetan plateau, the second the western uplands, and the third a vast and fertile agricultural plain (see map [II.2] on page 11). The lower the elevation, the more suitable for human habitation. This land mass is subject to a variety of climates, ranging from continental in the west to maritime in the east, and from subpolar in the north to subtropical in the south. As the map (II.3) on page 11 suggests, rainfall is sparse in the far west, low-to-moderate in the northeast, and heavy in the south.

A number of major river systems cut their way through the land mass, carrying water and silt necessary for agriculture (see map and table [II.4] on page 12). But the rivers can be a mixed blessing: inadequate flow reduces the area under cultivation; silting raises the level of the river and produces deltas as the rivers near the sea. Water resource management -- facilitating irrigation and preventing floods -- has thus been an age-old Chinese problem. Because of the uneven rainfall distribution, irrigation is the primary water management task in the north, flood control in the south.

A comparison with the American physical environment is instructive. China is slightly larger than the US, and the two countries are roughly comparable in north-south extent and in extent and diversity of topography and climate. But China has greater extremes of climate and larger areas that are unproductive and uninhabitable; cultivated land area in China is only 70% that of the US.

Economic Potential China's physical environment influences profoundly its economic potential. In agriculture there are three very general land-use patterns (see map [II.5] on page 13). A diagonal line drawn from northeast to southwest would halve the country. In the high and dry land to the west of the line, stock raising and oasis cultivation predominate. The eastern half contains the other two regions, north and south of the Jinling mountains/Huai valley dividing line. In the relatively dry northern zone, single cropping of grains like wheat and millet is the rule, although summer rice is common in some areas. With its wetter and warmer climate the southern zone supports multiple cropping of rice and commercial crops.

Well endowed with mineral and energy resources, China has great industrial potential. Before 1949, industrial development took place in major coastal and riverine centers that had higher population densities, better transportation and financial facilities, and some foreign presence. Particularly important were southern Manchuria, led by Shenyang and Dalian (Dairen), and the lower Yangzi (Yangtze) valley, dominated by Shanghai. Once order and central control were restored in 1949, industrialization began in a number of other centers (see map [II.6] on page 14). Nevertheless, development of both extractive and manufacturing industries still requires hard choices among competing priorities: accommodating regional diversification, minimizing investment in transportation facilities (already available in older centers), and promoting national security.

Human and Political Geography China's population is the largest in the world, but how large has often been a question. The Chinese government, after years of providing only rounded figures, is again announcing specific estimates. The one billion mark was broken in mid-1980, and a detailed census is to be taken in 1981, the first in 28 years. American government estimates of Chinese actual and projected population growth are presented in the table (II.7) on page 15.

China's population is not only large, it is also distributed unevenly over the landscape. It is concentrated in the area east of the diagonal line referred to above, concentrated in fertile, low-land agricultural areas, and along rivers and transportation arteries (see map [II.8] on page 16). Thus, one-fifth of the globe's population must support itself on land that is about 12% arable. (Again, there is an interesting contrast with the United States: China has many rural areas just as densely populated as urban America.)

At present, the age distribution of the population also poses problems. As the table (II.9) on page 17 indicates, approximately 48% of the population is under twenty years of age, consuming much more than they are producing. Moreover, the percentage of women in the 20-50 childbearing years -- now about 48% -- will grow over the rest of the century. Chinese population specialists have estimated that the population could quadruple in the next century if each fertile woman bore three children.

In view of these factors -- high absolute numbers and uneven age and spatial distribution -- the PRC government has intensified its already vigorous birth control program. The previous policy -- encouraging late marriage and distributing free contraceptives -- did reduced birth rates when it was stricly implemented. It also earned China a reputation for limiting population growth while still in an early stage of industrialization. Now the government believes that even that approach is not sufficient, and is also calling on young couples to have only one child.

Although over 80% of the population lives in rural settlements, China has many large cities, more in fact than the United States. To guarantee food supplies Chinese municipalities include rural areas within their jurisdiction (the table [II.10] on page 17 lists the thirteen cities with urban populations of over one million). Cities have both an economic role, as centers of manufacturing and distribution, and a political function, as links in the administrative chain of command.

The province is the most important subnational administrative unit. The PRC has 29 provincial-level units, most of them of substantial area and population (see map [II.11] on page 18 and table [II.12] on page 19). There are two special categories. One is the autonomous region, of which there are five. These have large minority populations who have received at least nominal guarantees that certain aspects of their culture will be preserved. The other special category is the centrally administered city, of which there are three: Beijing (Peking), the national capital; Tianjin (Tientsin), its port; and the great industrial and commercial metropolis of Shanghai. Like other municipalities, these units consist of the dominant city and the surrounding suburban and rural hinterland. At times during the PRC's history six regional units composed of several provinces have played an important role; over the long term, the central government, fearing the emergence of "independent kingdoms," has let power flow to the regional level only in special circumstances.

The people of China are ethnically and linguistically diverse. Although ethnic Chinese (Han) constitute 94% of the population, the 55 "national minorities" recognized by the government constitute 60 million people. Thirteen have populations exceeding one million (see table [III.13] on page 20). Minority peoples live mainly in a belt that surrounds the core Han population on the south, west, and north. They vary greatly in degree of integration with Chinese society and culture, though the pace of integration is faster now than in the past. As noted above, some minorities have "autonomous" provincial-level units; lower-level units have been created for smaller concentrations.

Linguistic divisions occur not only between the Han and minorities, but also among the Chinese speakers themselves (see map [II.14], page 21). The basic division in spoken Chinese is between the Mandarin dialect of north and central China and the numerous non-Mandarin dialects of the southeast. These "dialects" are really different languages, as different, say, as Italian and Spanish. Mandarin itself divides into different dialects, which are sufficiently dissimilar in pronunciation to cause some communication problems. The written language is the same for all these Chinese language groups, and a single national spoken language (called pu'tonghua [common speech]) is taught in all schools. Eventually, all PRC citizens will be able to converse in this official dialect, which is based on northern Mandarin. For the foreseeable future, however, pu'tonghua will remain a second language for close to 40% of the population.

Suggested Readings

China: A Geographical Sketch. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974. A collection of articles on various aspects of China's geography and resources.

Dryer, June Teufel. China's Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the People's Republic of China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976. A comprehensive discussion of Beijing's policies towards its many national minorities and the problems and process of implementation.

Fullard, Harold, ed. China in Maps. London: Denoyer-Geppert, 1968. An annotated collection of maps covering China's history, geography, climate, industry, agriculture, and communications networks.

An Illustrated Atlas of China. New York: Rand McNally, 1972. An excellent map collection, illuminating many aspects of China's material and human resources.

Lewis, John W., ed. The City in Communist China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. An anthology of articles on various aspects of the post-1949 Chinese city.

Orleans, Leo A. Every Fifth Child: The Population of China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972. A general discussion of China's population growth and problems, including chapters on urban population, population distribution, and national minorities. An excellent introduction.

Shabad, Theodore. China's Changing Map: National and Regional Development, 1949-71. Revised ed. New York: Praeger, 1972. A comprehensive survey of China's physical, political, and administrative geography, with detailed chapters on each region of the country.

Skinner, G. William, ed. The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979. A scholarly anthology on the traditional Chinese city and its relations to the rural hinterland.

Skinner, G. William, and Elvin, Mark, eds. The Chinese City Between Two Worlds. Stanford: Stanford Univerity Press, 1974. A collection of scholarly essays on the process of modernization and urbanization of a range of Chinese cities.

2. Elevation (in meters)



3. Precipitation (in inches)



4. Major River Systems



River	Length (1000 km.)	Drainage Area (billion sq. km.)	Silt Dischage (cu. m. per year)	Cultivated Area (mn. ha.)	Irrigated Area (mn. ha.)
Yangtze	5800	1,800	1,020	27	13
Yellow	5464	750	48	20	3.2
Pearl	2200	420	356	--	--
Hai	1090	265	15	12	--
Huai	1000	260	42	13	4.7
China			2,600	107	43.7

Source: James E. Nickum, Hydraulic Engineering and Water Resources in the People's Republic of China (Stanford: US-China Relations Program, 1974), p. 10. Abbreviations: km. = kilometers; sq. km. = square kilometers; mn. = million; cu. m. = cubic meters; ha. = hectares.

5. Agricultural Regions



Source: Frederic M. Kaplan, et al., Encyclopedia of China Today (New York: Eurasia Press, 1979), p. 157. Reprinted with permission.

6. Industrial Zones



Source: Frederic M. Kaplan, et al., Encyclopedia of China Today (New York: Eurasia Press, 1979), p. 181. Reprinted with permission.

7. Population and Vital Rates, Estimated and Projected

Year	Thousand Persons		Vital Rates/1,000 Persons		
	On 1 Jan	On 1 July	Natural Increase	Births	Deaths
1949	533,543	537,918	12.0	45.4	33.4
1950	542,293	547,364	13.5	45.4	31.9
1951	552,434	558,096	15.1	45.3	30.2
1952	563,759	569,904	18.0	45.2	27.2
1953	576,049	582,603	22.5	45.0	22.5
1954	589,157	596,206	23.6	44.7	21.1
1955	603,255	610,876	24.9	44.4	19.4
1956	618,496	626,198	24.6	43.1	18.5
1957	633,899	641,588	24.0	42.1	18.1
1958	649,277	656,816	23.0	41.2	18.2
1959	664,355	671,609	21.6	40.5	18.9
1960	678,863	685,081	18.2	40.0	21.8
1961	691,298	695,640	12.5	38.7	26.2
1962	699,981	706,005	17.1	35.1	18.1
1963	712,029	719,717	21.4	38.7	17.3
1964	727,405	735,633	22.4	38.3	16.0
1965	743,861	752,582	23.2	37.7	14.6
1966	761,303	770,136	22.9	37.5	14.6
1967	778,968	788,310	23.7	37.4	13.7
1968	797,651	807,506	24.4	37.4	13.0
1969	817,360	827,627	24.8	37.1	12.3
1970	837,894	848,501	25.0	36.6	11.6
1971	859,107	869,804	24.6	35.6	11.0
1972	880,500	891,176	24.0	34.6	10.7
1973	901,852	912,360	23.0	33.4	10.3
1974	922,868	932,923	21.6	31.5	9.9
1975	942,977	952,475	19.9	29.6	9.6
1976	961,973	970,987	18.6	28.9	10.3
1977	980,000	987,406	15.0	24.0	9.0
1978	994,811	1,002,437	15.2	24.0	8.8
1979	1,010,063	1,017,477	14.6	23.1	8.5
1980	1,024,890	1,031,988	13.8	22.1	8.4
1985	1,091,052	1,096,962	10.8	18.6	7.9
1990	1,147,986	1,153,694	9.9	17.7	7.8
1995	1,209,066	1,215,727	11.0	19.0	8.1
2000	1,277,492	1,284,328	10.6	19.1	8.5

Source: CIA, China: A Statistical Compendium (NTISUB/E/282-011, July 1979), p. 5. Estimates prepared in 1979 by the US Department of Commerce, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division. Official Chinese statements about year-end population (Taiwan included) are 962.05 million for 1977 and 975.23 million for 1978. Above estimates do not include Taiwan, whose population is slightly over 17 million.

8. Population Distribution



Source: Frederic M. Kaplan, et al., Encyclopedia of China Today (New York: Eurasia Press, 1979), p. 10. Reprinted with permission.

9. Estimated Age and Sex Distribution, July 1978

	Thousand Persons			Percent			M/100 F
Age range	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	
All	1,003,855	504,854	499,001	100.0	100.0	100.0	101.2
0-4	134,664	68,427	66,237	13.41	13.55	13.27	103.3
5-9	130,897	66,367	64,530	13.04	13.15	12.93	102.8
10-14	117,619	59,553	58,066	11.72	11.80	11.64	102.6
15-19	102,408	51,644	50,764	10.20	10.23	10.17	101.7
20-24	97,158	49,019	48,139	9.68	9.71	9.65	101.8
25-29	81,353	41,106	40,247	8.10	8.14	8.07	102.1
30-34	62,388	31,933	30,455	6.22	6.33	6.10	104.9
35-39	53,323	27,311	26,012	5.31	5.41	5.21	105.0
40-44	49,735	25,421	24,314	4.95	5.04	4.87	104.6
45-49	43,809	22,011	21,798	4.36	4.36	4.37	101.0
50-54	36,413	17,939	18,474	3.63	3.55	3.70	97.1
55-59	29,652	14,253	15,399	2.95	2.82	3.09	92.6
60-64	23,530	11,137	12,393	2.34	2.21	2.48	89.9
65-69	17,905	8,403	9,502	1.78	1.66	1.90	88.4
70-74	12,260	5,643	6,617	1.22	1.12	1.33	85.3
75+	10,741	4,687	6,054	1.07	.93	1.21	77.4

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: Economic Indicators (ER-78, 10750, December 1978), p. 9. These estimates were prepared in March 1978 by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division.

10. China's Thirteen Largest Cities

City	Municipality Population	Urban Population
Shanghai	12,000,000	5,800,000
Beijing (Peking)	10,000,000	5,600,000
Tianjin (Tientsin)	7,000,000	4,250,000
Chongqing (Chungking)	6,000,000	2.400,000
Chengdu (Chengtu)	4,000,000	2,300,000*
Shenyang	4,000,000	2,700,000
Nanjing (Nanking)	3,000,000	2,000,000
Guangzhou (Canton)	2,900,000*	2,000,000
Wuhan	2,700,000	1,600,000*
Xi'an (Sian)	2,700,000	1,600.000*
Changchun	2,300,000*	1,300,000
Harbin	2,000,000	1,200,000*
Taiyuan	1,900,000*	1,100,000

Note: Chinese municipalities have rural areas within their boundaries. In population, they are 50-100 percent larger than their urban areas. Figures marked with an asterisk (*) are derived from existing actual estimates according to the formula municipal population = urban population x 1.75.

Source: Unofficial 1980 estimates based on de Keijzer and Kaplan, China Guidebook (1980-81 edition); information supplied by Leo Orleans (to be published in 1981 edition of Collier's Encyclopedia); and Beijing Review, March 17, 1980, p. 7.

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11. Political and Administrative Map



Source: US Department of State, "Background Notes: China," March 1980. The dotted line denotes the July 1, 1979 expansion of Inner Mongolia (Nei Monggol), whereby the autonomous region received the western portions of Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces, and the northern portions of Liaoning and Gansu provinces and of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. This change restored the borders existing before July 1969.

12. Provincial-Level Units: Area and Population

Unit	Capital City	Area*	Population (in thousands)		
			1953	1965	1980
Provinces:					
Anhui	Hefei	54	30,663	37,442	48,000
Fujian	Fuzhou	48	13,143	17,823	23,000
Gansu	Lanzhou	142	11,291	15,200	21,000
Guangdong	Guangzhou	83	34,770	42,684	54,000
Guizhou	Guiyang	67	15,037	19,302	28,000
Hebei	Shijiazhuang	75	33,181	41,428	53,000
Heilongjiang	Ha'erbin	179	12,681	21,320	33,000
Henan	Zhengzhou	65	43,911	54,829	71,000
Hubei	Wuchang	72	27,790	35,221	43,000
Hunan	Changsha	81	33,227	40,563	50,000
Jiangxi	Nanchang	64	16,773	22,271	30,000
Jiangsu	Nanjing	40	38,329	48,523	59,000
Jilin	Changchun	72	12,609	17,177	25,000
Liaoning	Shenyang	58	22,269	32,403	41,000
Qinghai	Xi'ning	280	1,677	2,664	4,000
Shaanxi	Xi'an	76	15,881	20,800	30,000
Shandong	Ji'nan	60	50,134	63,257	77,000
Shanxi	Taiyuan	61	14,314	18,349	24,000
Sichuan	Chengdu	220	65,685	81,634	100,000
Yunnan	Kunming	168	17,473	22,120	30,000
Zhejiang	Hangzhou	39	22,866	28,918	38,000
Autonomous Regions:					
Guangxi Zhuang	Nanning	91	19,561	24,776	34,000
Inner Mongolia	Huhehaote	457	3,532	5,778	9,000
Ningxia Hui	Yinchuan	25	1,637	2,253	3,400
Xinjiang Uighur	Urumchi	640	4,874	7,119	11,000
Tibet (Xizang)	Lhasa	470	1,274	1,458	1,600
Centrally Administered Cities:					
Beijing		7	4,591	7,730	10,000
Shanghai		2	8,808	10,966	2,000
Tianjin		1	4,622	6,686	7,000
TOTAL		3,700	583,603	750,394	970,000

* in thousand square miles; approximate 1980 figures.

Source: 1970 area figures adapted from Theodore Shabad, _China's Changing Map_ (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 34; population figures from CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, _China: Economic Indicators_ (ERTH0508, October 1977), p. 9.; and from information supplied by Leo Orleans (to be published in _Collier's Encyclopedia_, 1981 edition).

13. China's Thirteen Largest National Minorities

Minority	Language Group	Primary Location	Population (in thousands) 1953	1965	1978
Zhuang	Zhuang-Thai	Guangxi Yunnan	7,030	7,780	12,000
Hui	Chinese	Ningxia Gansu	3,559	3,930	6,400
Uighur	Turkic	Xinjiang	3,640	3,900	5,400
Yi	Tibeto-Burmese	Sichuan Yunnan	3,254	3,260	4,800
Tibetan	Tibeto-Burmese	Tibet Qinghai Sichuan	2,776	2,770	3,400
Miao	Miao-Yao	Guizhou Hunan	2,511	2,680	3,900
Manchu	Tungus-Manchurian	Liaoning Jilin Heilongjiang	2,419	2,430	2,600
Mongol	Mongolian	Inner Mongolia Xinjiang	1,463	1,640	2,600
Bouyei	Zhuang-Thai	Guizhou	1,248	1,310	1,700
Korean	Korean	Jilin	1,120	1,250	1,600
Yao	Miao-Yao	Guangxi Hunan	666	n/a	1,200
Dong	Zhuang-Thai	Guizhou Hunan	713	n/a	1,100
Bai	Tibeto-Burmese	Yunnan	567	n/a	1,000

Source: Adapted from Leo A. Orleans, Every Fifth Child: The Population of China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 101. Population for 1965 is from Renmin Shouce (Beijing: Dagongbaoshe, 1965), p. 115. Population for 1978 from Beijing Review, March 3, 1980, p. 17. n/a = not available.

14. Ethnolinguistic Distribution

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

Source: Area Handbook for the People's Republic of China (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 89.

III. HISTORY OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

There is general agreement that the Chinese Revolution was a key element shaping the contemporary world. Unlike previous "great revolutions," which took place within a fairly short span of time, the Chinese Revolution spanned more than a century. It brought the collapse of one of the world's great traditional empires under the weight of internal revolts and foreign penetration. Competing political forces contended for the right to shape a new China. The ultimate victor, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), found great challenges in deciding how far and how fast to change the Chinese social order.

The End of the Empire The Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty, established by invading Manchu armies in 1644, was the last in a series of dynasties that governed the empire from its first unification in 221 B.C. China flourished for a century and a half under its new non-Chinese emperors, but domestic problems (especially growing population pressure) and revolts (most notabaly the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64) were a common feature of the nineteenth century.

The Opium War of 1839-42 marked the beginning of imperialist penetration, and the Western powers and later Japan forced increasing demands on the tottering Manchu regime. The growing package of foreign exactions included territorial acquisitions and leases, trading and manufacturing rights, special privileges for foreign residents and missionaries, war indemnities and other financial obligations. All these were secured by treaty and backed by the threat of military force. Scholars disagree on how much this foreign penetration actually hurt China; what was important was that Chinese believed increasingly that their country was in dire straits. The alternatives proposed ranged from conservative renewal to liberal reformism to anti-Manchu revolution. By the turn of the century, the revolutionary approach was winning the day.

National Disintegration The Revolution of 1911 was in some ways the result of the Manchu court's imperfect reform effort. The government had begun building modern armies, but could not prevent revolutionary propaganda from reaching the young officers recruited. It had started China down the road of parliamentary institutions, but not fast enough to suit local and provincial elites. It had also initiated a program of economic development, but at the expense of the projects begun by those same elites. Out of this combustible mix erupted a transformation that went far beyond the removal of the Manchus. The imperial structure was dismantled and a republican form of government proclaimed.

But the new parliamentary institutions were soon subverted because military power was dispersed among a number of political forces, none of which wished to allow its rivals to dominate the civil government. Thus military strongmen, dubbed "warlords," dominated the first phase of the republican period -- up until 1928. From their regional bases they contended for control of the major transportation arteries (see map [III.2] on page 26) and for the capital city of Beijing (Peking).

At lower levels of the political hierarchy, and in areas not reached by the grid of major rivers and railways, minor militarists carved out spheres of control.

The first major challenge to the shifting warlord balance of power came from the Nationalist Party (also known as the Kuomintang [KMT]). Sun Yat-sen founded the movement and, after his death in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek led it for the next five decades (see biographies [III.3a] on page 27). In the 1920s the Nationalists established a base in Guangdong province and tried building political institutions and military forces simultaneously, supported by the Soviet Union and allied with the nascent Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Chiang Kai-shek led a "Northern Expedition" during 1926-28 that gave his party a place on the river-railway grid and international recognition as the government of China, with its capital in Nanjing (Nanking).

Over the next nine years Chiang tried and failed to establish more than nominal control over the rest of China. He had to contend first with warlords not eliminated during the Northern Expedition, and made moderate progress against them. Then, in 1931, Japan invaded the northeastern provinces (called Manchuria), and subsequently extended its political and economic penetration into north China. The Communists posed a very different challenge from their remote base areas. Chiang's continuing preoccupation with military matters stunted the growth of political institutions and limited reform in the economic sector. War broke out with Japan in 1937, and the invaders soon took control of major cities and transportation arteries. The Nationalist defenders retreated to the southwest, where their movement fell into decline.

The Rise of the CCP The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921 amid the political and intellectual ferment following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, only gradually developed a formula for achieving political dominance. In the early years, under the guidance of the Communist International (Comintern), the CCP joined the Nationalists in a united front against the warlords and imperialist powers and pursued the conventional Bolshevik strategy of mobilizing and organizing urban workers. But conflicts with the Nationalists grew, and Chiang Kai-shek led an assault on the Communists in the spring of 1927. The CCP's two founding fathers left the scene: a northern warlord executed Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) and the Comintern purged Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) for his role in the failure of the united front. (See section [III.3b], pages 27-31, for biographies of CCP leaders, including those mentioned in this introduction.)

Outlawed, the surviving Communist forces turned to the countryside, where Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhu De (Chu Te) led the formation of a Red Army based in scattered rural "soviets" in south-central China. Simultaneously, the CCP began looking to the peasantry as a source of political support. But Nationalist military pressure in the early 1930s forced the CCP's main units to undertake the "Long March" of 1934-35. The leadership established a new headquarters at Yan'an (Yenan), in the remote northwestern province of Shaanxi. It was during the Long March that Mao established his primacy in the CCP.

With the beginning of the War of Resistance in 1937, the Communists and the Nationalists formed another united front to resist the Japanese. The actual cooperation was minimal, but the CCP took advantage of reduced Nationalist pressure to expand its forces by guerrilla mobilization against the Japanese. By the end of the war in 1945, it had grown into a formidable political and military movement, as the chart on CCP growth (III.4, page 32) indicates. The Party governed large parts of north China and dealt with other forces on the basis of self-reliance. Moreover, Mao and other CCP leaders had enriched their policy repertoire for promoting social, economic, and political change.

Complementing the approach of "class struggle" was that of "new democracy" -- peaceful co-optation from a position of strength of neutral or sympathetic elements of the existing order. Marxism-Leninism had been adapted to the Chinese Revolution.

After the war's end, only the Communists and Nationalists remained as serious contenders for power. Through American-sponsored mediation, the two parties explored the possibility of a coalition government but to no avail. It was only at that point that the CCP chose to contend with the Nationalists for the control of the river-railway grid. The Communists began the civil war on the defensive, but proved their superiority faster than even they expected. They had won the struggle by late 1949, and declared the new People's Republic of China government on October 1, 1949. The Nationalists retreated to the island of Taiwan, which, with several offshore islands, they have controlled ever since.

China under Mao Establishing military control was only the first step for the victors. A long agenda of new issues had to be addressed: determining the balance of power between central and regional governments, building new political institutions, rehabilitating and collectivizing the economy, formulating a strategy of economic development, remolding social values and institutions, and engineering a method of political succession. As time passed, the leadership became increasingly divided on all these issues. Mao Zedong, who once termed himself a "left centrist," tended to favor periodic shake-ups of social and political institutions ("class struggle") in order to prevent the emergence of new patterns of domination and inequality ("revisionism," or "capitalist restoration"). His opponents, who tended to coalesce around such figures as Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i), Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), and, to an extent, Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), favored a more gradual approach that emphasized the building of a technological and human foundation under the leadership of the Party bureaucracy (see pages 33-34 for a chronology of the PRC under Mao [III.6]).

During the early years (1949-57), Soviet-style economic planning and Soviet aid were the order of the day. But Mao and his more radical colleagues became increasingly disenchanted with this approach, believing that it emphasized development of industry at the expense of agriculture. Mao launched the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), in the belief that agriculture did not have to wait, that China could "walk on two legs." A combination of weather and human failures brought serious economic disruption, damaging Mao's reputation and strengthening the hand of moderate elements. Their pragmatic rehabilitation of the economy only made Mao even more suspicious that fundamental political principles were being discarded. By political maneuver and mobilization of substantial social discontent, he engineered a vast social movement -- the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" -- to attack his opponents and the political institutions through which they ruled.

The origins and consequences of the Cultural Revolution remain the subject of deep controversy both inside and outside China. Following its most convulsive period (1966-69), which shattered most institutions and destroyed many individuals' careers, there ensued seven years of intense political conflict. The first phase pitted Mao and Zhou against Lin Biao (Lin Piao -- minister of defense, one of Mao's Cultural Revolution allies, and his heir apparent). Lin apparently died in a plane crash in Mongolia in 1971 after allegedly conspiring to assassinate Mao. From that point till his death, Mao presided over a battle royal between a moderate coalition led by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (rehabilitated in 1973, see next chapter for biography), and a radical coalition led by the "gang of four," which included Mao's wife Jiang Qing. The struggle climaxed in 1976 with Zhou's death in January, massive demonstrations in support of the moderates in April, Deng

Xiaoping's purge in the same month, Mao's death in September, and the arrest of the "gang of four" and other radicals in October.

Suggested Readings

a) General works:

Bianco, Lucien. *Origins of the Chinese Revolution 1915-1949*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971. A scholarly synthesis of differing interpretations of the revolution, emphasizing its social origins.

Clubb, O. Edmund. *Twentieth Century China*. Rev. ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. An exhaustive factual history, from the fall of the Imperial system to the death of Mao.

Fairbank, John K. *The United States and China*. 4th edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Masterfully describes the evolving American relationship with China since the fall of the Imperial system.

Meisner, Maurice. *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic*. New York: Free Press, 1977. A careful, detailed history of the PRC from 1949 to 1976.

Wakeman, Frederic, Jr. *The Fall of Imperial China*. New York: Free Press, 1975. A comprehensive analysis of late traditional China and the causes -- domestic and foreign -- of its collapse.

b) Books by and about Mao Zedong

Mao Tse-tung. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*. Five vols. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press. Mao's works provide the authoritative statement of his ideology and illuminate many specific policy issues and conflicts. The selections in volumes 1-4 are from a 1960 edition that includes writings before September 1949. Volume 5, released in 1977, offers selections from the September 1949-November 1957 period. See also Schram, *Chairman Mao Talks to the People*, below.

Pye, Lucian W. *Mao Tse-tung: The Man in the Leader*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976. A psychological approach.

Schram, Stuart. *Mao Tse-tung*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967.

____ ed. *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters: 1956-1971*. New York: Pantheon, 1974. A good supplement to the *Selected Works*, bringing together many of Mao's later works, many of which are informal talks and conversations.

Snow, Edgar. *Red Star Over China*. New York: Grove, 1971. First published in 1938, this is a classic journalistic account of the Chinese Communist movement up to 1937. Snow's interviews with Mao remain a primary source of information on Mao's early life and career. In *The Long Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1971), Snow reports on interviews with Mao and Zhou Enlai much later in their careers and offers his own reflections on the course of the Chinese Revolution.

Terrill, Ross. Mao: A Biography. New York: Harper & Row, 1980.

Wilson, Dick. Mao: The People's Emperor. New York: Doubleday, 1980.

____, ed. Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Twelve scholars offer diverse and provocative essays on the significance of Mao's career.

2. River/Railway Grid of Pre-1949 Politics (ca. 1935)



3. Biographies of Revolutionary Leaders

a) the Nationalist Party

Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) The Chinese Nationalists regard Sun as "father of the country" and founder of their party. The CCP honors him as a leader of the Chinese Revolution. Born near Canton, he received most of his education in Western schools in Hong Kong and Hawaii. After joining the reform movement of the 1890s, he became a leader of the revolutionary forces seeking to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Sun lost out to military leader Yuan Shikai in the struggle for the presidency of the new Republic of China after the 1911 revolution, but he continued to head the major republican party and, at least abroad, was China's best known revolutionary leader. In the early 1920s, after establishing a Nationalist-led government in Guangzhou, Sun sought and received Soviet advice and materials in building a party-army to challenge the northern warlords. At the same time, he accepted a united front with the Communists. Sun died in Beijing in 1925. His "Three Principles of the People" (Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood) remain the guiding tenets of the Nationalist Party.

Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) Chiang was a native of Zhejiang province. He studied in military academies in both China and Japan, and became one of Sun's principal military advisers in the late 1910s. When Sun began building a party-army under Russian guidance in the early 1920s, he picked Chiang to be commandant of the Whampoa Military Academy. After Sun died in 1925, Chiang outmaneuvered his more prominent rivals and led the Northern Expedition (1926-28) against the northern warlords. Until 1949 he was locked in periodic struggles with a variety of military opponents (remnant warlords, the Japanese, and the CCP) and opponents within his own party. His power and prestige began to decline during World War II, as did the effectiveness of the Nationalist regime. Because of military blunders, hyperinflation, and alienation of political support, Chiang's forces lost the 1945-49 civil war to the CCP. He retreated to the island of Taiwan, which, now under the leadership of his son Chiang Ching-kuo, has enjoyed a remarkable economic prosperity. The elder Chiang died in April 1975.

b) the Chinese Communist Party

Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu) (1879-1942) Chen was the founder of New Youth magazine, a leader in the literary and cultural revolution which culminated in the May Fourth Movement, and a founder of the Chinese Communist Party. He headed the Party from 1921 to 1927, when he was expelled on charges of being too friendly with the Nationalists during the united front. He has remained a major negative symbol of right-wing deviation and bourgeois tendencies.

Jiang Qing (Chiang Ch'ing) (1914? -) Mao's third wife and a member of the "gang of four," Jiang achieved national visibility in 1966 as a leader of the militant elements in the Cultural Revolution. She was born in Shandong and was a

Shanghai film actress before moving to Yan'an to join the Communists in the late 1930s. She married Mao in the early 1940s, generating hostility from many Party veterans. Jiang became head of the film office of the CCP Central Committee's propaganda department in 1948, but for the most part remained in the background over the next decade. In the early 1960s, as Mao began mobilizing allies for his attack on the Party bureaucracy, Jiang launched a revolutionary reform movement in ballet and Beijing opera, provoking some opposition from the cultural establishment. During the Cultural Revolution she became first vice chairman of the Cultural Revolution Group and also directed much of the cultural work in the military. She continued to play a leading role in the arts, and was reputedly one of the most implacable foes of Deng Xiaoping and his moderate colleagues. In October 1976, one month after Mao's death, she was arrested, purged, and subjected to virulent criticism in the mass media. She and other members of the "gang of four" were brought to trial in November 1980.

Li Dazhao (Li Ta-chao) (1888-1927) Li was another influential leader of the May Fourth Movement. Along with Chen Duxiu, he was one of the founding fathers of the Chinese Communist Party. He led the CCP's organizational and propaganda activities. In adapting Marxism to the Chinese situation, he stressed the importance of the peasants and nationalism, which later bacame part of Mao's formula for revolution. Li was executed by warlord Zhang Zuolin in 1927.

Lin Biao (Lin Piao) (1907-1971) Lin was a veteran Red Army military commander who played important roles in battles against the Japanese and Nationalist forces. He rose rapidly in political rank in the mid-1950s and replaced Peng Dehuai as defense minister in 1959. He soon undertook a campaign to emphasize Maoist principles and the study of Mao's thought within the military. One of the most fervent "Maoists" in the Cultural Revolution, he was officially designated Mao's "successor" and "closest comrade-in-arms." Then in 1971 he was charged with deviations from Mao's policies and with plotting a coup against Mao. He apparently died in a plane crash in Mongolia in September 1971, allegedly while trying to escape to the Soviet Union.

Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i) (1898-1969) Liu was an early labor leader and one of the first Chinese Communists to study in the Soviet Union. He emerged during the 1940s as a major Party theoretician and specialist in organization, ranking second only to Mao. In 1959 he replaced Mao as chief of state (Mao remained Party Chairman), and was regarded as Mao's successor. With Deng Xiaoping and others, Liu guided the retrenchment from the Great Leap Forward, and his pragmatic approach increasingly offended Mao. Liu therefore became the chief target of the Cultural Revolution. He was labeled "China's Khrushchev" and stereotyped as China's leading proponent of Soviet-style "revisionism." Liu was formally expelled from all government and Party posts in 1968 and died of pneumonia in Kaifeng in 1969. As one element in the post-Mao leadership's judgment on the Cultural Revolution, Liu's "good name" was completely restored in February 1980.

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) (1893-1976) Born in Hunan, Mao was one of the historic figures of the twentieth century. A founder of the CCP, he played a major role in the establishment of the Red Army and the development of a defensible base area in Jiangxi province during the late 1920s and early 1930s. He consolidated his rule over the Party in the years after the Long March and directed overall strategy during the Sino-Japanese War and the civil war. He formally assumed the post of Party Chairman in 1945. His reliance on the peasantry (a major departure from prevailing Soviet doctrine) and dependence on guerrilla warfare in the revolution were vital to the Communist triumph in China.

Following the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Mao was responsible for many of the political initiatives that transformed the face of China, including land reform, the collectivization of agriculture, and the spread of medical services. In particular, this leader of the revolution remained alert to what he saw to be new forms of oppression and sensitive to the interests of the oppressed. Thus in 1958 he advocated a self-reliant "Great Leap Forward" campaign in rural development to compensate for the Soviet-style industry-first approach followed previously. The relative failure of the Leap led Mao to turn many reins over to more conventional leaders (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, etc.) and to withdraw from active decision making.

During the early 1960s, Mao continued his restless challenge of new forms of domination (in his words, "revisionism" or "capitalist restoration"). In foreign policy he led China's divorce from the Soviet Union. Domestically, he became increasingly wary of his subordinates' pragmatic approach to development, fearing that it was fostering deep social and political inequalities. When Liu, Deng, and others seemed to ignore his call to "never forget class struggle," Mao in 1966 initiated the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," exploiting discontent among some students (the "Red Guards") and others. The Cultural Revolution was successful in removing many who opposed his policies but led to serious disorder, forcing Mao to call in the military to restore order in 1968.

In 1969 Mao designated Defense Minister Lin Biao, a Cultural Revolution ally, as his heir apparent. But Mao came to have doubts about Lin and soon challenged him politically. One of the issues of debate was the opening to the United States, advocated by Mao and Zhou Enlai as a counter to the Soviet Union. In 1971 Lin was reportedly killed in a plane crash while fleeing China after an alleged assassination attempt on Mao.

Until his death, a failing Mao refereed a struggle between those who benefited from the Cultural Revolution and defended its policies, and rehabilitated veterans who believed that the Cultural Revolution had done China serious harm. It seemed for a while that the veterans, led by Deng Xiaoping, had won the day. But the radicals, either by manipulating Mao or appealing to his basic instincts, regained momentum after Zhou Enlai's death in January 1976. Mao chose the more centrist Hua Guofeng to carry on his vision. Four weeks after Mao's death, Hua led the arrest of major radical figures, four of whom -- Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan -- were dubbed a "gang."

The post-Mao era has seen a reversal of much that Mao stood for and the eclipse of many individuals, living and dead, that he stood behind. His leadership, especially the Cultural Revolution initiative, has been hotly debated. Deng Xiaoping and his allies currently charge that the late Chairman committed serious errors in judgment, especially during the 1960s and 1970s.

Peng Dehuai (P'eng Te-huai) (1898-1974) Peng was an important Communist military commander, beginning in the Jiangxi Soviet period. He took part in the Long March, was deputy commander under Zhu De during the Sino-Japanese War, commanded the Chinese forces which fought in the Korean War (1950-53), and was named minister of defense in 1954. He was purged in 1959 after attacking Mao's Great Leap policies and urging more emphasis on military modernization. Peng's case remained a controversial issue for almost two decades. Maoists used him as a symbol of Chinese "revisionism"; other leaders tried to reinstate him because they believed his challenge to have been correct. Once Deng Xiaoping got the political upper hand in December 1978, Peng was posthumously rehabilitated, four years after his death.

Wang Hongwen (Wang Hung-wen) Wang was a worker in a cotton mill in Shanghai when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966. He led an attack on the mill management and was part of the offensive against the municipal establishment. He was promoted to high Party and governmental posts in Shanghai and became a member of the Party Central Committee in 1969. Then in 1973, at the 10th Party Congress, Wang vaulted into national prominence as a vice chairman and member of the Politburo's Standing Committee. He was purged and labeled a member of the "gang of four" in October 1976, and put on trial in November 1980.

Yao Wenyuan (Yao Wen-yuan) Yao was a literary critic and ideologue from Shanghai and a close confidant of Mao's wife Jiang Qing. His 1965 articles attacking the anti-Mao drama, "Dismissal of Hai Rui," signalled the start of the Cultural Revolution. He was a member of the Cultural Revolution Group and entered the Politburo in 1969. In the years before Mao's death he had substantial influence over the mass media, and served as editor-in-chief of the key Party journal Hongqi (Red Flag). He was purged in October 1976 and named a member of the "gang of four," and put on trial in November 1980.

Zhang Chunqiao (Chang Ch'un-ch'iao) Zhang got his start in the leftist literary and art circles of Shanghai, and moved steadily up in the municipal Party structure. In 1966 he was catapulted into national prominence, becoming deputy chief of the Cultural Revolution Group. A capable theoretician and propagandist, he reported on the new State constitution proposed to the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. He was a leading candidate to succeed Zhou Enlai as premier when the latter died a year later, but like Deng Xiaoping was passed over in favor of Hua Guofeng. In October 1976 Hua led the purge against Zhang and other members of the "gang of four." They were tried in November 1980.

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai) (1898-1976) Zhou Enlai was for decades one of the most prominent and respected leaders of the Communist movement. Born into an upper-class family, he was drawn into the vortex of Chinese politics during the May Fourth Movement. In 1920 he traveled to Europe on a work-study program in which he met a number of future CCP leaders. He joined the Party in 1922 and returned to China in 1924, becoming the political commissar of the Whampoa Military Academy in Canton during the first united front with the Nationalists. He was in charge of labor union activity in Shanghai when Chiang Kai-shek attacked the CCP in April 1927 and took part in the Nanchang Uprising against the Nationalists in August -- the event now celebrated as the founding of the CCP's Red Army.

But Zhou was always most prominent during periods in which the CCP reached out to otherwise hostile political forces. He played an important role in securing Chiang Kai-shek's release during the Xian (Sian) Incident of December 1936. Once the Nationalists and CCP had formed a second united front to oppose Japanese imperialism, it was Zhou who headed the CCP liaison team. Similarly, Zhou represented the CCP in negotiations with the Nationalists during the mediation effort of US General George Marshall.

After the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Zhou became premier of the Government Affairs (later State) Council and foreign minister. In 1955 he acted as China's bridge to the non-aligned world at the Bandung Conference, and in the same year helped engineer initial contacts with the United States. He passed the foreign minister portfolio to Chen Yi in 1958 but continued to play an active role in foreign policy.

Zhou supported Mao Zedong in the latter's Cultural Revolution attack on the entrenched Party bureaucracy, and subsequently played a critical role in rebuilding political institutions and mediating numerous political quarrels. With the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Zhou advocated an opening to Japan and the West to counter the Russian threat. Zhou welcomed President Nixon to China in February 1972 and signed the historic Shanghai Communique for the PRC. That same year Zhou was diagnosed for cancer, and he began shedding some of his responsibilities, especially to Deng Xiaoping who was rehabilitated in April 1973. Zhou was also a strong advocate of modernization, particularly at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. Amid radical attacks on him during the Anti-Confucius Campaign, Zhou entered the hospital during 1974 and died on January 8, 1976.

Zhou continued to affect Chinese politics after his death. In April 1976 the removal of memorial wreaths placed in Tiananmen Square sparked riots that led to the second ouster of Deng Xiaoping. With the purge of the "gang of four" in October 1976, his policy of "four modernizations" received the full endorsement of the new leadership. And Zhou is held up as a model Communist for all Chinese to emulate.

Zhu De (Chu Te) (1886-1976) Zhu was the major Communist military commmander during the revolutionary period. In 1928 he joined with Mao to form the Red Army and was primarily responsible for much of its organization and tactics. Zhu was on the Long March and commanded the Communist armies in the Sino-Japanese War and civil wars. From 1950 to 1959 he was vice chairman of the Beijing government. He became less active thereafter but continued to serve as an elder statesman of the Party.

4. Growth of the Chinese Communist Party

Period and Year	Number of Members	Years Covered	Average Annual Increase
1st Revolutionary Civil War			
1921 (1st Congress)	57	-	-
1922 (2nd Congress)	123	1	66
1923 (3rd Congress)	432	1	309
1925 (4th Congress)	950	2	259
1927 (5th Congress)	57,967	2	28,508
1927 (after Nationalist purge)	10,000	-	-
2nd Revolutionary Civil War			
1928 (6th Congress)	40,000	1	30,000
1930	122,318	2	41,159
1933	300,000	3	59,227
1937 (after the Long March)	40,000	4	-65,000
Anti-Japanese War			
1940	800,000	3	253,333
1941	763,447	1	-36,533
1942	736,151	1	-27,296
1944	853,420	2	58,635
1945 (7th Congress)	1,211,128	1	357,708
3rd Revolutionary Civil War			
1946	1,348,320	1	137,192
1947	2,759,456	1	1,411,136
1948	3,065,533	1	306,077
1949	4,488,080	1	1,422,547
Under the PRC			
1950	5,821,604	1	1,333,524
1951	5,762,293	1	-59,311
1952	6,001,698	1	239,40
1953	6,612,254	1	610,556
1954	7,859,473	1	1,247,219
1955	9,393,394	1	1,533,921
1956 (8th Congress)	10,734,384	1	1,340,990
1957	12,720,000	1	1,985,616
1959	13,960,000	2	620,000
1961	17,000,000	2	1,520,000
1973 (10th Congress)	28,000,000	12	916,666
1977 (11th Congress)	more than 35,000,000	4	1,750,000
1980	38,000,000	3	1,000,000

Source: 1921-1963: adapted from John W. Lewis, Leadership in Communist China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963); 1973: Zhou Enlai's "Report" to the CCP 10th Congress, found in 10th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), p. 8; 1977: Peking Review, August 26, 1977, p. 6. 1980: Deng Xiaoping, "Report on the Current Situation and Tasks," FBIS Daily Report: People's Republic of China, March 11, 1980, Supplement, p. 24.

5. Chronology of China Under Mao

1949: The Communist Red Army defeats the Nationalists in a civil war. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is established on October 1. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists retreat to the island of Taiwan.

1950: Signing of Sino-Soviet Treaty (See Sino-Soviet chronology [V. 2]). China enters the Korean War; Marriage Law promulgated, providing freedom of marriage and divorce.

1952: Basic land reform completed after a five-year campaign. All land deeds destroyed and land redistributed (roughly two million landlords executed).

1953: Korean War armistice. Inauguration of PRC's First Five-Year Plan, relying on Soviet model of industrial development.

1954-55: Zhou Enlai plays a major role at the Geneva Convention and the Bandung Conference, establishing a new diplomatic prominence for the PRC. First constitution of the PRC is promulgated. Collectivization of agriculture is stepped up.

1956-57: In the wake of Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and political explosions in Poland and Hungary, Mao calls for a "Hundred Flowers Movement" to improve the relationship between the CCP and the people. Critics soon attack the legitimacy of CCP rule. The Party responds with an "anti-rightist campaign," suppressing the opposition.

1958-59: Mao promotes a "Great Leap Forward" in economic development, relying on mass mobilization, the commune system, and indigenous methods. The effort fails for the most part because of administrative weakness aggravated by bad weather. PRC attacks offshore islands under Nationalist control (September). Defense Minister Peng Dehuai ousted after he criticizes Mao's sponsorship of the Great Leap Forward; replaced by Lin Biao.

1960: Withdrawal of the Soviet technical advisors, widening the Sino-Soviet rift (see Sino-Soviet chronology [V.2]). Return to more conventional economic development policies to deal with the post-Great Leap Forward depression.

1961-65: The CCP becomes increasingly divided over how to pursue economic development, with Mao and his more radical associates pitted against Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and other moderate leaders. Lin Biao, defense minister and one of Mao's allies, leads campaigns to increase political consciousness in the military by stressing the study of Mao's thought. China detonates its first nuclear device (1964).

1966-69: Mao leads the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," to attack the Party bureaucracy that was frustrating his initiatives and to revive revolutionary commitment. Millions of students (the Red Guards) are mobilized and a host of Party veterans -- most notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping -- are purged. Mao is forced to call the army in to end the endemic disorder.

1969: The Ninth National Congress of the CCP issues a new Party Constitution that names Lin Biao as "Comrade Mao Zedong's close comrade-in-arms and successor."

1971: The beginning of Sino-American rapprochement (see Sino-American chronology [V.4]). Death of Lin Biao after alleged coup attempt (September). PRC succeeds to China's seat in the United Nations (October).

1972: Nixon visits the PRC. Shanghai Communique (see V.5) signed.

1973: Deng Xiaoping reappears in public for the first time since the Cultural Revolution (April). The CCP's Tenth Congress issues a new Party Constitution, eliminating clause naming Lin Biao as Mao's successor.

1974: Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and other moderate leaders chip away at policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution. Radical forces mount a campaign to "criticize Confucius," ostensibly to eliminate feudal ways of thought but actually to defend the Cultural Revolution and indirectly attack Zhou.

1975: Fourth National People's Congress is convened. Zhou Enlai outlines an economic modernization plan for the PRC, but radical opposition is apparent. Deng Xiaoping elected to Politburo Standing Committee, but his approach to economic development, education, and science comes under increasing attack by Mao's more radical followers.

1976: Zhou Enlai dies (January 8). Hua Guofeng is named acting premier (February 7) amid expectations that Deng Xiaoping would succeed Zhou. A mass demonstration occurs in Beijing's Tiananmen Square over the removal of wreaths honoring Zhou Enlai (April 5). The Politburo strips Deng of all his posts and names Hua Guofeng full premier and first vice chairman of the CCP (April 7). Zhu De dies (July 6). The northern city of Tangshan is struck by a massive earthquake (July 28) that kills close to a million people. Mao Zedong dies (September 9). Four weeks later (October 6), Hua Guofeng leads the arrest of leading radicals, including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao Wenyuan (soon labeled the "gang of four"). Hua becomes chairman of the CCP and chairman of its Military Affairs Commission.

IV. CHINA AFTER MAO

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

Mao Zedong died on September 8, 1976. On October 6 veterans of the revolution arrested a number of Mao's radical adherents and dubbed the leading figures the "gang of four" (their biographies appear in section III.3b). Those Politburo members remaining named Hua Guofeng the new Party chairman (biography begins on p. 40).

But like the Chinese Revolution as a whole, political succession in China should be seen not as a single event -- a change in the occupant of the nation's supreme office. Rather it is a process that goes through stages, beginning with key leadership positions and bodies, extending to policies and institutions, and culminating in the society as a whole. It is a process that must deal with the past as well as the present and the future. And it is a process that takes years rather than days, one that in fact began well before Mao died and continues today (see chronology [IV.2] on pages 38-40).

The Leadership Since 1976 Deng Xiaoping and his associates have gradually eclipsed Hua Guofeng and others who rose during the Cultural Revolution. Even in the mid-1970s, Deng had emerged as the leader of the moderate coalition, buoyed by broad political support in the government, Party, and military hierarchies. His vigorous advocacy of pragmatic policies in 1975 precipitated his second purge at the hands of the radicals in 1976. Mao then picked Hua Guofeng as his successor. In July 1977, Deng returned to his posts and began to reshape the central Party and State leaderships, simultaneously removing recalcitrant beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution and transferring power to younger individuals he can trust to perpetuate his policies. (See pages 40-45 for biographies of the Politburo standing committee [IV.3] and lists of leading Party and state leaders [IV.4 and IV.5].)

Deng reaped the fruit of his political labors in 1980. February saw the emergence of his protege Hu Yaobang as Party general secretary and the purge of the "little gang of four" (Maoist holdovers who had frustrated Deng's efforts). In April his close ally Zhao Ziyang took charge of day-to-day government administration and, in September, replaced Hua Guofeng as premier. Also in September Deng led many of his elder colleagues in resigning their government positions (they retained their Party posts). By the end of the year it appeared that Hua had resigned his chairmanship under pressure, leaving Hu Yaobang as the dominant figure in the Party hierarchy.

Institutions To implement its policies the Chinese leadership chooses to rely on a dual structure of Party and State hierarchies that reach from Beijing to every city and commune. But it is a structure that bears the scars of the Cultural Revolution. The intense leadership conflict in Beijing often fostered factionalism in provinces and counties. The line between Party and government was blurred. The rapidly shifting political line made lower level officials timid about implementing new policies. Some officials took advantage of reduced central controls to engage in corruption. Despite the Cultural Revolution, bureaucratic vested interests grew as China grew more complex. Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues have tried to get control of this bureaucracy as they have changed the nation's policy agenda.

The formal Party structure (see chart [IV.6] on page 46), modeled on the Soviet Communist Party, combines two different types of institutions: members' meetings and representative congresses; and committees and secretaries. Until now, the latter type has been more important that the former, and power has flowed from the top down rather than the other way. Formally, Party congresses -- held at national, provincial, and county levels -- and general membership meetings of primary organizations elect the committees and secretaries to be the executive bodies at that level. In practice, they meet infrequently, largely to ratify the work of their committees. Moreover, higher levels have a large say in the scheduling of congresses, their composition, and the election of the committees and secretaries.

At the national level, for example, the Central Committee of the Party, the most important representative body in China, delegates key decision-making powers to its Politburo, whose power is further centralized in the standing committee. The Politburo exercises its executive power through a central Party bureaucracy consisting of a Secretariat -- reestablished in February 1980 -- and various departments that supervise state ministries and lower level CCP organizations that conduct the daily work of the Party bureaucracy. These organizations themselves have secretaries and standing committees analagous to the Politburo.

Underlying this structure is the basic organizational principle of "democratic centralism." This principle combines "inner-Party democracy" in the discussion of issues and election of leading bodies, and, once a decision is made, "centralist discipline," subordinating the individual to the organization, the minority to the majority, the lower level to the higher level, and the entire Party to the Central Committee.

The current leadership believes that the Cultural Revolution seriously eroded the principle and has instituted changes that, it would say, makes the Party more democratic and more centralized. To encourage democracy a member's right to speak his mind in internal discussions without fear of sanctions has been guaranteed. Elections of representatives to basic-level congresses are now contested. To raise the standards of the Party's membership of 38 million, "commissions for inspecting discipline" have been created at all levels, and the central discipline commission has issued injunctions against factionalism, bureaucratic foot dragging, and the pursuit of privilege.

The State structure (see chart [IV.7] on p. 47) roughly parallels that of the CCP in two respects. First, there is a similar division of administrative units among central, provincial, county, and basic levels, facilitating Party supervision of corresponding state organs. Second, there is a similar distinction between representative and executive/administrative hierarchies. Representative congresses possess formal constitutional authority, but the administrative organs have the actual power. The representative bodies are called people's congresses; administrative bodies are known as governments (a change from the Cultural Revolution era when they were known as "revolutionary committees"). At the central level the key administrative unit is the State Council, a sort of large cabinet. With an array of commissions and ministries under its control, it is an important agency of the centralized governmental structure, even though it is subordinate to central Party directives.

To expand citizen participation at the local level, the leadership has instituted direct election of congresses up to the county level and is permitting election slates with more candidates than places to be filled. Congresses above the county level will continue to be elected indirectly by the subordinate congresses within their jurisdictions. In the past congresses have met too rarely and briefly to hold their committees accountable. The 1980 session of the National People's Congress, where delegates were unusually aggressive in raising questions concerning government structure, policy, and performance, was an exception to that rule. Whether it becomes the norm throughout the hierarchy remains to be seen.

The legal structure has been revived in an effort to prevent the perceived injustices of the Cultural Revolution. Procuratorates, responsible for investigation and prosecution, and courts are functioning again for the first time since 1966. A program of codification has begun: a criminal code and criminal procedure statute was promulgated in early 1980, with various civil codes promised later. A serious shortage of lawyers and judges is only one of the obstacles to the emergence of vigorous legal institutions. Traditionally the rule of law had only limited application; even after 1949 the rule of Party and police was primary.

Policy and Society Since Mao's death, there has been a sweeping reversal of Cultural Revolution policy in almost every field. Where Mao had advocated a policy of growth with equality, Deng Xiaoping has advocated rewarding expertise and performance that contribute to economic growth. Prosperity not politics, Deng believes, will end inequality. Where Mao had preferred to open China's doors only slightly to the outside world rather than risk "bourgeois" contamination, Deng has opened the door rather widely and thus candidly recognizes the economic backwardness of contemporary China. But he remains confident that China can hold to its cultural moorings. Whereas the late Maoist era saw close political supervision of all aspects of life, the new leadership is experimenting with allowing relatively more autonomy to economic enterprises, peasants, writers and artists, the legal system, religious believers, scientists, educators, and political critics. However, the boundaries between freedom and control are still being negotiated.

The Past The Dengist leadership has tried to secure its present and future position by criticizing the rule of Mao Zedong, particularly the period since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. As extracts from official documents make clear (see section IV.8, pages 48-50), a more and more clearcut verdict is being rendered, including an exoneration of Liu Shaoqi, Mao's principal Cultural Revolution target. What is unclear is how this new version of history will be accepted, especially by the beneficiaries of that convulsive period.

Suggested Readings

Barnett, A. Doak. *Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Based on research in the early 1960s, it provides a wealth of detail on the political system that the post-Mao leadership is to some extent trying to restore.

Kallgren, Joyce, ed. *The People's Republic of China After Thirty Years: An Overview*. Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley Center for Chinese Studies, 1979. Includes chapters on political institutions, political development, foreign policy, the economy, and public policy.

Li, Victor H. Law Without Lawyers: A Comparative View of Law in the United States and China. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978. Analysis of the recent and historical context of and possible obstacles to the current efforts to revive a formal legal system.

Oxnam, Robert B., and Bush, Richard C., eds. China Briefing 1980. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980. Short reviews on developments in China from late 1978 to early 1980, in the fields of politics, economics, foreign affairs, and culture.

Terrill, Ross, ed. The China Difference. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. Sixteen China specialists evaluate what makes China tick after three decades of Communist rule by exploring the complexities of belief systems -- past and present -- and of social, political, and cultural life.

Townsend, James R. Politics in China. 2nd ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980. A general survey of the Chinese political system, focusing on institutional development.

2. Chronology of Post-Mao China

1976: Mao Zedong dies (September 9). Four weeks later (October 6) Premier Hua Guofeng leads the arrest of the leading "radicals," including Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan who are dubbed the "gang of four." A virulent campaign against them ensues. Hua Guofeng is named chairman of the Party and of its military affairs commission. In November the new leadership reinstates the "four modernizations" as the central focus of economic policy and the principle of "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend" in cultural policy. "National Conference for Learning from Dazhai in Agriculture" convenes in December. Hua Guofeng gives major speech, emphasizing farm mechanization.

1977: The year is marked by: the ongoing campaign against the "gang of four" and their supporters; personnel changes at the central and provincial levels; and a shift in domestic policy away from the Cultural Revolution emphasis on egalitarianism and political loyalty and toward a stress on expertise and material incentives.

January The Anti-Confucius Campaign of 1974 is denounced as a political plot by the "gang of four" against Zhou Enlai and other moderate leaders (see page 34). Beijing wall posters call for the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping.

March A Party central work conference considers the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping.

April The fifth volume of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong (covering the years 1949-57) is published. The "Learn from Daqing in Industry" conference convenes.

July The CCP Central Committee confirms Hua Guofeng's Party posts, rehabilitates Deng Xiaoping, and expels the "gang of four."

August The Eleventh Party Congress is held, a new Central Committee and Politburo are selected, and Hua Guofeng announces the end of the "first Cultural Revolution." US Secretary of State Vance visits China.

Fall 60% of Chinese industrial workers receive wage increases, and bonuses reemerge as a way of spurring productivity. Academic entrance examinations are restored, and high school graduates are no longer required to spend time working before entering college.

1978: February-March The Fifth National People's Congress is held; Hua Guofeng remains premier of the State Council. In his report on the work of the government Hua lays out an ambitious program of industrial, agricultural, and scientific modernization. A new state constitution is promulgated. At a national science conference in March, Deng Xiaoping proposes an enhanced role for science in economic development and less political restrictions for scientists.
April A national education work conference is held amid continuing controversy over educational reforms.
May Zbigniew Brzezinski visits China.
June At an army political work conference, Deng proposes "seeking truth from facts" rather than taking Mao Zedong's ideas too literally.
August Hua Guofeng visits Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran.
Fall China modifies its foreign economic policies to permit more liberal credit arrangements, compensation trade, and direct foreign investments. Negotiations proceed with foreign corporations on a broad array of projects.
October The verdict on the Tiananmen Incident is reversed; it is now termed a "revolutionary act." Wu De, the mayor of Beijing during the incident and an alleged ally of the "gang of four," is removed from his position. Deng Xiaoping visits Japan.
November Amid contentious Party meetings on a broad range of economic and political issues, a vigorous "wall poster" campaign begins, attacking the Cultural Revolution and policies of Mao Zedong.
December The normalization of US-China relations is announced. From December 18 to 25, the third plenum of the CCP Central Committee meets. It calls for a focus on "socialist modernization," liberalizes agricultural policies, exonerates Deng Xiaoping of charges made against him in 1976, approves of the Tiananmen Incident as a "revolutionary" action, rehabilitates Peng Dehuai (see page 30), calls for a strengthening of the legal system and Party discipline, and promises an evaluation of the Cultural Revolution.

1979: January China enunciates a new policy on the "reunification" with Taiwan, whereby much of the status quo on the island could continue in return for Nationalist acceptance of PRC sovereignty. Deng Xiaoping leaves for the United States.
February China invades Vietnam and begins a reevaluation of the scope of the modernization program.
March Wall posters are restricted and leading dissidents arrested.
April-May Deng Xiaoping comes under attack on a range of issues (modernization, political dissidence, social unrest, the opening to the US, the Vietnam war, and the Cultural Revolution).
June Deng and his allies counterattack and regain the political momentum. The second session of the Fifth National People's Congress endorses an economic "readjustment," abolishes the revolutionary committee structure, and passes laws on the criminal legal system and joint ventures with foreign firms.

August US Vice President Mondale visits China.
September Fourth plenum of the Central Committee elevates Zhao Ziyang and Peng Zhen to the Politburo, approves more flexible agriculture policies, and endorses a review of the history of the PRC that scathingly criticizes the Cultural Revolution. Ye Jianying delivers the review as a speech.
October 30th anniversary of the PRC on the 1st. Wei Jingsheng, leading dissident, sentenced for 15 years. Hua Guofeng begins a trip to France, West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. Cultural Congress convenes, the first in 19 years; calls for greater freedom of artistic expression.
November China admitted to the Olympics.
December Beijing "Democracy Wall" moved from downtown to less accessible location.

1980: January New laws governing local governments and the legal system go into effect. On the 16th, Deng Xiaoping gives a major speech on China in the 1980s and recommends that the display of wall posters no longer be constitutionally protected.
February Deng resigns his position as Army chief-of-staff. The fifth plenum of the Central Committee fully rehabilitates Liu Shaoqi, Mao's principal Cultural Revolution target; removes Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De (all beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution) from the Politburo; restores the Party Secretariat; and elevates Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Politburo standing committee.
March The CCP issues a set of "principles for internal Party political life" in an effort to revive its institutional vitality.
April Zhao Ziyang becomes a vice premier and takes charge of the day-to-day work of the State Council. China is admitted to the International Monetary Fund.
May China is admitted to the World Bank.
June CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang says that Mao Zedong made serious "errors that have been the cause of great misfortunes for the Party and the Chinese people."
August Most public portraits of Mao are ordered removed.
September At the third session of the Fifth National People's Congress, Hua Guofeng resigns the premiership and is replaced by Zhao Ziyang.
November The "gang of four" and former military figures associated with Lin Biao go on trial for their activities.
December Hua Guofeng reportedly resigns his position as Party chairman; Deng Xiaoping replaces him as chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Commission.

3. Biographies of Major Party Leaders

Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party

Born in 1920 or 1921 in Shanxi Province, Hua rose to his present position through the ranks of Party and government administrators in Mao Zedong's native Hunan province. In the early 1950s he served as Party secretary at the county and special district level, and achieved local prominence by virtue of his vigorous sponsorship of the agricultural collectivization movement. By 1958 Hua had become a provincial vice governor and a member of the provincial Party committee, with responsibilities at various times for culture, education, finance and trade, and relations with non-Party groups.

Hua survived the Cultural Revolution to become a vice chairman of the Hunan revolutionary committee in 1968, and then the first Party secretary in 1970. In 1971 he began to appear regularly in Beijing, having been appointed to the staff office of Zhou Enlai's State Council and to a special body appointed to investigate the Lin Biao affair. Hua was elected to the Politburo in 1973 and became a vice premier and minister of public security in 1975. As vice premier he had responsibility for agriculture and for science and technology, as well as for public security work.

After the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, Hua was named acting premier, leapfrogging the two most prominent contenders, Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Chunqiao. After Deng's purge in April 1976, Hua became premier and first vice chairman of the Party Central Committee, reportedly on Mao's proposal. Following Mao's death in September, the "gang of four" sought to block Hua's accession to the Party chairmanship; he responded by placing them under arrest on October 6. Hua's selection as chairman was endorsed by the Politburo on October 7, by the Central Committee in July 1977, and by the Eleventh Party Congress in August 1977. He also served as the chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Committee. Hua was confirmed as premier of the State Council by the Fifth National People's Congress (early 1978), at which he delivered the report on the work of the government. He was the first person in PRC history to have held simultaneously the positions of Party chairman and premier.

Hua visited North Korea in May 1978, and Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran in August. In the fall of 1979 he traveled to four European countries, being the first Chinese head of state and Party to do so. He attended the funeral of Yugoslav leader Marshal Tito in May 1980 and visited Japan several weeks later.

Hua's political position became increasingly tenuous during 1980. In February four Politburo members (Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Ji Dengkui, and Wu De) were purged. They, like Hua, had had close ties to Mao and rose during the Cultural Revolution. In September Hua gave up the post of premier to Zhao Ziyang. At the end of the year he reportedly resigned as chairman of the Party's Central Committee and Military Affairs Commission, with a formal announcement to come in early 1981.

Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying), Vice Chairman of the Party

Born in 1898, Ye was a major Communist military figure during the revolution, serving as chief-of-staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the late 1940s. After 1949 he served as mayor of Guangzhou and governor of his native Guangdong province. With the reorganization of the PLA after the Korean War, Ye was named director of the PLA inspectorate and was elected to the Party's Military Affairs Committee. During the mid-1950s he was an outspoken advocate of military modernization. He was elected to the Politburo in January of 1967 and became a Party vice chairman in 1973. After the purge of Lin Biao in 1971, Ye was placed in charge of military affairs and was formally named minister of defense in 1975. At the Fifth National People's Congress in early 1978, Ye presented the report on the revision of the state constitution. He gave up the national defense portfolio at that time but became chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress (equivalent to head of state). In late September 1979 Ye delivered a major address on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. In this address Ye boldly rejected Mao's definition of revisionism and thereby eroded the ideological underpinnings of the Cultural Revolution.

Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing), Vice Chairman of the Party

Born in Sichuan in 1904, Deng joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1924 while on a work-study program in France. After returning to China, he assumed important posts in the political commissariat in the Red Army, eventually becoming the political commissar of the 2nd Field Army under Liu Bocheng. After 1949 Deng served for three years in Southwest China, but was transferred to Beijing in 1952 to become vice premier and to serve for a brief period as minister of finance. In 1954 he became secretary general of the Central Committee, where he was responsible for the day-to-day work of the Party. The following year he was elected to the Politburo, and his title was changed to general secretary, reflecting an increase in his power.

Deng held both those positions until the Cultural Revolution and was considered, along with Mao, Zhou, and Liu Shaoqi, to be one of the most powerful men in China. During the Cultural Revolution he was accused of following "Liu Shaoqi's revisionist line," and was dismissed from office.

Deng was rehabilitated in April 1973, resuming his vice premiership, and was returned to the Politburo in late 1973. In early 1975 he became a vice chairman of the Party and chief-of-staff of the military. He also took charge of the day-to-day work of the Party. Soon, however, his criticism of Cultural Revolution programs and his plans for China's economic development aroused the opposition of radical leaders, who succeeded in having him purged for a second time, in April 1976. After considerable discussion within the Politburo following Mao's death, Deng was restored to his various posts at the third plenum of the Tenth Central Committee in July 1977, and gradually thereafter achieved a preeminent political position. He has facilitated a near total reversal of the verdict on the Cultural Revolution, its victims (including his former ally Liu Shaoqi), and Mao himself.

In the fall of 1978 he went to Japan to sign the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The following January he came to the US, where he signed major science and cultural agreements and discussed the world situation with President Carter.

As part of the transfer of power to younger leaders, Deng gave up his army chief-of-staff post in April 1980 and his vice premiership in September of the same year. He reportedly replaced Hua Guofeng as chairman of the Party Military Affairs Commission in late 1980.

Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien), Vice Chairman of the Party

Born in Hubei province about 1905, Li was a commander in the People's Liberation Army before 1949. After liberation he was governor of his native province and held several other important positions in the central-south region. Li became minister of finance in 1954, succeeding Deng Xiaoping. He was soon promoted to a vice premiership, responsible for all financial and trade matters. In September 1956 Li was elected to the Politburo. He was one of the few high-ranking economic planners to remain in office throughout the Cultural Revolution. He became a vice chairman of the Party at the Eleventh Party Congress in August 1977. Since 1949 he has traveled widely in Asia and the Communist world. Li caused quite a stir in mid-1979 when he told Chinese officials that perhaps as many as 100 million citizens had an inadequate diet. In September 1980 Li gave up his vice premiership.

Chen Yun (Ch'en Yun), Vice Chairman of the Party

Chen was born in approximately 1900 (some say 1905) in Jiangsu Province. He participated in part of the Long March, and spent time in Russia in the mid-1930s. In the early 1950s Chen worked closely with Zhou Enlai on economic affairs, being named the first of ten vice premiers in 1954. Two years later he was elected to the Politburo and its standing committee, becoming one of China's most powerful half-dozen personalities. In the debates surrounding the Great Leap Forward -- initiated by Mao Zedong in the late 1950s -- Chen continually called for measured, steady, and systematic growth, stimulated by material incentives rather than mass mobilization. This opposition to Mao's policies had by 1961 earned him obscurity, an obscurity that ended only after Mao's demise and the purge of the "gang of four" in 1976. At the third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, Chen was catapulted back onto the Politburo and its standing committee. Formally, he ranks number five in the Party hierarchy. As well, Chen was named the first secretary of the Central Commission for Inspecting Party Discipline. In mid-1979 he was also named a vice premier, but gave up the post a year later as part of an effort to elevate younger officials.

Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang), General Secretary of the Party

Born in 1915 in Mao's home province of Hunan, Hu Yaobang is a rising star in the Chinese ruling elite, an individual with long-standing ties to Deng Xiaoping. For much of the period since the early 1930s, Hu was involved with Youth League work, becoming head of that organization in the early 1950s. From 1949 to 1952, years that Deng Xiaoping worked in Sichuan, Hu was a key official in the province's northern region. Elected a member of the Central Committee in late 1956, Hu generally spent the next decade in Beijing, except for a brief interlude in Shaanxi province in early 1965 as acting first Party secretary. During the height of the Cultural Revolution, Hu was denounced as a follower of Liu Shaoqi, and, as a result of his close ties to Deng Xiaoping, he was on neither the Ninth or Tenth Central Committees (1969 and 1973).

Only in August 1977 did Hu once again gain membership on the Central Committee. He became director of the Party's organization department late in the year, and a member of the standing committee of the National People's Congress in March 1978. At the third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978), he became a Politburo member, Party secretary general, and third secretary of the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. At about this time, he moved from the Party organization department to its propaganda department. At the February 1980 fifth plenum, Hu was elevated to the standing committee of the Politburo and was acknowledged as head of the newly reconstituted Party Secretariat, in the capacity of general secretary (the post held by Deng Xiaoping prior to the Cultural Revolution). He is no longer director of the Party propaganda department. Already one of the most powerful leaders in China, Hu will gain the most from Hua Guofeng's reported resignation from the Party chairmanship.

Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang), Premier of the State Council

Born in 1919, Zhao is a veteran Party cadre with extensive experience in south China. Between 1951 and 1955 he was secretary general of the Party's south China bureau, responsible for Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. Then, he rose gradually in the Guangdong provincial Party apparatus, finally becoming first Party secretary in 1965. Purged during the Cultural Revolution as a "revisionist," Zhao was rehabilitated in 1971 and sent to Inner Mongolia to serve on the provincial Party committee. By March 1972 he was back in Guangdong and was named first secretary in April 1974. In December 1975 he was transferred to Sichuan, China's most populous province, to become first Party secretary, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, and first political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region.

Since Deng Xiaoping's July 1977 rehabilitation, Zhao has rapidly gained political prominence. He made Sichuan a pacesetter in a number of policy areas. He was elected an alternate member of the Politburo at the Eleventh Party Congress (August 1977), a full member at the fourth plenum (September 1979), and a member of the standing committee at the fifth plenum (February 1980). During late 1979 and early 1980 Zhao relinquished his government and Party posts in Sichuan. In April 1980 he became a vice premier, and it was soon revealed that he had taken charge of the day-to-day work of the State Council, previously the responsibility of Deng Xiaoping. He became premier in September 1980, replacing Hua Guofeng.

4. Leadership of the CCP

The Politburo

Chen Muhua**
Chen Yonggui
Chen Yun*
Deng Xiaoping*
Deng Yingchao
Fang Yi
Geng Biao
Hu Yaobang*
Hua Guofeng*
Li Desheng
Li Xiannian*
Liu Bocheng
Ni Zhifu
Nie Rongzhen
Peng Chong
Peng Zhen
Seypidin**
Ulanhu
Wang Zhen
Wei Guoqing
Xu Shiyou
Xu Xiangqian
Ye Jianying*
Yu Qiuli
Zhang Tingfa
Zhao Ziyang*

The Secretariat

General Secretary: Hu Yaobang

Members:

Fang Yi
Gu Mu
Hu Qiaomu
Peng Chong
Song Renqiong
Wan Li
Wang Renzhong
Yang Dezhi
Yao Yilin
Yu Qiuli
Zhao Ziyang

Directors of Central Departments

Organization	Song Renqiong
Propaganda	Wang Renzhong
International Liaison	Ji Pengfei
Discipline Inspection Commission	Chen Yun
United Front Work	Ulanhu

* Members of the Politburo's Standing Committee.
** Alternate (non-voting) member

5. Government Leadership

National People's Congress Standing Committee

Chairman: Ye Jianying

The State Council

Premier: Zhao Ziyang

Vice Premiers:

Bo Yibo
Chen Muhua
Fang Yi
Geng Biao
Gu Mu
Huang Hua
Kang Shi'en
Wan Li
Yang Jingren
Yao Yilin
Yu Qiuli
Zhang Aiping

Commissions of the State Council

Agriculture	Wan Li
Capital Construction	Gu Mu
Economics	Kang Shi'en
Energy Resources	Yu Qiuli
Finance and Economics	Chen Yun
Foreign Investment	Gu Mu
Import-Export Control	Gu Mu
Machine Building Industry	Bo Yibo
Nationalities	Yang Jingren
Planning	Yao Yilin
Science and Technology	Fang Yi

Supreme People's Court

President: Jiang Hua

Supreme People's Procuratorate

President: Huang Huoqing

6. Structure of the Chinese Communist Party



N.B. County-level organizations include congresses and committees at the regimental level and above in the PLA. Primary-level organizations include branches, general branches, or committees which are set up in factories, mines and other enterprises, communes, offices, schools, shops, neighborhoods, PLA companies and other such units.

7. Structure of the PRC Government


State Council
Premier & Vice Premiers
Ministries & Commissions
Standing Comm.
National People's Congress
Supreme Court
Supreme Procuratorate
Provincial-level Governments: 21 provinces, 5 autonomus regions, 3 directly administered cities
Governments
Stndg. Comm. Congress
Courts
Procuratorates
Prefectural Adm. Offices
County-level governments: c. 2000 counties, 170 cities, 100 autonomous counties and prefectures
Governments
Stndg. Comm. Congress
Courts
Procuratorates
Basic-level governments: municipal districts, towns, c. 50,000 communes
Governments
Stndg. Comm. Congress
Street Offices & Police Boxes
Rural Production Brigades & Teams
Urban Production & Residential Units

Note: Terms for people's congresses are five years at the national and provincial levels, three years at the county level, and two years at the basic level.

8. Evaluations of the Cultural Revolution

a) Hua Guofeng's Political Report to the Eleventh Congress of The Chinese Communist Party, August 12, 1977

Smashing the "gang of four" is yet another signal victory achieved in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Chairman Mao pointed out: "The current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism." In the light of the historical lesson of capitalist restoration in the Soviet Union and the real danger of such a restoration in China, Chairman Mao, with unmatched revolutionary courage and vision, personally launched and led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which has no precedent in the history of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the course of this momentous political revolution, our Party won the ninth, tenth and eleventh major struggles of line and demolished the three bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao and the "gang of four." Through repeated battles our Party wrested from their hands that portion of power they had usurped. As a result, the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country is more consolidated than ever and the way is open to applying Chairman Mao's revolutionary line correctly and in its entirety. . . .

Through this political revolution Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has been disseminated, and in this great field of practice Chairman Mao's great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat has been enriched and developed and been grasped more profoundly by the numerous cadres and the masses. China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution provides the international communist movement with fresh experience in combatting and guarding against revisionism, consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and preventing capitalist restoration. It makes the world proletariat much more confident of victory in their struggle for socialism and communism. Beyond any doubt, it will go down in the history of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a momentous innovation which will shine with increasing splendour with the passage of time. . . .

Thus, the smashing of the "gang of four" marks the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted eleven years. . . .

The victorious conclusion of the first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution certainly does not mean the end of class struggle or of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Throughout the historical period of socialism the struggle between the two classes. the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and between the two roads, socialism and capitalism, continues to exist. This struggle will be protracted and tortuous and at times very sharp. Political revolutions in the nature of the Cultural Revolution will take place many times in the future.

b) Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, December 22, 1978

. . . Socialist modernization is . . . a profound and extensive revolution. There is still in our country today a small handful of counterrevolutionary elements and criminals who hate our socialist modernization and try to undermine it. We must not relax our class struggle against them, nor can we weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out, the large-scale turbulent class struggles of a mass character have in the main come to an end. . . . The Great Cultural Revolution should also be viewed historically, scientifically, and in a down-to-earth way. Comrade Mao Zedong initiated this great revolution primarily in the light of the fact that the Soviet Union had turned revisionist and for the purpose of opposing revisionism and preventing its occurrence. As for the shortcomings and mistakes in the actual course of the revolution, they should be summed up at the appropriate time as experience and lessons so as to unify the views of the whole Party and the people of the whole country. However, there should be no haste about this. Shelving this problem will not prevent us from solving all other problems left over from past history in a down-to-earth manner, nor will it affect our concentration of efforts to speed up the four modernizations, the greatest historic task of the time.

c) Speech by Ye Jianying on September 29, 1979 commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic China

. . . In the ten years of the Cultural Revolution which began in 1966, our country went through a fierce struggle between revolution and counterrevolution. The Cultural Revolution was launched with the aim of preventing and combatting revisionism. For a proletarian party in power, it is of course necessary to be constantly on guard against going down the revisionist road characterized by oppression of the people at home and pursuit of hegemony abroad. But the point is that, at the time when the Cultural Revolution was launched, the estimate made of the situation within the Party and the country ran counter to reality, no accurate definition was given of revisionism, and an erroneous policy and method of struggle were adopted, deviating from the principle of democratic centralism. Driven by counterrevolutionary motives, Lin Biao, the gang of four and other conspirators and careerists exploited these errors, pushed things to the extreme and formulated and pursued an ultra-Left line. They engaged in "overthrowing everything and launching an all-out civil war," usurping the Party leadership and staging a coup to seize power. They attempted to undermine the foundation of our socialist system, subvert the dictatorship of the proletariat, destroy the leadership of the Party, adulterate Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and plunge our country once again into blood-baths and terror. The havoc which the counterrevolutionary gang wrought for ten long years spelt calamity for our people and constituted the most severe reversal to our socialist cause since the founding of the People's Republic. Their conspiratorial activities were entirely different in nature from the errors committed by our Party. They were the most vicious enemies of the entire people, and it was impossible to settle their case through inner-Party struggle. By overthrowing the gang of four, we rescued our Party and state from disaster, swept aside the biggest obstacle in our path to progress, brought our work back onto the right track under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and ushered in a new period in the development of our country. . . .

d) Communique of the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, February 29, 1980

. . . The plenary session holds that Comrade Liu Shaoqi, former vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the People's Republic of China, and a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary, was loyal to the Party and the people at all times over the past decades, devoted all his energy to the revolutionary cause of the proletariat and made indelible contributions to China's new democratic revolution and its socialist revolution and construction. Because the appraisal of the situation in the Party and the country on the eve of the Cultural Revolution was contrary to fact, an entirely groundless inference was made, asserting that there was within the Party a counterrevolutionary revisionist line and then that there was a so-called bourgeois headquarters headed by Comrade Liu Shaoqi. Seizing upon this to serve their counterrevolutionary purpose of usurping supreme Party and state leadership and subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lin Biao, the gang of four and company concocted false evidence and deliberately subjected Comrade Liu Shaoqi to political frame-up and physical persecution, and they overthrew a large number of leading Party, government and army cadres on the false charges of being Liu Shaoqi's agents. This brought extremely grave consequences. This biggest frame-up our Party has ever known in its history must be completely overturned. . . .

. . . This plenary session . . . [has] decided to remove the labels "renegade, traitor and scab" which the 12th plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Party imposed on Comrade Liu Shaoqi, to cancel the erroneous resolution expelling him "from the Party once and for all and dismissing him from all posts both inside and outside the Party," to cancel the original report on the examination and clear the name of Comrade Liu Shaoqi as a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary and one of the principal leaders of the Party and state; to hold a memorial meeting at an appropriate time for Comrade Liu Shaoqi; to leave it up to the departments concerned to redress the frame-ups and false and wrong cases arising from the issue of Comrade Liu Shaoqi; and, in the spirit of unity and looking ahead, to transmit the resolution of the plenary session to all Party members and the people throughout the country so as to clear away the effects flowing from the past incorrect decision on Liu Shaoqi's case and encourage all Party comrades and the rest of the Chinese people to work confidently, devotedly and with one mind for the realization of the splendid cause of the four modernizations.

Source: a) Peking Review, August 26, 1977, pp. 38-39.
b) Peking Review, December 29, 1978, p. 173.
c) Beijing Review, October 5, 1979, p. 15.
d) Beijing Review, March 10, 1980, p. 9.

V. FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

China in the Modern World For over a century China has simultaneously faced three foreign policy problems. The first problem is strategic, avoiding both isolation and dependence. The second is diplomatic, gaining international recognition and respect as a full member of the community of nations. The third is military, protecting national borders from external threat.

China's plight was probably most acute in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (See the chronologies of Sino-Soviet [V.2], Sino-Japanese [V.3], and Sino-American relations [V.4] on pages 55-57, 58-61, and 61-66.) The foreign powers treated China as a semi-colony, depriving it of sovereign powers (such as collection of maritime customs, and prosecution of foreigners who committed crimes in the country). Militarily China was weak, the object of periodic episodes of "gunboat diplomacy." Strategically, it had to choose between isolation in the face of a foreign "united front" or extreme dependence on one power. There was some improvement under the Nationalists -- customs autonomy was restored in the early 1930s and extraterritoriality ended in the early 1940s -- but that progress came in the context of a major Japanese invasion and anxious reliance on the United States.

With the Communist victory in 1949 the problems of foreign policy persisted (see chronologies cited above). International recognition had to be gained anew. New strategic choices had to be made. And a revolutionary army had to be transformed into a national defense force. Although the United States did not initially view a "Communist China" in a completely negative light, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 led to a twenty-year US diplomatic, strategic, and military containment of the PRC.

Foreign Policy Strategy Since 1949 China's foreign relations have gone through three major phases. In the 1950s Beijing "leaned" to the side of the socialist camp (especially the Soviet Union) for trade, economic assistance, and national security. Mao and other Chinese leaders soon began to resent the dependency involved and came to doubt whether the Soviet economic model could be adapted to China.

The Sino-Soviet conflict began as early as 1956 and was obvious by the early 1960s. More isolated internationally, Beijing sought closer ties with the growing number of Third World countries, chose Japan as its major trading partner, and began developing nuclear weapons. This second, "anti-imperialist," stage of Chinese foreign policy was most intense during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

With the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and a bloody border incident on the Sino-Soviet border in early 1969, Chinese foreign policy entered its third phase. Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai discarded the "dual adversary" strategy of the 1960s in favor of building a "global united front" against the USSR, including Western Europe, Japan, and the United States. In the process they placed more emphasis on relations with governments than on revolutionary parties opposing those governments. And vis-a-vis the United States they postponed resolution of the Taiwan issue to facilitate rapprochement, a process that began in 1972 with Richard Nixon's visit to Beijing (see Shanghai Communique text [V.5], pp. 66-68).

Mao's successors have moved more quickly along the strategic course of the early 1970s. Trade with and investment from the advanced industrial countries are seen as a key factor in achieving the "four modernizations." Moreover, Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues have been willing to make certain compromises on principles to enhance relations with Japan and the United States. The normalization of Sino-American relations in early 1979 is a prime example (see relevant documents [V.6] on pp. 68-69). Since then relations have developed rapidly in the economic, scientific, cultural, and even military realms. In its search for a "peaceful international environment" Beijing has also tried to avoid direct military conflict with Moscow, but deep-seated tensions will probably prevent rapprochement with the USSR in the short term and insure competition on a range of multilateral issues.

Growing International Status The change in China's strategic position facilitated its emergence as a full member of the international community. Gaining diplomatic recognition was a slow process (see chronological list of recognizing countries [V.7] on pp. 70-71). In late 1949 and early 1950 all the Soviet bloc countries and fifteen European and Asian nations recognized the new regime. With the beginning of the Korean War and the American containment policy, the situation remained frozen till 1955. Over the course of the next decade a number of new Third World nations and France brooked American opposition and recognized Beijing. After the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-69), as the United States was moving toward China strategically, all but a handful of countries have extended recognition. Also, in 1971, China replaced the Nationalists in the United Nations. With the normalization of US-China relations in 1979 and China's entry into the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Olympics in 1980, the process is now virtually complete.

The Chinese Military China has the world's largest standing army, with about 4.3 million persons under arms (i.e., about 4% of the population), and a much larger militia force in reserve. As early as 1927 the Communist Party began building armed forces to survive in a militarized political environment. By 1949 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had grown to over 2.3 million soldiers, and its five major component armies had won the civil war over the Nationalists and occupied various parts of China. The PLA, which now includes other service arms as well, has two principal tasks: preserving China's national security and, when necessary, insuring domestic stability. To fulfill the former goal, China has occasionally crossed its borders to fight limited wars (in Korea in the early 1950s, in India in 1959 and 1962, and in Vietnam in 1979). The late 1960s, the period of greatest Cultural Revolution turmoil, was the principal instance of PLA intervention in domestic politics to preserve order.

The PLA, as the chart (V.8) on page 71 indicates, is under the dual supervision of the Party's Military Affairs Commission and the Ministry of National Defense. PLA headquarters includes three general departments -- Staff, Logistics, and Political -- and a number of specialized service arms. The country is geographically divided into military regions and military districts. The PLA leadership (see list [V.9] on page 72) is in the midst of a generational succession as veteran leaders of the revolution are replaced by officers whose central career experience has been the tumultuous politics of post-1949 China.

There are three types of ground force units. First are well-equipped main force units, administered by the military regions but controlled by the Military Affairs Commission. Military districts (usually equivalent to provinces) have charge over the second type, *local force units* which have border defense and internal defense functions. Third, units such as communes, factories, and mines maintain *militia units*. The disproportionate deployment of main force units in the Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, and Urumchi Military Regions in the north and the Guangzhou and Kunming Military Regions in the south reflects China's concern about the USSR and its Vietnamese ally. (See table [V.10] on page 73).

China's leaders have long debated the assets and liabilities of a "labor-intensive" army. In the wake of the Korean War the PLA began with extensive Soviet help the modernization and professionalization of China's conventional forces. As China moved away from the Soviet economic model in the late 1950s, there was simultaneous deemphasis of military modernization. Revived was the strategy of "people's war," whereby an enemy is "lured deep" and then overwhelmed by large numbers of politically conscious soldiers with only basic weapons. China did not eschew high technology completely -- a small nuclear arsenal was developed to provide a deterrence floor.

The "people's war" strategy remained basically in vogue for the rest of the Maoist era, though there were variations (military expenditures rose substantially during the period of Lin Biao's ascendancy but declined once Zhou Enlai and his economic planners regained influence). Following Mao's death national defense was designated one of the "four modernizations," and the importance of "weapons" (relative to "men") has increased steadily. Technical training has received new emphasis.

However, external estimates and limited foreign observation suggest that the PLA's arsenal is obsolete compared to those of the US and USSR (see table [V.11] on pp. 73-74). Nonetheless, the leadership has decided that modernization of China's conventional forces (to replace the equipment purchased from the Soviets in the 1950s) should be commensurate with general economic growth. Total military expenditures, the CIA estimates, amount to 5-10% of the GNP. And even "quick-fix" purchases of advanced military technology from abroad will be constrained by scarcity of foreign exchange. For the foreseeable future the PLA will be able to provide China with basic yet limited security.

Suggested Readings

Barnett, A. Doak. *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977. A detailed analysis of China's relations with Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, focusing on the early 1970s. Discusses the possible emergence of a stable balance of power in North Asia.

Ch'en, Jerome. *China and the West*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979. A study of China's social and cultural contacts with the West from the early 19th century through the late 1930s and the consequences for China's modernization.

Clubb, O. Edmund. *China and Russia: The Great Game*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. A history of the clash of Russian and Chinese civilizations, in the twentieth century and before.

Isaacs, Harold R. *Scratches on Our Minds*. White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980. A classic study, published first in 1958, of the evolution of American images of China, both positive and negative.

Jansen, Marius B. *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975. A history of China and Japan from the first Sino-Japanese War to the normalization of PRC-Japanese relations.

Jones, DuPre, ed. *China: U.S. Policy Since 1945*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1980. An excellent source of analysis, chronology, documents, and statistics.

Fairbank, John K. *The United States and China*. 4th edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. Masterfully describes the evolving American relationship with China since the fall of the Imperial system.

Gittings, John. *The Role of the Chinese Army*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Analyzes the emergence of the People's Liberation Army.

_____ *The World and China, 1922-1972*. New York: Harper & Row, 1974. Examines the development of the CCP's view of the world, combining both Marxist-Leninist and Chinese elements.

Griffith, Samuel B., II. *The Chinese People's Liberation Army*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. The history of the Chinese military.

Harding, Harry. *China and the U.S.: Normalization and Beyond*. New York: Foreign Policy Association and China Council of The Asia Society, 1979. Discusses the issues now facing the US as it develops its relationship with China.

Lee, Chae-jin. *Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976. A thorough analysis of Sino-Japanese relations through normalization in 1972.

Nelsen, Harvey W. *The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the People's Liberation Army*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977. A scholarly examination of the Chinese military from an organizational perspective.

Oksenberg, Michel, and Oxnam, Robert B., eds. *Dragon and Eagle, United States-China Relations: Past and Future*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978. Essays on the historical context of contemporary US-China relations.

Schaller, Michael. *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. An interpretive history of US-China relations.

Whitson, William. *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-71*. New York: Praeger, 1971. An extensive scholarly treatment of Communist military history, focusing on the factional divisions within the military and their impact on politics in general.

2. Chronology of Sino-Soviet Relations

17th-18th centuries:	Russian migration eastwards, spearheaded by the Cossacks, leads to military confrontation between the Chinese and Russian troops in the 17th century. Treaties are signed at Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727) to delineate Sino-Russian boundaries and to establish limited commercial and diplomatic exchanges.
1858-60:	Through military occupations, ratified by so-called "unequal treaties," Russia takes all the land north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River. This land was later called the Maritime Province, and has been a source of Chinese hostility towards Russia to the present day.
late 19th century:	Although China manages to maintain most of its territories in the westernmost province of Xinjiang, Russian interest in East Asia increases through the late 19th century, particularly with the building of the Trans-Siberian Railway in the 1890s.
1900-05:	Russia occupies part of Manchuria in the wake of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. This becomes a major cause of the Russo-Japanese War which led to the Russian defeat by Japan in 1905.
1917-20:	The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 stirs considerable interest among Chinese students and intellectuals, particularly in the year 1919 when the Versailles Treaty cedes former German concessions in China to the Japanese (thus casting doubts on Western liberalism and Wilsonian idealism).
1920-27:	Comintern agents assist in the development of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). But the major thrust of Soviet policy developed by Stalin is to build Sun Yat-sen's Nationalist Party into a strong political and military movement allied with the Soviet Union. Stalin helps foster a CCP-Nationalist alliance, the first "united front," which lasts until 1927. In April of that year Chiang Kai-shek begins the "White Terror" in Shanghai and other cities, arresting or killing many of his erstwhile allies and terminating the short-lived alliance.
1927-35:	In the CCP underground in Shanghai, Stalin's influence remains strong. Mao Zedong works independently to build a peasant-based guerrilla movement in southeastern China. During the Long March (1934-35) Mao emerges as the leader of the CCP.
1935-36:	Fearing encirclement by Japan and Germany, the Comintern orders the CCP and other Communist Parties to form "united fronts" with other nationalistic forces. Having retreated to the Yan'an area in northwest China, the CCP gradually complies. When Chiang Kai-shek is kidnapped by a recalcitrant general in Xian in December 1936, the CCP favors executing him. In the interest of expanding the united front in China, Stalin orders the CCP to work for Chiang's release. The CCP does so, albeit reluctantly.

1937-45: During the rest of the Yan'an period, Mao creates a strong and independent CCP movement in the northwest, as the anti-Japanese "second united front" with the Nationalists gradually deteriorates. From 1937-39 the USSR provides Chiang with over 4,000 advisers and over $250 million in aid. During the Second World War small numbers of Soviet agents are stationed in Yan'an, while most diplomatic and military negotiations involve the Soviets with the Chinese Nationalists.

1945: In the Yalta Agreement and subsequent negotiations, Stalin pledges to deal only with the Nationalists. Soviet troops are permitted into Manchuria for possible involvement in the war against Japan. After V-J Day Soviet troops block the Nationalists' advance into Manchuria, stripping the region of many military and industrial supplies.

1946-49: Soviet troops withdraw from Manchuria in 1946, and Moscow remains aloof during the Chinese civil war. In 1949 Stalin admits his surprise over the rapid CCP military success, and Moscow extends diplomatic recognition to the newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949.

1950: Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance is signed. During the 1950s the Soviets provide limited loans to the PRC and send 10,000 technical advisers to assist in China's economic development.

late 1950s: Beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split. In 1956 the Chinese criticize "de-Stalinization" movement, the Soviet use of force in suppressing the Hungarian revolt, and Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States. Soviets are reluctant to provide PRC with nuclear weaponry, and do not support the PRC in the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis (1958) and the Sino-Indian border conflict (1959).

1960-63: Full-scale Sino-Soviet split. Led by Mao, the Chinese denounce the Soviets as "revisionists," and the Soviets withdraw all technical advisers from the PRC in 1960. Chinese criticize Soviet handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and signing of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Soviets remain neutral during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The two sides compete for influence among other Communist Parties and emerging Third World countries. Sino-Soviet trade declines sharply.

1966-68: Soviets criticize Cultural Revolution as the work of "Mao Zedong and his group." After the Soviet embassy is besieged in Beijing, Soviet and Chinese diplomats are withdrawn from each country. Both countries increase troop strength along the Sino-Soviet border. In August 1968 the Soviet Union invades Czechoslovakia, saying later that it was obligated to do so because "socialism" had been fundamentally attacked.

1969: In March armed clashes develop between Soviet and Chinese troops over an island on the Ussuri River.

1970-75: While the propaganda battle continues, both sides increase troop strengths along the Sino-Soviet border, to the point that each side has about one million troops. Both sides pursue rapprochement with the United States. China fears that the US will either "collude" with the Soviet Union or "appease" its policy of "superpower hegemonism." South Vietnam falls (April 1975), and North Vietnam emerges as a Soviet-leaning power on China's border.

1976: In the wake of Mao Zedong's death, Moscow eases anti-Chinese propaganda as a gesture to the new leadership. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilyichev returns to Beijing in November to resume border talks. China's propaganda offensive against the Soviets continues unabated.

1977: China's leadership holds to the Zhou-Mao strategy of the early 1970s. Ilyichev returns to the Soviet Union in February, and Moscow resumes its verbal attacks in April, calling China a "threat to world peace." In October, after eight years of talks, China and the Soviet Union reach a limited agreement on rules of navigation on the Ussuri River.

1978: In February the Soviets make a major proposal for the improvement of relations with China. The Chinese reject the offer in March. As Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorate (over the issues of Cambodia and the overseas Chinese in Vietnam), China charges the Soviet Union with responsibility for the deterioration. As part of its effort to build an anti-Soviet "global united front" China concludes a Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan (August) and agrees to normalize relations with the United States (December); major Chinese leaders make a number of foreign trips. Vietnam and the Soviet Union conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation, and Vietnam invades Cambodia (November).

1979: Deng Xiaoping visits the United States (January-February); Moscow accuses him of making "slanderous" remarks about its role in the world. On February 17 the PRC invades Vietnam, and withdraws by March 16 after Vietnam agrees to negotiations. In April China announces that it will not renew the 1950 treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union but calls for talks to reduce bilateral tensions. Amid propaganda charges and countercharges the talks begin in September. Hua Guofeng visits Western Europe (October) and gives oblique support for a strong NATO. The Soviet Union invades Afghanistan (December).

1980: In the wake of the Soviet invasion, US Defense Secretary Brown visits China (January). Each side pledges "parallel action" to deal with the challenge; China vows to continue aid to the Afghan rebels; the US encourages Chinese aid for Thailand should it be invaded by Vietnam; and the US offers to sell China non-lethal military equipment. China refuses to resume the recessed Sino-Soviet talks (January). To protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China joins the Olympic boycott (February). China tests an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range that includes all points within the Soviet Union (May). China and the USSR sign an agreement for 1980 trade, expected to reach only $375 million (June).

3. Chronology of Sino-Japanese Relations

1868: With the Meiji Restoration Japan begins its program of modernization through selective borrowing from the West. In the process it begins to move out of the orbit of China, its nominal suzerain, from which it drew cultural inspiration in previous centuries.

1870s: Japan establishes control over the Ryukyu Island group (nominally under Chinese domain), and begins to put pressure on Chinese-controlled Taiwan and Korea.

1894-95: Sino-Japanese War. Japan soundly beats China, annexes Taiwan, severs Korea from Chinese control, and shocks Chinese political leaders and intellectuals into a realization of the country's weakness. In the wake of the defeat, Chinese students begin going to Japan to study.

1902: Establishment of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

1905: Russo-Japanese War. Japan defeats Russia, the first loss by a Western power to an Asian one. Japan inherits the Liaodong Peninsula, previously held by Russia, and begins construction of the South Manchurian Railway. The flow of Chinese students to Japan increases to more than 10,000 per year.

1910: Japan annexes Korea.

1915: With the European powers preoccupied with World War I, Japan presents the Chinese government of Yuan Shikai with the notorious Twenty-One Demands, which, if accepted, would have given Japan a greatly enhanced position in China. Leads to a nationalistic protest.

1919: Japan's attempt to assume German rights in Shandong province arouses intense nationalistic protest in China -- the May Fourth Movement.

1920s: Japan pursues a generally moderate policy towards China, but remains protective of its interests in Manchuria and willing to intervene militarily if provoked.

1931-33: Japan gradually takes control of northeast China, first by occupying Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces in the months following the Mukden (Shenyang) Incident (September 1931); second, by occupying Jehol province in early 1933 and threatening north China. In 1932 Japan establishes the puppet state of Manchukuo, with the last Qing emperor (Henry Pu-yi) as its nominal leader. The Japanese occupation provokes another round of Chinese nationalism, but Chiang Kai-shek is unwilling to commit his forces to resist the aggression.

1935: The Japanese military forces the end of the formal Nationalist presence in North China and the Nationalists later consent to autonomous political bodies more amenable to Japanese pressure. This provokes new anti-Japanese protest under the banner of the December 9th Movement.

1936: In the midst of gradual preparations to challenge Japan, Chiang is kidnapped in Xian. He moves closer to a policy of resistance in a united front with the CCP.

1937: War with Japan begins in August after a military incident at Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing on July 7. The united front is consummated. Japan captures Nanjing (the Nationalist capital) in December.

1938: The Japanese take the central China city of Wuhan, thus assuming complete control of the main transportation arteries of lowland China and driving the Nationalists into west China.

1939-44: The conflict persists, usually at low levels, with the Japanese trying in vain to eliminate guerrilla resistance from the CCP and others and to build political support through puppet governments. The Nationalist-CCP united front gradually dissolves as the Communists extend their influence throughout north China.

1945: Japan surrenders; Taiwan comes under Nationalist control; the CCP and the Nationalists begin the contest for control of occupied China.

1950: The victorious CCP regards American-occupied Japan as a source of potential danger and signs a defense pact with the Soviet Union specifically directed at Japan. Chinese fears are confirmed when, after the start of the Korean War, Japan becomes the principal US staging area.

1951-52: Japan and the US conclude peace and security treaties. As part of the latter, Japan is bound to conclude a peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan.

1952-57: China tries to develop trade, cultural, and political ties with a variety of groups in Japan in the hope that they would pressure Tokyo to be more independent of Washington.

1957-60: In response to Prime Minister Kishi's strengthening of Japan's ties with Taiwan, China creates insurmountable obstacles to trade, supports left-wing parties opposed to the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, and calls for the end to the US-Japan security treaty.

1960-62: In the wake of the Great Leap Forward and the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid, China turns to Japan as an economic alternative, dropping previous political conditions. Trade grows with "friendly" Japanese firms and through a more formal barter agreement.

1964: Japan and China exchange trade missions. But when a Japanese company seeks Japanese Export-Import Bank backing for the sale of a synthetic textile factory, Taiwan objects and Japan backs down. Trade grows to $310 million.

1965: Prime Minister Sato affirms a dual policy of maintaining relations with Taiwan and promoting contact with the PRC.

1966-68: Trade grows to $621 million in 1966, then declines during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution; Japanese correspondents and businessmen are harrassed or expelled.

1969-71: In the context of the US withdrawal from Vietnam and its return of Okinawa to Japan, China fears that a pro-Taiwan Japan is moving to fill the military vacuum. Tokyo's view, expressed in November 1969, that Taiwan was "important" and Korea "essential" to Japanese security prompts a Chinese propaganda campaign against Japanese "remilitarization." China refuses to trade with Japanese firms that have business interests in Japan or South Korea (1970). In July 1971 Richard Nixon angers Japan by beginning rapprochement with China without informing Japan. Sino-Japanese trade rises to $900 million.

1972: China sends a trade mission to Japan, the first in six years; two-way trade reaches $1.1 billion. Kakuei Tanaka becomes prime minister of Japan (July) and travels to Beijing (September) to normalize relations. Japan recognizes China, says that it "understands and respects" China's claim that Taiwan is a part of China, and develops informal mechanisms to continue relations with Taiwan.

1973: China ends the trade restrictions imposed in 1970 (March), and diplomatic relations begin formally (April). Trade soars to just over $2 billion, and agreement is reached on a three-year trade pact which includes Japanese most-favored-nation treatment of China (August). Tanaka fails in his attempt to reach a peace treaty with the Soviet Union and so facilitate Japanese involvement in the development of Siberia (October).

1974: Japan and China sign a civil air agreement (April) and a shipping agreement (November). Two-way trade amounts to $3.3 billion.

1975: A fishery agreement is concluded (August). Trade climbs to $3.8 billion.

1976-77: With the death of Mao Zedong and its aftermath, Sino-Japanese trade drops to around $3 billion in 1976 and creeps back up to $3.5 billion in 1977.

1978: An eight-year trade agreement is concluded whereby China will send coal and oil to Japan in return for technology and finished goods, to total $10 billion. Despite some Chinese nationalistic protest in April over the disputed Senkaku Islands (Tiaoyudai), the two countries finally conclude a Treaty of Peace and Friendship that includes a clause opposing "hegemonism" (August). The trade agreement is extended by five years and $20 billion (September). Throughout the fall Japanese firms reach a number of major business deals with China. Deng Xiaoping visits Japan to sign the Peace and Friendship Treaty; television coverage of the trip exposes Chinese to the Japanese standard of living (October). Two-way trade equals $5.1 billion.

1979: Unsure of its ability to finance a major import program, China suspends 22 major contracts with Japanese firms, worth

$2.5 billion (February). The target value of the trade agreement is more than doubled (March). Because the Japanese Export-Import Bank extends $1.7 billion in credits, China restores 21 of the suspended contracts (May). In December Prime Minister Ohira visits China and reaches agreement on a $1.5 billion Japanese government loan to China and on joint exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Bohai Gulf. Total trade is $6.7 billion.

1980: Hua Guofeng makes a state visit to Japan (May).

4. Chronology of Sino-American Relations

1784: First American ship, the "Empress of China," calls at Chinese port; Sino-American trade begins, mainly in US food crops (maize, sweet potato, peanuts, tobacco) and Chinese arts, crafts, and textiles.

1811: First American missionary arrives in China. Their ranks grow rapidly in the latter half of the century to about 8,000 in 1925.

1844: Treaty of Wangxia (Wang-hsia) signed by the United States and China, granting America same rights imposed upon China by Britain after the Opium War (1839-42) -- extraterritoriality, most-favored-nation treatment, and establishment of commercial centers, churches, and hospitals in five ports.

1850: Beginning of two decades of substantial Chinese immigration into the United States.

1861: US Secretary of State Seward sends Anson Burlingame as a first minister to China with instructions to cooperate with other foreign powers in assuring equal economic opportunity for all.

1864: Roughly 10,000 Chinese are recruited to work on the first transcontinental railroad across the United States.

1868-70: Anson Burlingame conducts a world-wide tour to help revise treaties with foreigners in the hope of bringing "the shining banners of Western civilization" to China.

1872-81: A total of 120 Chinese students travels to the United States.

1879: Congress, responding to increasingly violent agitation against Chinese immigration, passes bill limiting the number of Chinese permitted to arrive in US to 15 per shipload. Although President Hayes vetoes the bill, both parties put immigration restrictions on their election platforms.

1882: Congress passes and President Arthur signs into law a bill to suspend Chinese immigration for ten years.

1892: Congress promulgates Geary Act, another exclusion law, which also requires Chinese to register and carry identification.

1899-1900: Secretary of State John Hay plays the leading role in having Western powers endorse the "Open Door Policy" which upholds the "equality of economic opportunity" for foreigners, and promises to protect the "territorial and administrative integrity" of China.

1900: America provides 2,100 men for an Allied force which suppresses the Boxer Rebellion and occupies the city of Beijing. In 1901 the United States is granted part of the indemnity paid by China because of the Boxer Rebellion. US later returns the money to China in the form of scholarships for selected Chinese to study in America.

1902: US exports to China reach $25 million, and investments total $19.7 million.

1905: Students in China initiate boycotts of American goods, protesting US immigration restrictions.

1912: US is first Western power to recognize the newly proclaimed Republic of China.

1915: By this time 1,200 Chinese students are studying in US universities.

1917-18: High tide of Chinese student interest in America prompted by Woodrow Wilson's idealism, and of Chinese hopes for an end to foreign imperialism through "self-determination." John Dewey lectures at Beijing (Peking) University and wins many adherents to his philosophy of pragmatism.

1919: Widespread anger and protests by Chinese students and intellectuals concerning the Versailles Treaty, which ceded former German concessions in China to the Japanese. This "May Fourth Movement" engendered much hostility against the United States and turned many eyes towards Russia, which had just experienced its October Revolution.

1921-22: At initiative of US, treaty powers hold Washington Conference to work out postwar settlement of Far East territorial claims; Japan obliged to withdraw from Chinese territory.

1928: US recognizes Nanjing (Nanking) government of Chiang Kai-shek and restores tariff autonomy to China.

early 1930s: Beset with problems at home and wary of foreign involvement, the US does little to halt the Japanese penetration of China. The Silver Purchase Act (1934), passed for domestic political reasons, seriously complicates Nationalist efforts to rebound from the Great Depression.

1937-41: Although formally neutral in the war between China and Japan, the US provides China with economic aid and diplomatically takes an increasingly anti-Japanese line.

1941: Claire Chennault organizes "Flying Tigers" to aid the Chinese against the Japanese. Pearl Harbor bombed, bringing the US into war as China's ally. Chiang Kai-shek becomes

"Supreme Commander of the China Theater" and General "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell is named his chief of staff.

1943: US formally rescinds extraterritoriality in China. US insists, at Moscow Conference of the Allied Powers, that China be included as one of the Big Four. Madame Chiang Kai-shek tours United States and addresses Congress. US later grants China a $300 million "morale-booster" loan.

1944: Chiang forces resignation of General Stilwell, who is replaced by General Albert Wedemeyer. Ambassador Patrick Hurley arrives in China on a mission to maximize the war effort (in the face of complaints of Chiang's laxness), and to negotiate improved relations between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communist Party.

1945: War with Japan ends. At US urging, Chiang and Mao Zedong sign a ceasefire agreement, but internal fighting continues. US troops involved in minor skirmishes with Communists. General George Marshall, architect of the "Marshall Plan" to aid Europe, arrives in China to try to effect a coalition government between the Nationalists and the Communists.

1947: Marshall Mission fails; the civil war intensifies. Congress approves $400 million aid bill for Nationalists (total postwar aid amounts to $2.5 billion). Wedemeyer report (made public in 1949) bluntly indicts Nationalist government for its failures; US continues to support Chiang.

1949: Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) established. Nationalists abandon mainland and flee to Taiwan. State Department "White Paper" on China ascribes Nationalist defeat to corruption and incompetence. US follows interim policy of withholding recognition from new government while attempting to disassociate itself from the Nationalists and wait for the "dust to settle."

1950: Under increasing harassment of Americans in China, US withdraws all official personnel, closes embassy and consulates. North Korean invasion of South Korea. Truman reverses policy and orders the US Seventh Fleet into Taiwan Straits to prevent any Communist attack. China enters Korean War as UN forces (over half of which are US troops) approach the Yalu River and Chinese territory. US freezes Chinese assets in the US and begins a trade embargo.

1953: Korean Armistice; several thousand US troops remain in South Korea.

1954: In December US and Nationalist government sign Mutual Defense Treaty, ratified by Congress in February 1955.

1955: US-PRC ambassadorial level talks begin in Geneva, later to be moved to Warsaw where they continue intermittently for 15 years. State Department rejects Chinese proposal that Dulles and Zhou Enlai meet to discuss "Taiwan and other problems," citing continued imprisonment of 13 Americans in Beijing.

1956: In speech to the National People's Congress, Zhou states that "traditional friendships" between the American and

Chinese people will eventually lead to US diplomatic recognition of China.

1958: Chinese precipitate crisis by shelling Nationalist-held offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

1962: China begins a series of warnings against US intrusion into or over Chinese territory in connection with war in Vietnam.

1965: American bombing of North Vietnam provokes strong PRC reaction in anti-US statements and increased aid to Hanoi.

1966: Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds hearings on US-China relations; an amendment to the Foreign Aid Bill to nullify the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan is rejected; President Johnson declares the "US will persist in efforts to reduce tensions between the two countries" (US and PRC). At the United Nations, Ambassador Goldberg announces support of Italian proposal to take a fresh look at seating China in the UN.

1968: Republican party platform opposes recognition of PRC or admission to UN. Candidate Richard Nixon agrees, but also states, "any American policy towards Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China." Democratic platform promises to "actively encourage economic, social and cultural exchange with Mainland China as a means of freeing that nation and her people from their narrow isolation."

1969: Secretary of State Rogers implies United States is prepared to accept principle of "peaceful coexistence" with PRC. US eases restrictions on American travel to China for scholars, journalists, students, scientists, and members of Congress. US suspends Seventh Fleet patrols of Taiwan Straits. Trade restrictions eased, permitting foreign subsidiaries of US companies to trade with the PRC in non-strategic goods. Sino-Soviet border conflicts encourage Beijing to explore rapprochement with non-Communist powers.

1970: Mao Zedong tells American journalist Edgar Snow that he would welcome a visit by President Nixon to Beijing. US-PRC talks resume in Warsaw but cancelled after two meetings by Chinese in protest over US invasion of Cambodia. US announces it will support entry of PRC into UN as long as it is not at the Nationalists' expense. Selective licensing of direct exports to China authorized.

1971: State Department abolishes travel restrictions to China. US table tennis team invited to Beijing in April. In July Henry Kissinger travels secretly to Beijing; a few days later President Nixon announces he will visit China in 1972 to seek "normalization of relations between the two countries." UN votes to seat People's Republic of China and expel Nationalists' representative (October).

1972: President Nixon makes his trip to Beijing, and Shanghai Communique is issued. The US acknowledges and does not challenge that all Chinese maintain that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China"; agrees to progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan "as the tension in the area diminishes," but states its interest in "a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

1973: Liaison offices are established in Beijing and Washington, and exchanges between the US and PRC gradually increase.

1974-76: Sino-American relations lose momentum for a variety of reasons. Succession conflicts in both the US (Watergate and the 1976 election) and in China (the deaths of Zhou and Mao) make normalization of relations impossible. Because of the recession and political factors trade declines to $336 million in 1976 after hitting a peak of almost $1 billion in 1974. China criticizes US-Soviet detente and wonders what role the US will play in Asia after the fall of South Vietnam (1975). President Ford visits China in December 1975 without concrete result.

1977: At the beginning of his administration, President Jimmy Carter reaffirms that normalization of US-PRC relations is US policy. In August Secretary of State Vance visits Beijing for an "exploratory" exchange of views with Chinese officials. One month later, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping terms the trip a "setback" in Sino-American relations, but also notes the PRC's recognition of "special conditions" in the US relationship with Taiwan.

1978: In May National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski visits Beijing to discuss strategic and bilateral issues. In July President Carter's science adviser, Frank Press, leads a delegation of government science administrators to China. On December 15, after five months of secret negotiations, President Carter announces the normalization of relations between the US and the PRC. Mutual recognition is extended, and diplomatic relations are to begin on January 1, 1979. Formal US relations with Taiwan are ended, but trade and cultural relations are to continue. The US reiterates its interest in a "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question."

1979: China begins a campaign for "peaceful reunification" of Taiwan with the mainland. Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping visits the United States on a nine-day tour (January-February). Agreements are signed on a variety of scientific and cultural exchanges; American consulates are to be established in Shanghai and Guangzhou, Chinese ones in Houston and San Francisco. The two sides state different points of view on the Soviet Union. When the PRC invades Vietnam in mid-February, the US calls for a withdrawal of Chinese troops. On March 2 the US and China initial an agreement settling the issue of frozen Chinese assets and blocked American claims, deadlocked for 30 years. After amendments that provoke Chinese criticism, Congress passes and President Carter signs (April 10) the Taiwan Relations Act, which establishes the American Institute in Taiwan to handle future relations, and specifies future US obligations to the island. In May the US and China sign the claims-assets agreement and initial a trade agreement. In the absence of an agreement on Chinese textile exports, the US unilaterally imposes quotas. The US-PRC trade pact is signed (July). In

August Vice President Mondale visits China. He offers $2 billion in Export-Import Bank credits over five years, signs an expanded cultural agreement and a preliminary hydropower agreement. The US Supreme Court upholds President Carter's authority to terminate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (December).

1980: January In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Brown visits China. Both sides agree to take coordinated, parallel actions vis-a-vis Pakistan and Thailand (threatened by Vietnam). The US offers to sell China selected non-lethal military equipment. Congress approves the US-PRC trade agreement, thus granting most-favored-nation treatment to China.

March In Washington talks between American officials and PRC Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Wenjin, the two sides agree to take separate but "mutually reinforcing" actions to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The US and China reach final agreement on cooperation in developing China's hydroelectric power. Seamen from the PRC tour Taipei.

April China approves its first joint ventures with foreign firms, including one American corporation.

May Vice Premier Geng Biao visits Washington and selected military installations, and the US allows China to purchase air-defense radar, helicopters, and transport planes, and authorizes American companies to build electronics and helicopter factories in China.

June China protests the US sale of defensive military equipment to Taiwan.

July The US and China conclude a textile agreement.

August Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan brings protests from Beijing by suggesting that he would restore official relations with Taiwan.

September Vice Premier Bo Yibo visits the United States, signs agreements covering establishment of consulates, airline and maritime service, and textile import quotas.

October The US grants Taiwan's representatives the privileges and immunities normally accorded diplomats, provoking a PRC protest.

5. The Shanghai Communique, February 27, 1972

. . . The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world require efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. . . .

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution -- this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries. . . .

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

Source: Excerpted from Peking Review, March 3, 1972, pp. 4-5.

6. Normalization of US-China Relations, December 15-16, 1978

The Joint Communique

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the Unites States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai communique and emphasize once again that:

--Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

--Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

--Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

--The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China.

--Both believe that normalization of relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange ambassadors and establish embassies on March 1, 1979.

The United States' Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese people themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interests and to the peace of the entire world.

China's Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is an historic event in Sino-United States relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai communique and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries.

As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Deputy Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.

Source: *Peking Review*, December 22, 1978, pp. 8-12.

7. Chronological List of Countries Recognizing the PRC

1949: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Republic of Korea, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, German Democratic Republic, Albania, Burma, India

1950: Pakistan, United Kingdom, Ceylon, Norway, Denmark, Israel,* Afghanistan, Finland, Sweden, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Switzerland, Netherlands, Indonesia

1955: Nepal

1956: United Arab Republic (Egypt), Syria, Yemen

1958: Cambodia, Iraq, Morocco, Sudan

1960: Ghana, Cuba, Mali, Somalia

1961: Senegal, Tanzania

1962: Laos, Algeria, Uganda

1963: Kenya, Burundi

1964: Tunisia, France, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic, Zambia, Dahomey#

1965: Mauritania

1968: South Yemen

1970: Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Italy, Ethiopia, Chile

1971: Nigeria, Kuwait, Cameroon, Austria, Sierra Leone, Turkey, Iran, Belgium, Peru, Lebanon, Rwanda, Senegal, Iceland, Cyprus

1972: Argentina, Mexico, Malta, Mauritius, Greece, Guyana, Togo, Japan, German Federal Republic, Maldives, Malagasy, Luxembourg, Zaire, Chad, Australia, New Zealand

1973: Spain, Upper Volta

1974: Guinea Bissau, Gabon, Malaysia, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Niger, Brazil, Gambia

1975: Botswana, Philippines, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Thailand, Sao Tome, Fiji, Western Samoa, Comoros

1976: Cape Verde, Surinam, Seychelles, Papua New Guinea

1977: Liberia, Barbados, Jordan

1978: Oman, Libya

1979: United States, Djibouti, Portugal, Ireland

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* recognition extended but diplomatic relations never established.

# relations broken in 1966 and recognition switched to Taiwan.

1980: Ecuador, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Bolivia

Source: For the 1949-1964 period, adapted from A. M. Halpern, Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 496-497; for later years, China Quarterly, Peking Review, and Beijing Review.

8. Structure of the People's Liberation Army


CCP Chairman (Commander in Chief)
CCP Military Commission
State Council Premier
Ministry of National Defense
People's Liberation Army
General Logistics Department
General Staff
General Political Department
Special Service Arms
Air Force
Armored Corps
Artillery Corps
Navy
Construction Engineers
Engineer Corps
Railway Engineers
Signal Corps
Second Artillery Corps (nuclear)
Military Region Commanders
Main Force Units
Military District Commanders
Local Force Units
Party Committees & Political Commissars down to the company level
Militia units in cities, communes, factories, mines, etc., under the dual control of the Party and PLA at the relevant level.

9. Major Military Leaders

Commander in Chief	Hua Guofeng(?)*
Minister of National Defense	Xu Xiangqian

Military Affairs Commission of the CCP

Chairman	Deng Xiaoping*	
Vice Chairmen	Liu Bocheng Nie Rongzhen	Xu Xiangqian Ye Jianying
Standing Committee	Han Xianqu Su Yu Wang Pin	Xu Shiyou Yang Dezhi Yang Yong
Secretary General	Geng Biao	
Leading Members	Wang Zhen	Zhang Tingfa

PLA Headquarters

Chief of Staff	Yang Dezhi
General Logistics Department Director	Hong Xuezhi
General Political Department Director	Wei Guoqing
Air Force Commander	Zhang Tingfa
Navy Commander	Ye Fei

Military Region Commanders

Beijing	Qin Jiwei	Lanzhou	Du Yide
Chengdu	You Taizhong	Nanjing	Nie Fengzhi
Fuzhou	Yang Chengwu	Shenyang	Li Desheng
Guangzhou	Wu Kehua	Wuhan	Zhang Caiqian
Jinan	Rao Shoukun	Xinjiang	Xiao Qianfu
Kunming	Zhang Zixiu		

*Hua Guofeng assumed the posts of commander in chief and Military Affairs Commission chairman in October 1976. In late December 1980, it was reported that Deng Xiaoping, who had been a commission vice chairman, had replaced him as chairman. Whether Hua is still a commission member was unknown at the time this volume went to press. Since the PRC constitution states that the Party chairman serves ex officio as commander in chief, Hua's reported resignation of the former post also leaves the latter one vacant.

10. Deployment of PLA Ground Forces

Military Region	Component Military Districts	Main Force Divisions		Local Force Divisions
		Infantry	Armored	
Beijing	Hebei Inner Mongolia Shanxi	29-31	5	3-4
Shenyang	Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning	15-18	4	9-10
Lanzhou	Gansu Ningxia Qinghai Shaanxi	10-11	-	4-5
Jinan	Shandong	5-6	1	1
Nanjing	Anhui Jiangsu Zhejiang	6-7	1	4
Fuzhou	Fujian Jiangxi	6-7	-	4
Wuhan	Henan Hubei	10-12	-	2
Guangzhou	Guangdong Guangxi Hainan Island	12-14	-	8
Chengdu	Sichuan Tibet	9-10	-	6
Kunming	Guizhou Yunnan	10-11	-	5
Urumchi	East Xinjiang North Xinjiang South Xinjiang	8-10	-	8-9

Source: Asia Yearbook 1980 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1980), p. 35.

11. Force Levels of the Chinese Military

Total Regular Forces	4,360,000
Army	3,600,000
Navy	360,000
Air Force	400,000

Paramilitary Forces (public security forces plus civilian militia)

Armed Militia	7,000,000
Urban Militia	several million
Civilian Production and Constuction Corps	4,000,000
Ordinary/Basic Militia	75-100 million

Land Weapons and Vehicles

Tanks	11,000
Armored Personnel Carriers	1,500
Guns and Howitzers	16,000
Mortars, rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns	32,000

Ships and Submarines

Major Surface Combat Ships	25
Submarines	93*
Destroyers	11
Smaller Craft	884
Coast and River Defense Craft	1,000

Aircraft (Naval)

Medium and Light Bombers	150
Fighters	575
Helicopters and Light Transport	50

Aircraft (Air Force)

Medium Bombers	80-90
Light Bombers	300
Fighter Bombers	500
Fighters	4,100
Fixed-wing Transport Aircraft	500
Helicopters	350

Air Defense (of urban and industrial areas, military installations, and weapon complexes)

Naval and Air Force Fighters	4,000
Surface-to-air Missiles	100
Anti-aircraft Guns	10,000

Strategic Forces

Intercontinental ballistic missiles	50
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles	50-70
Medium-range ballistic missiles	40-50
Aircraft	90

* including one Han-class nuclear submarine

Source: Adapted from Asia Yearbook 1980 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1980), p. 41.; Michael Gibson, ed. China: U.S. Policy Since 1945 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p. 224; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (London, 1978), pp. 56-57.

VI. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN TRADE

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

Economic Performance since 1949 The Chinese Communist Party had no sooner won a nationwide military victory than it had to deal with an economy on the brink of collapse. Food was in short supply. Two decades of war had ravaged a small industrial sector. Hyperinflation was rapidly devaluing the currency. Distribution of wealth was grossly unequal.

After a three-year rehabilitation of the economy (in the midst of the Korean War), rapid economic development began. A two-pronged approach was employed. One prong was the transforation of most existing economic institutions (the "transition to socialism"). Land reform, begun in the late 1940s, ended large concentrations of wealth in the rural areas. In the mid-1950s collectivization ended the private ownership system. And there was even a temporary flirtation with immediate communization (see Chapter VIII for details). In the cities the government took control of enterprises run by the Nationalists and later, in the mid-1950s, nationalized private industrial, financial, and commercial businesses, compensating the former owners. A state-run planning system replaced market allocation of labor, raw materials, and products.

The second prong was technological transformation, the application of science to production. Industrial plant grew rapidly, with most new technology transferred from abroad (from the Soviet Union in the 1950s, from Japan and the West in more recent times). Agriculture experienced a continuing "green revolution": the development and dissemination of high-yield seeds, supported by some mechanization and expanded use of irrigation and chemical fertilizers.

These two parts of the Chinese developmental strategy are not mutually exclusive; changes in one affect the other. Nor have they been employed at the same time with equal emphasis. Which approach to pursue has often been a central issue of political conflict. Mao Zedong and others tended to focus on institutional and ideological change, while Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others emphasized technological change.

How has the Chinese economy performed in the aggregate over the last three decades? The chart (VI.2) on page 79 and the more detailed table (VI.3) on page 80 demonstrate three major points.

First, China has generally experienced strong, sustained economic growth. Over the 1952-1978 period, average annual growth rates were 6% for gross national product, 11% for industry, and 2% for agriculture. If 1970 is taken as the base year, the annual growth rates were 7% for GNP, 9% for industry, and 3% for agriculture. This compares favorably with other large developing countries.

Second, poor performance in agriculture has inhibited growth. Given only a 2% growth rate, the food supply has held even with population growth, and the government has had to import grain (10 million metric tons in 1979) to provide a margin of safety. The situation may be improving: grain output grew by 9% in 1979, and demand for food should stabilize if new population control techniques are effective. But good weather, on which Chinese agriculture is still very much dependent, may have been the main cause of the exceptional 1979 harvest. Whatever the case, the food problem will continue to be a weak link, not only because it creates fears of shortages or the specter of famine, but also because importing grain drains scarce foreign exchange.

Third, economic growth has been interrupted by three periods of recession. By far the most severe was in 1959-62, when a combination of bad weather, withdrawal of Soviet aid, and dislocations caused by the Great Leap Forward led to absolute declines in GNP, industrial production, and agricultural production. There was another dip in 1967 (due mainly to disruptions of the Cultural Revolution), and a period of stagnation in 1975-76 caused by political conflict preceding Mao's death.

Post-Mao Economic Policy After 1976 Mao's technology-oriented successors drew a connection between the periods of economic decline and the late Chairman's advocacy of institutional change, and shifted course very quickly. Under the banner of the "four modernizations" they pledged to bring industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and technology up to world standards by the end of this century. The annual growth targets initially proposed were highly ambitious: over 10% in industry and over 4% in agriculture. Rapid mechanization of agriculture and a broad expansion of heavy industrial plant -- in part through foreign imports -- were the central features of the strategy.

By late 1978 the leadership realized that the new goals were inappropriate to China's resources and conditions. It embarked on a policy of "readjustment" to rectify a number of problems. One of these was a serious decline in labor productivity, due to a stagnation of personal income. In response, economic planners have tried to raise the ratio of consumption to accumulation. As a result,personal incomes grew, especially in the countryside, as investment in capital construction stabilized. Furthermore, the government shifted investment funds away from heavy industry towards agriculture (to increase the food supply), light industry (for exports and to satisfy pent-up consumer demand), and transportation and energy resources. Importing foreign technology was to continue, but within the context of China's ability to pay.

The general targets set for the 1980-85 period reflect the readjustment policy (see the table [VI.4] on page 81). Over the next five years, industrial output is to grow at an annual rate of 8% of which heavy industry is to increase at 7% per annum and light industry at 9%, the reverse of past priorities. Agricultural production is still projected to grow at 4% annually. State budget allocations have changed accordingly.

Tapping new sources of energy will be crucial to insuring sustained economic growth (see table [VI.5] on page 81 for data on supply and demand). In potential terms, China seems energy rich, with abundant resources of coal (always been the primary source of fuel), oil (increasingly important in the 1970s), and hydroelectric power. But China is poor in its capacity to exploit these resources, and the government faces a series of tough choices in remedying the situation: how much to rely on foreign technology, how to pay for that technology, how to balance domestic energy needs and the foreign exchange earning power of coal and oil.

The post-Mao leadership has also experimented with "restructuring" -- changing the relationship between the state and economic enterprises. Since the mid-1950s, enterprises remit all their profits to the state, which in turn provided grants to underwrite any new investment. Consequently, those remittances have provided the bulk of the state's revenue base, and economic construction (capital investment) has become the largest item of government expenditure (as the table on the state budget [VI.6] on page 82 demonstrates). Some Chinese leaders now believe that this system and the mutual dependence it engenders have hampered productivity, since new investment is not contingent on past performance. As an experiment, many enterprises may now retain a portion of their profits to use for reinvestment, worker bonuses, and worker services. Outside money for new equipment will come more in the form of bank loans than state grants. In the distribution of goods, the state is expermineting with greater reliance on market forces and less on administrative mechanisms.

The Role of Foreign Trade China's international trade has increased gradually over the years, dropping only during the periods of recession noted above (see table [VI.7] on page 83). Though China is not pursuing a development strategy of export-led growth like Singapore and South Korea, it shares their status as a "newly industrializing country" in that its exports are primarily industry-related commodities (see table [VI.8] on page 84). Concerning imports, China depends on international markets for advanced technology, supplemental food supplies, and agricultural raw materials. This dependence and the deepening Sino-Soviet dispute have caused a dramatic change in China's list of trading partners, with Japan and the West replacing the Soviet bloc countries, the principal partners of the 1950s (see tables [VI.9a and 9b] on page 85). China began importing grain in the crisis years of the early 1960s and continues to do so now (see table [VI.10] on page 86).

The United States embargoed trade with China from 1950 to 1972. Subsequently, trade grew quickly, buoyed by major Chinese purchases of American wheat and cotton. It declined in the mid-1970s due to political and economic reasons, and then grew again in the late 1970s (see chart [VI.11] and table [VI.12] on pages 86-87). The US is already China's third largest trading partner, and two-way trade is expected to approach $4 billion in 1980. The composition of American exports to China, still dominated by grain and textile raw materials in 1979, is expected to shift more towards industrial goods; US imports should remain diverse, led by oil and textiles (see table [VI.13] on page 88).

Several factors will prevent China's international trade from growing more than gradually. First, like other large countries, its foreign trade will always be only a small proportion of total economic activity (5% of GNP in 1978). Second, the composition of Chinese exports (agricultural products or light manufactured goods) and future world recessions will problably limit international demand (oil is the only possible exception, but the supply picture is uncertain). Limited demand and the necessity of importing grain will in turn limit the foreign exchange available for purchasing foreign technology. To deal with this problem, China is now experimenting with joint ventures, compensation trade, and concessionary aid.

These innovations are radical departures from the cash-and-carry approach of the Maoist era, but even they are designed to reduce foreign indebtedness. On the other hand, they will also increase China's contact with the the "capitalist" world, which, like the technology-based developmental strategy, could become politically explosive if it does not produce favorable results soon.

Suggested Readings

Baum, Richard, ed. China's Four Modernizations: The New Technological Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980. A collection of essays on the problems and prospects facing China as it pursues the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The acquisition and absorption of foreign technology is given special attention.

China Business Review. Published bimonthly by the National Council for US-China Trade, Washington, D.C. The most authoritative and up-to-date source of information on the Chinese economy and foreign trade.

CIA Reference Aids. Include a number of reports and statistical compendia on the Chinese economy. See page 2 for ordering information.

Donnithorne, Audrey. China's Economic System. New York: Praeger, 1966. Describes the pre-Cultural Revolution system, which resembles today's in many respects.

Eckstein, Alexander. China's Economic Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. A general analysis of China's economic heritage, development policies, and performance during the Maoist era.

Gurley, John G. China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. A collection of essays, written between 1966 and 1976, emphasizing differences between capitalist and Maoist approaches to development.

Hsiao, Gene T. The Foreign Trade of China: Policy, Law, and Practice. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977. A specialized yet thorough treatment.

U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee. Chinese Economy Post-Mao. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978. One of a series of compendia on the Chinese economy, providing detailed analysis of economic policy and performance by government and academic economists. Earlier similar JEC compendia include An Economic Profile of Mainland China (2 vols.), 1967; People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, 1972; and China: A Reassessment of the Economy, 1975.

Woodward, Kim. The International Energy Relations of China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980. An exhaustive examination of China's energy development and the implications for world energy markets. Includes a wealth of statistical material.

2. Trends in Aggregate Performance

Index: 1957 = 100

Year	Gross National Product (billion 1978 US$)	Agricultural Production	Industrial Production
1949	59	53	20
1950	72	64	27
1951	84	72	38
1952	99	84	48
1953	105	84	61
1954	110	84	70
1955	120	94	73
1956	130	97	88
1957	138	100	100
1958	164	107	142
1959	156	83	173
1960	152	74	181
1961	120	78	105
1962	131	87	111
1963	148	93	134
1964	164	98	161
1965	185	101	199
1966	210	112	232
1967	202	118	202
1968	204	110	221
1969	226	112	266
1970	263	126	316
1971	281	130	349
1972	294	126	385
1973	332	142	436
1974	344	146	455
1975	368	148	502
1976	368	148	502
1977	398	144	574
1978	444	156	651

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: A Statistical Compendium (NTISUB/E/282-011, July 1979), p. 3.

3. Selected Economic Indicators

	1952	1957	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
General									
GNP (b '78 US$)	99	138	185	263	368	368	398	444	-
Population, mid-year (m pers)	570	642	753	848	952	971	987	1002	1017
Per capita GNP (1978 US$)	174	215	246	310	387	378	403	443	n/a
Agricultural Production									
Total grain (mmt)	161	191	194	243	284	285	283	305	332
Cotton (mmt)	1.3	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.2
Hogs (m head)	93	146	168	226	-	-	292	301	320
Industrial Production -- Machinery									
Electric generators (m kW)	N	0.3	0.8	2.3	-	-	3.2	4.8	6.2
Internal combustion engines (m hp)	N	0.5	-	-	-	-	27.4	28.1	29.1
Machine tools (th units)	13.7	28.3	45	70	90	85	-	183	140
Locomotives (units)	20	167	-	-	-	-	293	521	573
Freight cars (th units)	5.8	7.3	-	-	-	-	6.4	17.0	16.0
Trucks (th units)	0	7.5	-	-	-	-	125.4	149.1	186
Industrial Production -- Other									
Electric power (b kWh)	7.3	19.3	62	107	187	203.5	223.4	256.6	282.0
Crude Oil (mmt)	0.44	1.5	11.4	30.1	77	86.8	93.6	104	106.2
Coal (mmt)	66.5	130.7	232.2	327.4	478	483	550	618	635
Crude steel (mmt)	1.3	5.4	13.8	22	33.8	28.8	25.1	34.8	34.5
Chemical fertilizer (mmt)	0.2	0.8	7.6	14	28.8	26.3	36.4	43.7	-
Cement (mmt)	0.3	6.9	16.3	26.5	46.9	48.6	55.7	65.2	73.9
Timber (th cu m)	11.2	27.9	-	-	-	-	49.7	51.6	54.4
Machine-made paper (mmt)	0.4	0.9	-	-	-	-	3.8	4.4	4.9
Consumer Goods Production									
Cotton cloth (b lin m)	3.8	5.0	5.8	8.5	9.7	9.0	10.2	11.0	12.2
Processed sugar (mmt)	.5	0.9	1.5	1.8	2.3	-	1.8	2.3	2.5
Salt (mmt)	4.9	8.3	-	[illegible]	-	-	17.1	19.5	14.8
Bicycles (m units)	0.1	0.8	1.8	3.[illegible]	5.5	-	7.4	8.5	10.1
Watches (m units)	-	-	1.2	-	-	-	11.0	13.5	17.1

Source: CIA, NTIS, China: A Statistical Compendium (NTISUB/E/282-011, July 1979), pp. 6, 8-10; China Business Review, May-June 1980, pp. 54-56. Production figures for 1978 and 1979 are official PRC statistics released by State Statistical Bureau (1977-78 statistics issued June 27, 1980; 1979 figures released April 30, 1980). Abbreviations: b = billion, m = million, th = thousand, mmt = million metric tons, kW = kilowatt, kWh = kilowatt hours, hp = horse power, th cu m = thousand cubic meters, lin m = linear meters.

4. Targets of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Gross value of industrial output (1970 constant yuan, billion)	486.6	525.5	567.5	612.9	661.9	714.9
Of which:						
Heavy industry	280.2	300.3	321.9	345.1	370.0	396.6
Light industry	206.4	225.2	245.6	267.8	291.9	318.3
Grain output (million metric tons)	325.0	338.0	352.0	367.0	383.0	400.0

Note: 1979 production figures were: gross value of industrial output, Y459.1; heavy industry, Y265.8; light industry, Y193.3; and grain, 332 million metric tons. The above targets for grain were based on an initial 1979 output report of 315 million metric tons (the final figure was 332 million metric tons). Because of poor weather, the 1980 harvest will probably be around the projected figure.

Source: The China Business Review, March-April 1980, p. 6.

5. Energy Supply and Demand (million metric tons of coal equivalent)

Supply	1952	1957	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Coal	48	103	177	246	355	360	409	458
Oil	2	5	17	46	104	119	128	142
Natural Gas	--	1	12	27	46	50	62	69
Hydropower	--	2	2	3	6	6	7	8
Total	50	110	208	322	511	535	606	677

Consumption	1952	1957	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	1978
Industry & Construction	11	36	95	168	292	305	345	387
Agriculture	--	1	6	12	30	33	36	40
Transportation	5	9	15	17	24	25	28	32
Residential & Commercial	26	50	80	96	125	129	149	167
Total	42	96	196	273	471	492	558	626

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: A Statistical Compendium (NTISUB/E/282-011, July 1979), p. 10.

6. The National Budget

Revenue

Source (% share)	1950	1952	1957	1959	1977	1978	1979
Tax revenue	75.1	55.6	49.9	37.8	n/a	n/a	50.4
Industry & Commerce	34.7	35.0	36.4	28.9	43.7	40.2	n/a
Agriculture	29.2	15.4	10.0	6.0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Other sources	11.2	5.2	3.5	2.9	n/a	n/a	n/a
Enterprise profits	13.3	26.5	36.6	52.7	35.5	39.2	46.2
All other revenue	11.6	17.9	13.5	9.5	n/c	n/c	n/c
TOTAL (millions of current yuan)	6,190	17,370	30,320	52,160	91,711	112,111	106,800

Expenditures

Sector (% share)	1950	1952	1957	1959	1977	1978	1979
Economic construction	25.5	45.4	51.4	59.0	n/c	50.7	47.2
Health, education, culture, & science	11.1	13.6	16.0	11.1	10.6	10.1	11.0
National defense	41.5	26.0	19.0	10.9	17.6	15.0	18.5
State administration	19.3	10.3	7.8	5.4	5.1	4.4	4.7
Other	2.6	4.7	5.8	13.6	n/c	19.8	18.6
TOTAL (millions of current yuan)	6,810	16,790	29,020	52,770	84,353	111,093	120,300

Note: The 1978 and 1979 figures for economic construction expenditures include funds for construction of new enterprises, retooling old ones, and some circulation funds. Total revenues for 1979 do not include Y3.53 billion in foreign loans; total 1979 expenditures do not include Y7.9 billion appropriated out of foreign loans and spent for capital construction and other purposes. The increase in 1979 defense spending was due to China's border war with Vietnam. Abbreviations: n/a = not available; n/c = not computable.

Source: Data for 1950 to 1959 is adapted from Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 184, 186. Figures for 1977, 1978, and 1979 are drawn or derived from "Report on the Final State Accounts for 1978 and the Draft State Budget for 1979," Beijing Review, July 20, 1979, and "Report on Financial Work," Beijing Review, September 29, 1980.

7. Balance of Foreign Trade (in million US$)

	Total	Exports	Imports	Balance	Total	Exports	Imports	Balance	Total	Exports	Imports	Balance
1950	**1,210**	620	590	30	350	210	140	70	860	410	450	−40
1951	**1,900**	780	1,120	−340	975	465	515	−50	920	315	605	−290
1952	**1,890**	875	1,015	−140	1,315	605	710	−105	575	270	305	−35
1953	**2,295**	1,040	1,255	−215	1,555	670	885	−215	740	370	370	0
1954	**2,350**	1,060	1,290	−230	1,735	765	970	−205	615	295	320	−25
1955	**3,035**	1,375	1,660	−285	2,250	950	1,300	−350	785	425	360	65
1956	**3,120**	1,635	1,485	150	2,055	1,045	1,010	35	1,065	590	475	115
1957	**3,055**	1,615	1,440	175	1,965	1,085	880	205	1,090	530	560	−30
1958	**3,765**	1,940	1,825	115	2,380	1,280	1,100	180	1,385	660	725	−65
1959	**4,290**	2,230	2,060	170	2,980	1,615	1,365	250	1,310	615	695	−89
1960	**3,990**	1,960	2,030	−70	2,620	1,335	1,285	50	1,370	625	745	−120
1961	**3,015**	1,525	1,490	35	1,685	965	715	250	1,335	560	775	−215
1962	**2,670**	1,520	1,150	370	1,410	915	490	425	1,265	605	660	−55
1963	**2,775**	1,575	1,200	375	1,250	820	430	390	1,525	755	770	−15
1964	**3,220**	1,750	1,470	280	1,100	710	390	320	2,120	1,040	1,080	−40
1965	**3,880**	2,035	1,845	190	1,165	650	515	135	2,715	1,385	1,330	55
1966	**4,245**	2,210	2,035	175	1,090	585	505	80	3,155	1,625	1,530	95
1967	**3,915**	1,960	1,955	5	830	485	345	140	3,085	1,475	1,610	−135
1968	**3,785**	1,960	1,825	135	840	500	340	160	2,945	1,460	1,485	−25
1969	**3,895**	2,060	1,835	225	785	490	295	195	3,110	1,570	1,540	30
1970	**4,340**	2,095	2,245	−150	860	480	380	100	3,480	1,615	1,865	−250
1971	**4,810**	2,500	2,310	190	1,085	585	500	85	3,725	1,915	1,810	105
1972	**6,000**	3,150	2,850	300	1,275	740	535	205	4,725	2,410	2,315	95
1973	**10,300**	5,075	5,225	−150	1,710	1,000	710	290	8,590	4,075	4,515	−440
1974	**14,080**	6,660	7,420	−760	2,435	1,430	1,010	420	11,645	5,230	6,415	−1,185
1975	**14,575**	7,180	7,395	−215	2,390	1,380	1,010	370	12,185	5,800	6,385	−585
1976	**13,275**	7,265	6,010	1,255	2,345	1,240	1,105	135	10,930	6,025	4,905	1,120
1977	**15,055**	7,955	7,100	855	2,520	1,370	1,150	225	12,530	6,580	5,950	630
1978	**21,100**	10,000	11,100	−1,100	3,200	1,600	1,600	0	17,900	8,400	9,500	−1,100

Data are rounded to the nearest $5 million, with the exception of 1978 data which are preliminary and rounded to the nearest $100 million. Exports are f.o.b.; imports are c.i.f.

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: A Statistical Compendium (NTISUBE/E/282-011, July 1979), p. 13.

8. Commodity Composition of Foreign Trade, 1977

	Million US$	% of total
Exports (f.o.b.)	7,955	100
Agricultural	1,840	36
Animals, meat and fish	650	8
Grain	455	6
Fruits and vegetables	490	6
Oilseeds	90	1
Textile fibers	290	4
Crude animal materials	330	4
Other	535	7
Extractive	1,000	13
Crude minerals and metals	120	2
Crude oil	785	10
Coal	95	1
Manufacturing	4,115	51
Petroleum products	230	3
Chemicals	380	5
Metals and metal products	355	4
Machinery and equipment	270	3
Textile yarn and fabric	1,300	16
Clothing and footware	625	8
Other light manufactures	955	12
Imports (c.i.f.)	7,100	100
Foodstuffs	1,230	17
Grain	745	10
Sugar	320	5
Other	165	2
Industrial Supplies	4,545	65
Rubber	225	3
Textile fibers	500	7
Chemicals	885	12
Iron and steel	1,570	22
Nonferrous metals	265	4
Metal products	55	1
Other	1,045	15
Capital Goods	1,290	18
Nonelectric machinery	455	6
Electric machinery	105	1
Transport equipment	640	9
Other	90	1
Consumer Goods	35	-

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China International Trade, 1977-78 (ER78-10721, December 1978), p. 5.

9. Direction of Foreign Trade

a) Leading Trade Partners, 1959 & 1979 (in million US$)

1959		1979		
Country	Total Trade	Country	Total Trade	PRC Trade Balance
USSR	2,054	Japan	6,471	-889
East Germany	221	Hong Kong	3,363	2,607
Hong Kong	201	United States	2,318	-1,130
Czechoslovakia	195	West Germany	1,957	-1,028
West Germany	191	Romania	1,115	27
United Kingdom	121	Australia	900	-568
Indonesia	111	United Kingdom	745	-182
Poland	99	Canada	647	-363
Malaya/Singapore	88	France	624	-55
Hungary	84	Italy	572	38

Source: 1959 data adapted from Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 94, 280-85, 291. 1979 data from CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: International Trade Quarterly Review Fourth Quarter, 1979 (ER CIT 80-003, May 1980), pp. 9-14.

b) Regional Distribution of China's Trade, 1979 (in million US$)

Region/Country	Total	% of Total
Japan	6,471	22.0
Western Europe	5,279	18.0
Southeast Asia	5,025	17.1
United States/Canada	2,965	10.1
Eastern Europe	2,373	8.1
Middle East	1,083	3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	1,016	3.5
Australia/New Zealand	1,001	3.4
Latin America	994	3.4
Non-European Communist Countries	871	3.0
South Asia	437	1.5
North Africa	381	1.3
USSR	355	1.2

Note: China's trade with Hong Kong is included in the figure for Southeast Asia, and accounted for 70 percent of the regional total. The figure for Latin America excludes Cuba; non-European Communist countries include Kampuchea, Cuba, Mongolia, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam.

Source: CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: International Trade Quarterly Review Fourth Quarter, 1979 (ER CIT 80-003, May 1980), pp. 9-12.

10. China's Import of Grain (thousand metric tons)

Country	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Argentina	14	158	735	172	--	850	191	912
Australia	--	768	1,318	1,352	934	2,985	2,435	2,735
Canada	3,687	2,398	1,772	1,922	987	3,003	3,275	2,742
US	941	4,315	2,759	--	--	--	3,348	3,994
Other	--	2	206	25	140	--	60	129
TOTAL	4,642	7,641	6,790	3,459	2,061	6,838	9,309	10,512

Source: US Department of Agriculture, People's Republic of China Agricultural Situation: Review of 1979 & Outlook for 1980 (Washington DC, 1980), p. 25. United States figures reflect direct exports plus transhipments through Canada. 1979 figures are estimates.

11. Highlights of US Trade with China



Source: US Department of State, Background Notes: China (Washington DC, 1980), p. 16.

12. Volume and Composition of US-China Trade, 1972-79 (in millions US$)

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
US Exports								
Manufactured goods:	2.3	86.5	137.6	202.2	122.2	86.9	192.5	827.2
Machinery	2.3	68.9	109.0	120.9	66.9	55.6	93.0	276.8
Other	0	17.7	28.6	81.9	55.3	31.3	99.5	550.4
Agricultural goods	61.3	578.3	653.5	79.7	negl	64.0	573.3	888.7
Other	0	24.2	15.8	21.1	13.2	20.4	52.4	0.6
TOTAL	63.5	689.1	806.9	303.6	135.4	171.3	818.2	1716.5
US Imports								
Manufactured goods	15.6	39.0	75.6	118.3	130.4	123.1	228.2	492.0
Agricultural goods	16.5	21.3	25.3	28.7	56.4	67.8	84.7	95.8
Other	0.1	3.0	13.8	11.3	15.1	11.7	11.1	4.4
TOTAL	32.2	63.7	114.7	158.3	201.9	202.7	324.0	592.2
TRADE TURNOVER	97.5	752.8	921.6	461.9	337.3	374.0	1142.2	2308.7
TRADE BALANCE	31.3	625.4	692.2	145.3	-66.5	-31.3	494.3	1124.3

Source: National Council for US-China Trade (Washington DC): "Sino-US Trade Statisics 1972, 1973 Including Agricultural Trade" (Special Report No. 7, March 1974); "Sino-US Trade Statistics" (Special Report No. 12, March 1975); "Sino-US Trade Statistics 1979" (Special Report No. 16, June 1980). Also, US Department of Commerce, "China's Economy and Foreign Trade, 1978-79" September 1979. Items may not sum due to rounding.

13. US-China Trade: Leading Exports and Imports, 1979

US Exports to China

	Value	% of total
Cotton	$356,763,016	20.8
Yellow corn	268,547,073	15.6
Wheat, unmilled	214,105,583	12.5
Soybeans	106,722,343	6.2
Polyester fibers	56,777,062	3.3
Seamless oil well casings	56,536,766	3.3
Oil and gas field drilling parts	54,157,663	3.2
Seamless pipe, non-iron or steel alloy	36,521,461	2.1
Soybean oil, crude	35,894,335	2.1
Seamless oil well drilling pipe, non-iron or steel alloy	29,937,468	1.7
Urea	27,179,233	1.6
Polyester resins	22,565,155	1.3
Textured yarns of polyester	22,416,073	1.3
Rotary drilling machines for oil and gas fields	17,800,320	1.0
Electric geophysical instruments and parts	17,698,320	1.0
Total US exports	$1,716,499,905	

US Imports

Crude petroleum	$71,788,895	12.1
Gasoline	21,614,894	3.7
Fireworks	15,623,799	2.6
Plain printcloth shirting	15,153,376	2.6
Ammonium molybdate	13,136,891	2.2
Antiques	12,275,794	2.1
Men's cotton or flannel sports shirts	10,551,376	1.8
Floor coverings, pile	10,253,620	1.7
US-type Oxford female footware	9,948,416	1.7
Shrimp, raw, peeled	9,731,628	1.6
Bristles, crude or processed	9,570,709	1.6
Tungsten ore	9,314,857	1.6
Cotton gloves	9,119,163	1.5
Baskets and bags of bamboo	8,908,688	1.5
Women's cotton corduroy slacks	8,166,679	1.4
Total US imports	$592,282,994	

Source: China Business Review, March-April 1980, p. 35.

VII. MATERIAL WELFARE, EDUCATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

All the characteristic problems of very poor societies plagued China in 1949. Distribution of wealth and income was quite unequal and most people were at or below subsistence level. Malnutrition, starvation, and infectious diseases were widespread. As a result, only 20 out of every 100 infants survived to their first birthday; the average life expectancy was between 35 and 40 years of age. Social services were minimal and concentrated in urban areas. The ratio of patients to doctors trained in modern science was around 35,000:1. There were only 17 million primary school students, 20% of the total age group. Only a million of those could expect to get any secondary education. And probably a substantial majority of adults were illiterate.

How has post-1949 economic development (outlined in the previous chapter) affected the welfare of the Chinese people? The Communist Party has undeniably ended the mass poverty that it found when it took power in 1949. Through institutional and technological change, through expanding production and improving distribution, the regime has for the most part laid a floor of subsistence so that very few people must relive the horrors of the past. Public health services have more or less eliminated serious infectious diseases. Basic education is now available to the very many instead of the very few.

But progress beyond subsistence has come slowly to China's growing population. Consequently, Party leaders have continually argued over whether the low standard of living or the inequality of its distribution is the greater political liability, and over how to rectify the situation. One group, led by Mao Zedong before his death, has held that inequality breeds political alienation, which in turn breeds economic stagnation. It has advocated reducing the gap -- in material goods, in education, in health care, etc. -- between the relative "haves" and the relative "have-nots." It would foster political consciousness to spur productivity. The other group, epitomized by Deng Xiaoping, believes that this egalitarianism has only perpetuated backwardness. It believes that all will benefit to some degree from rapid economic growth, but that it is necessary to enhance productivity by rewarding materially those who excel.

Material Welfare There are various estimates of per capita income in China, ranging from $250 to around $400. Within that average there is a relatively broad range, although extremely high incomes have been eliminated. As the table (VII.2) on personal income on page 93 suggests, senior cadres, professionals, and technicians constitute an economic elite that receives substantially higher monthly incomes than ordinary workers and peasants.

Even outside this elite, there is substantial variation. At the top are skilled, senior workers in state enterprises and members of wealthy suburban farming communes. On lower rungs of the economic ladder are less skilled workers and peasants in more remote communes. One in four rural dwellers has an annual per capita income of less than $35 per year. Moreover, there can be substantial income differences within each occupation, between production teams within the same commune, and even between families within the same team. (Several factors complicate such general comparisons: many urban dwellers receive allowances and bonuses; peasants earn supplemental income by working in private plots; and most individuals pool their incomes with those of other family members.)

What can these incomes buy? Let us focus on urban families since more information is available. Compared to Americans, Chinese generally spend much less on housing, transportation, education, and health care (less than 15% of total income) but much more on food (around 50%). They save at a much higher rate (sometimes as high as 20-30%). But Chinese must work longer hours than Americans to purchase comparable goods (see the table [VII.3] on page 94 for an early 1970s' estimate). America's technological lead accounts for much of this difference in purchasing power. But another factor has been the PRC government's tendency to direct investment toward producer goods, forcing it to ration the distribution of consumer goods (including food) by prices and other mechanisms.

Thus, looking at per capita material welfare one sees an even starker picture. Supplies of two key commodities -- grain and cotton cloth -- have shown no significant per capita increase since the late 1950s (see table [VII.4] on page 95). And 1978 data on average food consumption (table [VII.5] on page 95) indicate a diet limited in both quantity and quality. In fact, it was revealed in March 1979 that about 100 million people (10% of the population) suffered from malnutrition.

This stagnation in consumer welfare has had a serious effect on labor productivity. The post-Mao leadership has responded with the readjustment policies outlined in the previous chapter: raising wages, increasing the supply of consumer goods, and instituting incentives in agriculture and industry to stimulate output. The shift has not been without problems: consumer goods output is still far behind demand, and rural incomes have been allowed to grow faster than urban ones; both imbalances have fed a mild inflation. More broadly this materialist emphasis has caused concern among those who fear it will exacerbate rather than soothe political conflict.

Education How best to use scarce educational resources has been an issue of continuing controversy in China. Quality and quantity have been competing goals. On the one hand, economic development requires increasing numbers of technicians and managers. On the other, spreading basic knowledge is essential to rural development and fostering upward mobility. The rival priorities are evident in the evolution of the educational system (see description [VII.6] on pages 96-97) and enrollment statistics (see table [VII.7] on page 97).

The pre-Cultural Revolution approach emphasized training technical specialists. Middle school and college enrollments grew at a faster rate than primary school enrollments. The Cultural Revolution attacked this focus on expertise: schools were closed for varying lengths of time from 1966 on, with universities not reopening until 1970. The approach that then emerged stressed the expansion of primary and secondary enrollments, especially in the rural areas, and the selection of univeristy students on the basis of political commitment rather than tested academic ability. The post-Mao leadership has reemphasized expertise. Expanding higher education is the highest priority, universalizing middle school education is now a goal for the long term, and entrance exams have been restored as a screening device. Because of tightened standards and demographic trends, primary and secondary enrollments have actually declined.

An educational balance sheet reveals both pluses and minuses in both quality and quantity. Primary education is now nearly universal, and secondary education has expanded considerably. The adult literacy rate is said to be about 85%. However, rural schools still lag behind their urban and suburban counterparts, and closing that gap does not seem to be a high priority of current policy. A negative side effect of the Cultural Revolution turmoil and the enrollment policies adopted subsequently was a decline in school discipline.

Concerning quality, the higher education system has over the past 30 years trained a corps of specialists in fields appropriate to modernization -- science, engineering, teaching, and medicine (see table [VII.8], page 98). But here the Cultural Revolution took a tremendous toll, damaging or destroying the careers of older specialists and preventing the training of younger ones. The revival of the higher education system will remedy this shortage of skilled manpower only over the long term.

If one uses aggregate enrollment statistics to measure equality of educational opportunity, the following becomes clear:

--As noted above, primary education has become increasingly accessible, with 95% of the age-group in school.

--Secondary education has become increasingly accessible (middle school enrollments were about 10% of primary school enrollments in 1957, 13% in 1965, 25% in 1974, 39% in 1977, and 40% in 1979).

--As secondary education expanded, university education became relatively less accessible (enrollments for the latter were 7% of the former in 1957, 4% in 1965, and around 1% in 1974 and 1977). That trend, which the Cultural Revolution probably aggravated, has now been reversed to a limited extent (the ratio was 1.7% in 1979).

--Even though primary enrollments have more than doubled since 1957, the probability of the average primary school student getting into university are about the same now as then (around 1 in 145) after dropping during the intervening period.

But these general trends mask an underlying question: whether specific groups -- for example, urban youth, particularly children of officials and the well educated -- are getting better access to scarce secondary and higher education resources. The renewed emphasis on academic admissions criteria, especially for university, would seem to favor these groups. And Mao's mid-1960s belief that those groups held a disproportionate share of college enrollments, at a time when the number of high school graduates was growing, was a partial basis for his Cultural Revolution attack on the educational status quo. The current leadership's emphasis on improving quality may create similar political discontent among those who have gained and would stand to gain from the Maoist stress on quantity.

Health Care As with education, medical services have expanded gradually, but not without political conflict over how they are distributed. The number of hospital beds and doctors has increased over time (see table [VII.9] on page 99), with public health campaigns to combat specific problems supplementing the more formal medical institutions. This combination has brought about the "modernization" of China's health problems. Infectious and endemic diseases are now fairly rare. Life expectancy is now 67 years for men and 70 for women; infant mortality is around one-tenth of its 1949 rate. As in the industrial world, cancer and cardiovascular problems are now the main cause of death. Although epidemiological statistics for one district of Beijing are not representative of the country as a whole, they do demonstrate the dimensions of the transformation (see table [VII.10] on page 99).

Despite this progress, there has been substantial political controversy over which groups should receive what level of medical services. Public health work before 1966 focused on the urban areas, and attention to the countryside came only as the Cultural Revolution began. Subsequently, health services spread much more broadly, so that today each of the country's 2,000 counties has at least one general hospital; each of the 55,000 communes has at least one clinic; and practically all rural production brigades (totaling 600,000) have medical stations staffed by almost 1.6 million paramedical personnel (barefoot doctors). Whereas the proportion of urban to rural hospital beds was 3:1 in 1949, it is 3:5 today.

But this quantitative improvement came at the expense of quality of care, especially in the cities. Upgrading urban hospitals and improving the skills of medical personnel -- especially paramedics and full doctors trained after 1966 -- are now of high priority. It remains to be seen whether there will be sufficient resources (scarce to begin with) to maintain and improve services in the countryside, where peasants have become used to basic health care.

Evaluating the quality of life in China depends in large measure on the yardstick employed. If the standard is the dark days of the 1940s, then there has been substantial progress. Basic subsistence and services are available to the great majority of the population, an accomplishment which many developing countries have yet to achieve. If the standard is the still spartan existence of China's cities and wealthier communes, then a large proportion of the population has a long way to go. If one judges by the expectations of Chinese themselves, there can only be a tentative verdict. Those who experienced China at its pre-1949 worst seem fairly content. Less satisfied are those for whom the past is only their parents' reminiscences, who have lived the contradiction between socialism's promise and its mixed performance. Unless the "four modernizations" bring them fairly quick rewards, they may be unwilling to sacrifice for an uncertain future.

Suggested Readings

Ch'en Pi-chao. Population and Health Policy in the People's Republic of China. Washington: The Smithsonian Institution, 1976. A detailed and useful introduction to institutions and policies in the public health and population control fields.

Eberstadt, Nick. Poverty in China. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University International Development Institute, 1980. An evaluation of the PRC's success in raising the level of human welfare, in the context of performance of other developing countries and prior claims of China's progress.

Kessen, William, ed. Childhood in China. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. The report of an American delegation that visited China in late 1973 to study early childhood development. Offers interesting material and observations on preschool, primary, and secondary educational programs of that time.

Lampton, David M. The Politics of Medicine in China. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977. A detailed analysis of health care as an issue of political conflict.

_____. "New 'Revolution' in China's Social Policy." Problems of Communism, 24 (September-December 1979), pp. 16-33. An evaluation of the PRC's social welfare performance since 1949 and prospects for the future.

Pepper, Suzanne. "Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?" China Quarterly, no. 81 (March 1980), pp. 1-65. A comprehensive analysis of the post-Mao educational system and the contrast with its predecessor.

Seybolt, Peter J., ed. Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science Press (now M. E. Sharpe), 1973. Examination of the educational system that emerged in the early 1970s.

2. Personal Income

(All wages are monthly figures in yuan [1 yuan = $0.57]. Urban wages do not include allowances for transportation, cost of living, etc., nor bonuses paid in factories. Rural incomes are undervalued because they are in per capita terms, and because they do not include income [sometimes as much as 30%] earned outside the collective on private plots or in rural factories.)

	Wages	Ratio
Occupational Wage Ranges		
Government Workers (30 grades)	18-560	31:1
Premier & Vice Premiers	440-560	
Ministry Head	230-380	
Province-Level Head	200-340	
City Mayors	77-230	
County Magistrates	86-122	
Factory Cadres	35-200	
Government Clerks	26-45	
Professors & Doctors	60-360	6:1
Technicians & Engineers (18 grades)	52-210	5:1
State Industrial Workers (8 grades)	33-120	3.6:1
Average Monthly Wages, 1979		
Workers & Staff, State Factories & Offices	58.75	
Workers & Staff, Urban Collectives	42.88	
Rural Per Capita Income from Collective Work	6.95	
Income Differences		
Urban-Rural		2:1
Between communes		4:1
Between teams in the same commune		3:1
Between workers in the same team		3:1

Source: Chen Po-wen, "Rising Prices and Wages in Mainland China: An Analysis," Issues and Studies, February 1980, n.p.; Martin Whyte, "Inequality and Stratification in China," China Quarterly, no. 64 (December 1975), pp. 685-93; State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on the Fulfillment of China's 1979 Economic Plan," Beijing Review, May 19, 1980.

3. Comparative Purchasing Power of Industrial Wages, China and the US (early 1970s)

(The comparison below is purely suggestive since wages and prices in both countries have changed considerabley since the data were compiled.)

Category	Amount the Average Wage Can Buy:		
	In China	In US	Ratio
		(per hour)	
Foodstuffs, in pounds			
Rice (long-grain)	2.0	14.2	7:1
Wheat flour	1.8	23.9	12:1
Irish potatoes	4.8	30.5	6:1
Carrots	4.8	12.4	25:1
Cucumbers	5.5	10.9	2:1
Chicken	0.26	6.9	26:1
Beef	0.48	2.0	4:1
Pork	0.34	2.7	8:1
White sugar	0.44	20.4	46:1
		(per week)	
Fabrics, Clothing, Footware			
Cotton prints (sq m)	7.0	129.2	18:1
Corduroy fabrics (sq m)	2.7	81.9	30:1
Unpadded cotton jackets	1.6	6.4	4:1
Cotton work pants	2.1	26.9	13:1
Corduroy jackets	1.6	5.6	3.5:1
Corduroy trousers	2.3	19.2	8:1
Cloth coats with lining	0.2	2.9	14:1
Blue cotton work shirts			
Good quality	3.2	19.2	6:1
Poorer quality	5.0	33.6	7:1
Light wool sweaters	0.7	10.7	15:1
Men's cotton socks (pr)	11.1	206.7	18:1
Tennis shoes, basic	3.1	33.8	11:1
Tennis shoes, sturdy	1.5	21.3	14:1
Miscellaneous Consumer Goods			
Drinking glasses	49.4	1,344.0	27:1
Simple alarm clocks	1.0	16.8	17:1
Very simple bedside lamps	1.3	29.8	23:1
Umbrellas	1.7	26.8	16:1
Ball-point pens	13.8	149.3	11:1
Durable Consumer Goods			
Bicycles	0.4	9.1	23:1
12-inch TV sets	0.14	6.5	47:1
Small transistor radios	1.6	84.4	53:1
Watches, Swiss	0.11	5.9	53:1
Watches, domestic	0.54	32.8	60:1

Source: Adapted from Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 306-7.

4. Per Capita Indicators of Consumer Welfare

	GNP ('78 US$)	Grain (kms)	Cotton Cloth (linear m)	Consumer Goods Index ('57=100)
1952	174	282	6.6	67
1957	215	297	7.8	100
1965	246	257	7.7	155
1970	310	287	10.0	206
1975	387	298	10.0	250
1977	403	286	10.3	n/a
1978	443	304	11.0	n/a
1979	n/a	331	12.0	n/a

Source: Per capita figures are derived from the aggregate production data presented in section VI.3. The consumer goods index is taken from CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, China: Economic Indicators (ER-78 10750, December 1978), p. 47.

5. Per Capita Food Consumption, 1978

	Annual Consumption	Daily Consumption		
	(kg)	Energy (kcal)	Protein (g)	Lipids (g)
Vegetable Food				
Milled rice	81.2	800	15	2
Wheat flour	37.3	370	12	1
Corn	29.0	280	8	3
Other grains	16.5	155	4	1
Potatoes	72.4	185	3	1
Soybeans	5.8	55	6	3
Vegetable oils	2.1	50	-	16
Vegetables	96.8	55	4	1
Fruit	6.0	10	-	-
Sugar	3.4	35	-	-
Total, Vegetable	350.0	1,995	52	28
Animal Foods				
Pork	8.5	65	3	78
Other meats	0.7	5	-	1
Poultry	1.4	5	1	-
Fish	4.5	10	2	1
Eggs	1.8	5	1	1
Milk	0.4	-	-	-
Animal fats	0.6	15	-	2
Total, Animal	17.9	105	7	12
TOTAL	367.9	2,100	59	40

Source: Vaclav Smil, "Communist China's Food: Still a Long Way to Go," Issues and Studies (April 1980), p. 43.

6. Evolution of the Educational System

The Pre-Cultural Revolution Model

This model emerged gradually over the years between 1949 and 1965. It emphasized the cultivation of expertise, through examinations to evaluate performance and potential, and "key" schools at all levels for brighter students. Theoretical research was stressed in universities. Curriculm was centralized. This model was attacked vigorously during the Cultural Revolution as an elitist system that did not address adequately the educational needs of Chinese society.

Primary School: 6 years, 4 years junior and 2 years senior

Secondary School: 6 years, 3 years junior and 3 years senior

Higher Education: Undergraduate programs, 4 to 5 years; teacher's college, 2 years; postgraduate research & training

The Cultural Revolution Model

Following the Cultural Revolution period's initial turmoil, there was much local experimentation, especially in curriculum, and no single pattern prevailed for the country as a whole. On the whole, years of schooling were reduced. Examinations, academic criteria, teaching professionalism were downgraded, and more emphasis was placed on political criteria. Applied or practical study was stressed over advanced theoretical research. Two to three years of productive labor were required before admission to university.

Primary School: 4 to 6 years

Secondary School: 4 to 5 years, 2 to 3 years junior and 2 to 3 years senior

Higher Education: 2 to 3 years for undergraduate programs; inservice training replaces postgraduate programs

The Post-Mao Model

Since mid-1977, the major elements of the pre-Cultural Revolution model -- academic criteria, examinations, six years for primary school, "key" schools, centralization of curricula, postgraduate study, theoretical research -- have returned. Some aspects of the Cultural Revolution model -- the work experience requirement before university, heavy emphasis on political commitment -- were relaxed. Advanced students and scholars, many of them graduates of the pre-Cultural Revolution system, have gone overseas to study.

Primary School: 6 years

Secondary School: 5 years, 3 years junior and 2 years senior

Higher Education: 4-year undergraduate program; restoration of post graduate research and training; overseas study

Other Educational Institutions Three important, and more or less formal, types of institutions supplement the regular educational system. First is the variety of locally-run preschool programs (nurseries, day-care centers, and kindergartens). Second, is the large, complex system of part-time and "half-work/half-study" schools that provide compensatory technical or vocational education. Third, Chinese citizens acquire knowledge about work, society, and politics through participation in study groups, special campaigns and conferences, and on-the-job training.

7. School Enrollments (in thousands)

Year	Primary	General Secondary	Specialized Secondary	University
1949	24,391	1,039	220	117
1950	28,924	1,305	n/a	137
1951	43,154	1,568	n/a	153
1952	51,100	2,490	n/a	191
1953	51,664	2,933	n/a	212
1954	51,218	3,587	n/a	153
1955	53,126	3,900	n/a	288
1956	63,464	5,165	n/a	403
1957	64,279	6,281	n/a	441
1958	86,400	8,520	n/a	660
1959	90,000	n/a	n/a	810
1960	90,000	n/a	n/a	955
1965	110,000	14,418	n/a	533
1972	127,000	36,000	n/a	200
1974	145,000	36.500	n/a	325
1977	150,000	58,280	690	620
1978	146,240	65,480	889	850
1979	146,630	59,050	1,199	1,020

Source: David M. Lampton, "Performance and the Chinese Political System: A Preliminary Assessment of Education and Health Policies," China Quarterly, no. 75 (September 1978), p. 525; Suzanne Pepper, "Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?" China Quarterly, no. 81 (March 1980), p. 6; Leo A. Orleans, Manpower for Science and Engineering in China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1980); and "Communique on the Fulfillment of China's 1979 Economic Plan," Beijing Review, May 12, 1980, pp. 12-15.

8. Educational Specialization and Achievement

Number of University Graduates in

Year	Engineering	Natural Sciences	Agricul. /Forestry	Medicine	Other*	Total
1949	4,752	1,584	1,718	1,314	11,632	21,000
1950	4,711	1,468	2,477	1,391	8,953	18,000
1951	4,416	1,488	1,538	2,366	9,192	19,000
1952	10,213	2,215	2,361	2,636	14,575	32,000
1953	14,565	1,753	2,633	2,948	26,101	48,000
1954	15,596	802	3,532	4,527	22,543	47,000
1955	18,614	2,015	2,614	6,840	24,917	55,000
1956	22,047	3,978	3,541	5,403	28,081	63,000
1957	17,162	3,524	3,104	6,200	26,010	56,000
1958	17,499	4,645	3,513	5,393	40,950	72,000
1959	23,300	4,400	6,318	9,000	26,982	70,000
1960	45,000	8,500	10,800	14,900	55,800	135,000
1961	54,000	10,000	12,000	19,000	67,000	162,000
1962	59,000	11,000	20,000	17,000	71,000	178,000
1963	77,000	10,000	17,000	25,000	71,000	200,000
1964	70,000	11,000	18,000	23,000	78,000	200,000
1965	60,000	10,000	15,000	19,000	66,000	170,000
1966	29,000	5,000	7,500	9,000	32,500	83,000
1967	36,000	5,400	8,100	10,000	44,500	104,000
1968	40,000	6,000	9,000	11,000	48,000	114,000
196 -72	0	0	0	0	0	0
1973	11,300	1,700	3,200	3,500	9,300	29,000
1974/75	64,400	9,900	18,200	18,100	54,400	165,000
1976	58,500	9,000	16,500	16,500	49,500	150,000
1977	60,800	9,600	16,000	16,000	57,600	160,000
1978	61,400	10,000	16,600	16,600	61,400	166,000
1979	58,300	9,700	14,600	14,600	64,800	162,000
Total	937,575	154,672	234,849	281,218	1,070,686	2,679,000

*Primarily teachers

Note: All figures for 1949 through 1958 and 1961 through 1963 are actual reported figures. Figures for 1966 through 1968 and 1974 through 1977 are estimates. For 1959, 1960, 1964, 1965, 1973, 1978, and 1979, only the totals are actual reported figures. For 1959, the total and the figures for agriculture and forestry, and for medicine are actual reported figures.

Source: Leo A. Orleans, Manpower for Science and Engineering in China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 22.

9. Medical Services

	1952	1957	1960s	1977	1978	1979
Hospital Facilities						
Beds (1000s)	180	364	672*	1,771	1,850	1,932
Per 1,000 persons	0.32	0.57	0.89	1.79	1.85	1.90
Medical Personnel						
Professionals (1000s)						
Doctors, Western Medicine						
Senior	52	74	n/a	n/a	350	393
Junior	67	136	n/a	n/a	420	435
Nurses	61	128	n/a	n/a	n/a	421
Other Professionals	860	1,570	n/a	n/a	n/a	1,393
Total Professionals	1,040	1,900	1,400#	2,336	2,460	2,642
Barefoot Doctors (1000s)	-	-	-	n/a	1,600	1,575
TOTAL PERSONNEL (1000s)	1,040	1,908	1,400	n/a	4,060	4,217
Per 1,000 persons	1.82	2.97	1.85	n/a	4.05	4.15

*1965 figure #1963 figure

Note: In 1979, there were reportedly 258,000 doctors of Chinese medicine.

Source: Chu-yuan Cheng, "Health Manpower: Growth and Distribution," in Myron E. Wegman, et al., eds., Public Health in the People's Republic of China (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1973), p. 145; State Statistical Bureau, "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1978 National Economic Plan," Beijing Review, July 6, 1979, and "Communique on Fulfillment of China's 1979 Economic Plan," Beijing Review, May 19, 1980.

10. Changing Incidence of Disease in Beijing

Cause	Deaths per 100,000 persons	
	1955-59	1974-78
Infectious Disease	112.9	17.4
Cancer	25.6	67.6
Heart Attacks	73.8	118.4
Stroke	43.1	97.3
Total Cardiovascular	116.9	215.7

Source: M. Gregg Bloche, "China Discovers Health Perils Accompanying Modernization," Washington Post, August 19, 1979; and Bloche, "Hypertension on the Rise in Modern China," Washington Post, August 20, 1979.

VIII. DAILY LIFE

1. Introduction and Suggested Readings

Trying to describe the daily life of a society of one billion people is presumptuous at best. Previous chapters have made apparent China's great variety and the Chinese people's range of life styles. Most foreigners can make only general observations.

Families and Organizations The family is an important institution in China today, though very different from what it was thirty years ago. Reforming the family system was high on the CCP's immediate post-1949 agenda: land reform and confiscation of firearms deprived the clan of its power, and a marriage law ended flagrant abuses against women. Subsequently, demographic changes have caused the extended family to decline. But Chinese today still spend much of their time as members of family units. The family is still a principal institution for production, savings, consumption, and socialization. And in many ways, it is perhaps more cohesive, more closely knit, and more a part of the social fabric today than it was in 1949. The post-1949 restoration of political and economic stability made the forced breakup of families less likely. Public health measures and better diet have increased the number of generations living at the same time. Severe restrictions on migration within the country have discouraged family members from seeking employment away from their kin. Because they provide a foundation of social order, facilitate savings, and instill discipline, China's approximately 200 million family units are a significant resource in fostering development.

But unlike three decades ago, Chinese now live in a world of organizations that are linked directly or indirectly to the state. Everyone is a member of a work unit or a residential unit -- in many cases the two are the same. An individual's work unit defines one's social status; sets the level of income, health care, and old-age pension; provides (in cities) ration coupons for scarce basic commodities; may regulate the purchase of durable consumer goods; authorizes marriage; and even attempts to regulate the conception of children. One's unit often also provides a family-like social support. Organizations are responsible for a wide range of other social activities -- schools for education, medical facilities for health care, urban housing offices for living space, retail outlets for consumer goods, the police and the courts for social control, and the Communist Party and mass organizations for political indoctrination.

Work The type of work dictates much about the individual's daily life and the extent to which organizations impinge on it. In the composition of its labor force, China is still very much an agricultural country (see table [VIII.2] on page 105). Three-fourths of the labor force works in farming, one-tenth in the manufacturing sector, and the remainder in the service sector. As in many developing countries, creating new jobs in China's cities has not kept pace with even the natural increase of the urban population. As the table suggests, less than half-a-percent of the labor force has moved out of agriculture each year.

The government has taken a variety of measures over the years to minimize urban unemployment and the social problems it engenders. There have been strict controls on internal migration since the late 1950s. Beginning in the early 1960s, millions of urban middle school graduates have had to settle on communes and state farms at varying distances from their home cities for varying lengths of time. The resettlement rate rose in 1968 (to restore order after the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution) and then again in the mid-1970s (see table [VIII.3] on page 105). The post-Mao leadership deemphasized this very unpopular program, but soon faced a rise in urban unemployment -- about 20 million persons by March 1979 (20% of the urban population). The government is permitting some "private enterprise" to reduce the number of young people out of work.

There is a sharp contrast between city and countryside in the organization of work. In the rural areas, the 1950s saw the end of an economy based on family farms and the beginning of experimentation with more collective forms of ownership (see chronology [VIII.4a] on pages 106-107). The ultimate result was the three-level commune system which, despite the extensive transformation of the rural social and economic structure, still relies on the commitment of family units (see glossary [VIII.4b] on page 107).

This institutional change has not altered the back-breaking character of agricultural work and the long hours in hot weather. In compensation, a commune member receives a predetermined number of points for each day's work, with more points allocated for harder work or to more experienced workers. At the end of each accounting period (usually a half a year) the team sets aside its fixed expenses -- a small land tax, a larger compulsory sale of grain to the state at a fixed price, and funds to meet production costs. It reserves an amount for special purchases, welfare, and savings; how much depends on its level of prosperity. The team then distributes the remainder -- in the form of grain, cash, cloth, and other food -- to each household according to the work points accumulated by its members. Families supplement their income with wages from nonagricultural employment and the sale of produce grown in private plots (the supplement is sometimes as high as 30% of total income).

In urban areas most organizations -- factories, stores, schools, government offices, etc. -- are "owned by the whole people" and run by the state. These tend to be large, formal organizations in which the family as an institution plays a much more limited role than in the countryside. The work week is usually six eight-hour days. Monthly wages are paid according to the relevant salary scale (see the table [VII.2] on page 93 for examples). In some cities, employees also receive supplemental payments to compensate for a higher cost of living. In economic enterprises particularly, more productive workers receive bonuses based on the basis of periodic evaluation. Rising urban unemployment has brought greater variety to the organization of work: the government has given private citizens permission to establish individual and collective (i.e., partnership) enterprises, especially in handicraft and service trades.

In sum, work creates two very different styles of life in China. In agriculture, the hours are long and irregular, wages are paid on a piece rate basis, and hard physical labor is the norm. In the urban areas, one's job still consumes many waking hours, but they are more regular. There are many exceptions to physical labor. Wages, higher to start with are primarily time rate, though sometimes supplemented by output incentives. It is not surprising that commune members often envy their city cousins.

Residence City and countryside also differ considerably in the housing available to families, and in the degree of neighborhood organization. Rural dwellers usually own their own homes (but not the land on which they sit), may build new ones, and may transfer ownership to their children when they die. Depending on the family's wealth, houses range from mud huts to spacious two-story brick homes.

Urban residents must put up with more crowded conditions. They either live in traditional style one-story houses or in more "modern" multi-story apartment buildings. There are some enterprises that provide housing for their employees, but many urban residents rent housing from the municipal government. The supply of urban housing has not kept pace with population growth, and families must live in very tight quarters. According to government statistics, residents of 192 municipalities have 3.6 square meters of living space per capita, a decline from the early 1950s. The government is investing more in new housing, but probably not enough to quickly alleviate the shortage.

Concerning community organization, rural areas are much less complex than urban. Production teams are both work and residential units, equivalent to a small natural village or part of a large one. In some parts of China, the production team is composed of members with the same surname. In cities separation of work and residence is the norm, and municipal governments have extended organizational tentacles into urban neighborhoods, both to maintain social control and to mobilize the populace (see the chart and glossary [VIII.5] on pages 108-109). Fifteen to 40 households form a resident's small group; several of these fall under the jurisdiction of a residents' committee supervising up to several hundred households. The next level is the neighborhood committee, which controls several residents' committees and probably several thousand people. Units at each level draw their leaders from within and work under the supervision of police and various administrative agencies.

But the purpose of these institutions should not be misinterpreted. Generally speaking, the organizational networks that most affect daily life -- both work and residential, in both city and countryside -- encourage individuals to solve problems within their immediate social context. Direct official intervention occurs only for the most serious cases.

Leisure The demands of work and household maintenance leave Chinese relatively little time for leisure, and the quantity and quality of recreational activities have varied over time. The low point was certainly the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76): offerings in the arts were few and didactic, and many parks and monuments were closed on the grounds that they might foster "feudal" thinking. But since the fall of the "gang of four," there has been substantial liberalization of culture. Entertainment is no longer taboo in the performing arts (though a political message often remains), and the number of movies, plays, and operas has greatly increased. In the fine arts, both traditionalism and a searching modern eclecticism are permitted. Literature has become a central vehicle for personal expression. Museums and reopened traditional cultural sites appeal to the Chinese pride in their long past. Spectator sports continue to be popular. Radio and, increasingly, television bring varied cultural fare into units and households.

Restoring Political Bonds The liberalization of culture is part of a broader effort to recreate public confidence in the regime. Over the last three decades the Communist Party lost much of its originally broad mandate to transform the country's social and political life. Especially among those born after 1949, there is skepticism -- how much is impossible to measure -- about whether the government can bring a change for the better.

The relatively low standard of living and limited career opportunities -- problems common in most developing societies -- are partly responsible for these attitudes. But China's unique political history also plays a role. A final verdict has yet to be rendered on the Cultural Revolution era, but there is substantial evidence that it wreaked havoc with the lives of many and created a social climate of cynicism and anxiety. This lack of confidence in a political solution to China's problems is perhaps not unrelated to the moderate levels of reported mental illness and a government-tolerated revival of religion (see tables [VIII.6] and [VIII.7] on page 109).

The post-Mao leadership has taken some specific steps to reduce its political liabilities and reknit old loyalties. It has cancelled class labels assigned during the social and political transformations of the 1950s and 1960s, and has forbid discrimination in employment, social services, and political participation on the basis of such labels. Revived legal institutions guided by rules of due process are to replace arbitrary police rule. Basic-level organizations are to allow more participation by members. More colorful and, in the Chinese context, fashionable clothes are replacing drab uniformity.

On the surface, the shape of daily life in China will probably not change radically in the foreseeable future. The great majority of Chinese will, as they do now, have to work hard to guarantee a standard of living that ranges from basic subsistence to moderate comfort. They will continue to live in close quarters with families and neighbors, relying on time-tested ways of maintaining social harmony. Like others in the modern world, they must find personal orbits in a universe of organizations that create opportunites while imposing controls. But whether they have confidence in their government will depend on its success in raising the general standard of living and guaranteeing some measure of personal autonomy.

Suggested Readings

Bennett, Gordon A. Huadong: The Story of a Chinese People's Commune. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978. A description of the structure and daily life of one commune in South China.

Bernstein, Thomas P. Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth from Urban to Rural China. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. An exhaustive analysis of the origins, rationale, and effectiveness of one solution to the problem of youth unemployment.

Bonovia, David. The Chinese. New York: Lippincott, 1980. Perceptive observations of life in China today by a British journalist resident in Beijing.

Chen, Jack. A Year in Upper Felicity: Life in a Chinese Village during the Cultural Revolution. New York: Macmillan, 1973. A report on a year's (1969-70) residence in a rural commune. The author, who lived in the PRC for many years, offers much detail on village life, attitudes, and relationships.

Ch'en Jo-hsi. The Execution of Mayor Yin: Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978. Graphic stories of daily life in China during the late 1960s and early 1970s by a Chinese-American who lived in China during that period.

Chinese Literature (monthly). Short stories, poems, and novellas from both the traditional and modern periods. Literature is currently one of the principal modes of personal expression in China, and so is an excellent way to "get inside" contemporary Chinese life.

Croizier, Ralph C., ed. *China's Cultural Legacy and Communism*. New York: Praeger, 1970. A collection of essays on all aspects of culture, broadly defined. Although scholarly in approach, they have much to offer the general reader about the old and new in China and how the individual Chinese experiences the mixture.

Davis-Friedmann, Deborah. *Long Life: Aging and Old Age in the Peoples's Republic of China*. New Haven: Yale University Press, forthcoming 1981. Scholarly examination of the place of old people in contemporary Chinese society.

Finkiestein, David. "When the Snow Thaws." *The New Yorker*, September 10, 1979. A revealing look at the "underside" of Chinese life and the impact of the Cultural Revolution.

Frolic, B. Michael. *Mao's People: Sixteen Portraits of Life in Revolutionary China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. Individual Chinese relate both their pride in much of what China has accomplished and their problems in coping with a shifting and sometimes oppressive political environment.

Lo, Ruth Earnshaw, and Kinderman, Katharine S. *In the Eye of the Typhoon*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980. The powerful memoir of an American woman, the widow of a Chinese intellectual, who lived in China from 1937 to 1978.

Parish, William, and Whyte, Martin. *Village and Family in Contemporary China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. An important scholarly study that analyzes rural social change -- and the persistence of some traditional social patterns in post-1949 China.

Rawski, Thomas G. *Economic Growth and Employment in China*. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1980. An economist's examination of China's performance in providing employment for its work force of over 400 million persons.

Terrill, Ross, ed. *The China Difference*. New York: Harper & Row, 1979. A collection of essays in which 16 scholars evaluate what makes China tick after three decades of Communist rule by exploring the complexities of belief systems and social, political, and cultural life.

2. Composition of the Labor Force (in millions)

	1957		1975	
Sector	Size	%	Size	%
Agriculture#	231.53	84.5	329.04	76.7
Manufacturing and Services				
Industry and Contruction	16.71	6.1	45.90	10.7
Commerce, Finance, Food & Drink, Personal Services	4.38	1.6	9.00	2.1
Transport & Communications	8.76	3.2	19.30	4.5
Health, Education, & Culture	4.65	1.7	14.15	3.3
Government & Mass Organizations	3.01	1.1	6.00	1.4
Military	3.01	1.1	3.43	0.8
Salt & Fishing	1.91	0.7	2.14	0.5
Total, Manufacturing and Services	42.47	15.5	99.96	23.3
TOTAL	274.00	100.0	429.00	100.0

#includes farmland capital contruction, forestry, and water conservancy

Source: Adapted from The Economist, February 16, 1980, p. 108.

3. Transfer of Urban Youth to the Countryside

Year	Number	Year	Number
1962-63	292,000	1972	646,000
1964	3-400,000	1973	1,123,000
1965	250,000	1974	2,000,000
1968	1,725,000	1975	2,000,000
1969	2,700,000	1976-78	5,000,000
1970	1,067,000	1979	800,000 (projected)
1971	738,000		

Source: Thomas P. Bernstein, Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages: The Transfer of Youth From Urban to Rural China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 25, 32; Suzanne Pepper, "Chinese Education After Mao: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back and Begin Again?" China Quarterly, no. 81 (March 1980), pp. 48, 57.

4. Rural Organization: Chronology and Structure

Since the late 1940s, the Chinese Communist Party has led a sweeping social transformation in the Chinese countryside. Land reform was the first stage. Subsequently, the Party has had to address two major institutional issues: the extent of collectivization of ownership and work, and the size of the social unit designated the "basic accounting unit" (the unit that makes work assignments, organizes production and distribution of the agricultural product, and handles its own accounting with responsibility for profits and losses).

The chart and chronology that follow outline the evolution of the ownership system, the search for the appropriate basic accounting unit, and the institutions created at various levels of rural society (sub-village, village, and multi-village marketing area). The glossary describes the key units in the present system, as it stabilized after 1963. The following abbreviations are used: BAU = Basic Accounting Unit; MAT = Mutual Aid Team; LAPC = Lower Agricultural Producers' Cooperative; HAPC = Higher Agricultural Producers' Cooperative.

a) Chronology

Time / Level of Society	1949 Land Reform	1952 Land Reform Ends	1955	1957	1958	1959	1963
Supra Marketing Area					Commune = BAU		
Marketing Area							Commune - →
Large Village/ Village Cluster				HAPC = BAU	Production Brigade	- - - = BAU	- - - - - →
Small Village/ Village Section		MAT	LAPC = BAU	Production Team	- - - - -	- - - -	- - - - → = BAU
Household	= BAU	= BAU	LAPC Component	Team Component - -	- - - - - -	- - - -	- - - - →

1949: The household was the basic accounting unit (BAU). Land reform (1949-52) redistributed the land, ending tenancy and larger holdings and creating a system of roughly equal holdings among owner-cultivators. But the peasant household remained the BAU.

1952: Mutual Aid Teams (MAT) were introduced. Small groups of neighbors shared labor, tools, and draft animals on an informal, temporary or seasonal basis.

1955: Lower Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (LAPC) began to appear as the BAU. Members pooled land, labor, tools, and animals, and divided the agricultural product collectively, but retained ownership of their pooled assets and received shares that reflected the value of these assets.

1957: Higher Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives (HAPC) emerged as the BAU. These were "fully socialist" collectives in which all assets were pooled, ownership passed to the collective, and distribution was based on work. (LAPCs became "production teams" within the HAPCs responsible for organizing collective work.)

1958: People's communes -- a new administrative and economic unit larger in size than existing marketing systems -- were established as the BAU. HAPCs became "production brigades" within the commune.

1959: Because of difficulties in the early commune system, the brigade again became the BAU.

1963: The commune experiment was further modified: the production team was designated the BAU; communes were reduced in size to conform roughly to rural marketing areas; and "private plots" (collectivized in 1958) were restored for household use.

This system has essentially remained intact since the early 1960s. As the number of communes has declined (from 70,000 in the early 1960s to about 50,000 in the mid-1970s), the average population has grown. Experiments in the 1970s to make the production brigade the BAU have ended as the powers of teams and households have expanded.

b) Glossary

People's Commune. The basic-level government in the countryside and a local economic system of considerable importance, usually assumed to coincide with a rural marketing area. Figures suggest an average population of 15,000, but communes near large cities or in highly productive areas are known to be much larger. The commune management (formerly revolutionary) committee administers state plans and provides unified planning for its area. It manages hospitals or clinics, middle and vocational schools, rural industry, power plants and water conservation projects, large-scale commercial agriculture, tractor stations, radio stations, stores, and banks.

Production Brigade. Composed of 100-300 households. The intermediate level of the "three-level commune management" system, with responsibility for health stations, primary schools, small industry and handicrafts, and medium-scale undertakings such as animal husbandry, orchards, and fisheries. It is served by branches of state stores and banks.

Production Team. Composed of 20-40 households. The lowest level of management within the commune and usually the basic accounting unit. It is allowed to draw up its own production plans, allocate labor, and distribute the product to its member households on the basis of work contributed.

Household. An important social, residential, and consumption unit, normally pooling and budgeting the income of its members. Households probably average four to five persons, although they vary greatly in size and structure. They also farm "private plots."

5. Urban Neighborhood Organization

A combination of official government agencies and community organizations structure the life of city residents. Municipal administration extends down to the level of the "neighborhood" (7,000 to 14,000 households). Two levels of subordinate community organizations cover smaller areas. Guided by the city government, they mobilize the populace to pursue collective goals, preserve social order, and try to deal with problems at the lowest level possible.



Municipal or District Government. The administrative organs of basic-level government. In theory, government leaders are selected by the relevant congress; in practice, personnel decisions are made within the administration itself. Subordinate to municipal and district governments are a number of functional departments. Most important for urban neighborhoods are the public security department (the police) and the courts.

Street Office. A branch office of the city or district administration at the neighborhood level. Together with the police station, it extends state authority and activity into the neighborhood for more direct contact with citizens and mass organizations. It administers government programs and campaigns and may run street factories or neighborhood hospitals and clinics.

Residents' Committees and Residents' Small Groups. These organizations emerged in the early 1950s and have recently received new official support. The residents' committee has jurisdiction over large residential groupings (normally 100 to 600 households); residents' small groups deal with smaller ones (normally 15 to 40 households). Both operate under street office leadership and supervision. Each residents' small group chooses a leader, who is likely to serve as that group's representative on the residents' committee. Committees and small groups work together to set up working street committees, recruit activists and organize the masses to carry out activities that assist the government and benefit the community. Public security committees which work closely with the police, and mediation committees which try to settle civil disputes under the supervision of the courts, are common. Residential organizations also assume responsibilities for child care, public sanitation, maintenance of public facilities, propagation and implementation of campaigns, household services activities, and cultural enrichment programs.

6. Mental Illness in Shanghai (1970s)

	Rate	Number (derived)
In Urban Districts	7.86/1000	44,788
In Suburban Communes	6.67/1000	41,354
Municipality-wide	7.28/1000	87,360

Source: Beijing Review, June 23, 1980, pp. 24-25. Based on a 1972-78 survey among 4 million residents of Shanghai municipality.

7. Religions in China

Religion	Number of Adherents
Buddhism	100,000,000
Islam	10,000,000
Christianity	
Catholics	3,000,000
Protestants	700,000

Source: Chinese government estimates. The figure for Islam is for the late 1970s. Other figures refer to the situation prior to 1966, the start of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese Christian leaders believe the number of Christians has not declined, and may have even increased. How many Buddhists remain is unknown.

APPENDIX: ROMANIZATION CONVERSION TABLE

Below are the Chinese proper names whose pinyin romanization differs from previous systems used. Personal names are accompanied by their Wade-Giles equivalents. Place names appear with their Postal Atlas equivalent where it exists; for others the hyphenated Wade-Giles rendering is provided. For other terms, the Wade-Giles form is given.

Personal Names

Pinyin	Wade-Giles
Bo Yibo	Po Yi-po
Chen Duxiu	Ch'en Tu-hsiu
Chen Muhua	Ch'en Mu-hua
Chen Xilian	Ch'en Hsi-lien
Chen Yi	Ch'en Yi
Chen Yonggui	Ch'en Yung-kui
Chen Yun	Ch'en Yun
Deng Xiaoping	Teng Hsiao-p'ing
Deng Yingchao	Teng Ying-ch'ao
Du Yide	Tu Yi-te
Geng Biao	Keng Piao
Gu Mu	Ku Mu
Hai Rui	Hai Jui
Han Xianqu	Han Hsien-ch'u
Hong Xuezhi	Hung Hsueh-chih
Hu Qiaomu	Hu Ch'iao-mu
Hu Yaobang	Hu Yao-pang
Hua Guofeng	Hua Kuo-feng
Huang Huoqing	Huang Huo-ch'ing
Ji Dengkui	Chi Teng-k'ui
Ji Pengfei	Chi P'eng-fei
Jiang Hua	Chiang Hua
Jiang Qing	Chiang Ch'ing
Kang Shi'en	K'ang Shih-en
Li Dazhao	Li Ta-chao
Li Desheng	Li Te-sheng
Li Xiannian	Li Hsien-nien
Lin Biao	Lin Piao
Liu Bocheng	Liu Po-ch'eng
Liu Shaoqi	Liu Shao-ch'i
Mao Zedong	Mao Tse-tung
Ni Zhifu	Ni Chih-fu
Nie Fengzhi	Nieh Feng-chih
Nie Rongzhen	Nieh Jung-chen
Peng Chong	P'eng Ch'ung
Peng Dehuai	P'eng Te-huai
Peng Zhen	P'eng Chen
Qin Jiwei	Ch'in Chi-wei
Rao Shoukun	Jao Shou-k'un
Seypidin	Saifudin
Song Renqiong	Sung Jen-ch'iung
Su Yu	Su Yü
Wang Dongxing	Wang Tung-hsing
Wang Hongwen	Wang Hung-wen
Wang Pin	Wang Bin
Wang Renzhong	Wang Jen-chung
Wang Zhen	Wang Chen
Wei Guoqing	Wei Kuo-ch'ing
Wu De	Wu Te
Wu Kehua	Wu K'e-hua
Xiao Qianfu	Hsiao Ch'ien-fu
Xu Xiangqian	Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien
Xu Shiyou	Hsü Shih-yu
Yang Dezhi	Yang Te-chih
Yang Jingren	Yang Ching-jen
Yang Yong	Yang Yung
Ye Fei	Yeh Fei
Ye Jianying	Yeh Chien-ying
You Taizhong	Yu T'ai-chung
Yu Qiuli	Yü Ch'iu-li
Yuan Shikai	Yuan Shih-k'ai
Zhang Aiping	Chang Ai-p'ing
Zhang Caiqian	Chang Ts'ai-ch'ien
Zhang Chunqiao	Chang Ch'un-ch'iao
Zhang Tingfa	Chang T'ing-fa
Zhang Wenjin	Chang Wen-chin
Zhang Zixiu	Chang Tzu-hsiu
Zhao Ziyang	Chao Tzu-yang
Zhou Enlai	Chou En-lai
Zhu De	Chu Te

Place Names

Pinyin	Postal Atlas	Pinyin	Postal Atlas
Baotou	Paotow	Ji'nan	Tsinan
Beijing	Peking	Lanzhou	Lanchow
Changsha	Changsha	Liaodong	Liaotung
Chengdu	Chengtu	Ningxia	Ninghsia
Daqing	Ta-ch'ing	Qingdao	Tsingtao
Dazhai	Ta-chai	Qinghai	Tsinghai
Fengtian	Fengtien	Shaanxi	Shensi
Fujian	Fukien	Shandong	Shantung
Fuzhou	Fuchow	Shanxi	Shansi
Gansu	Kansu	Shijiazhuang	Shihchiachuang
Guangdong	Kwangtung	Sichuan	Szechwan
Guangxi	Kwangsi	Tianjin	Tientsin
Guangzhou	Canton	Tiaoyudai	T'iao-yu-tai
Guiyang	Kuiyang	Wuxi	Wu-hsi
Guizhou	Kuichow	Xi'an	Sian
Ha'erbin	Harbin	Xiangtan	Hsiang-t'an
Hangzhou	Hangchow	Xi'ning	Sining
Hebei	Hopei	Xinjiang	Sinkiang
Hefei	Hofei	Xizang	Tibet
Heilongjiang	Heilungkiang	Xuzhou	Hsüchow
Henan	Honan	Yan'an	Yenan
Hubei	Hupei	Yangzi	Yangtze
Huhehaote	Huhehot	Yinchaun	Yinchwan
Jiangsu	Kiangsu	Zhejiang	Chekiang
Jiangxi	Kiangsi	Zhengzhou	Chengchow
Jilin	Kirin		

Other

Pinyin	Wade-Giles
Bai	Pai
Dong	Tung
Hongqi	Hung-ch'i
pu'tonghua	p'u-t'ung-hua
Zhuang	Chuang

N.B. The apostrophe in pinyin indicates syllable division in words where there might be confusion as to the proper division. In Wade-Giles the apostrophe indicates aspiration of the preceding consonant.